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ABSTRACT 
 
Prescriptively, the requirement of fire safety protection systems for distribution substations is 
not provided in the compliance document for fire safety to the New Zealand Building Code. 
Therefore, the New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) has proposed a list of fire safety protection 
requirements for distribution substations in a letter, dated 10th July 2002. A review by Nyman 
[1], has considered the fire safety requirements proposed by the NZFS and discussed the 
issues with a number of fire engineers over the last three years. Nyman concerned that one of 
the requirements regarding the four hour fire separation between the distribution substation 
and the interior spaces of the building may not be necessary when considering the risk 
exposure to the building occupants in different situations, such as the involvement of the 
sprinkler systems and the use of transformers with a lower fire hazard.  
 
Fire resistance rating (FRR) typically means the time duration for which passive fire 
protection system, such as fire barriers, fire walls and other fire rated building elements, can 
maintain its integrity, insulation and stability in a standard fire endurance test. Based on the 
literature review and discussions with industry experts, it is found that failure of the passive 
fire protection system in a real fire exposure could potentially occur earlier than the time 
indicated by the fire resistance rating derived from the standard test depending on the 
characteristics of the actual fire (heat release rate, fire load density and fire location) and the 
characteristics of the fire compartment (its geometric, ventilation conditions, opening 
definition, building services and equipment). Hence, it is known that a higher level of fire 
safety, such as 4 hour fire rated construction and use of sprinkler system, may significantly 
improve the fire risk to health of safety of occupants in the building; however, they could 
never eliminate the risk. 
 
This report presents a fire engineering Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) on a transformer 
fire initiating in a distribution substation inside a high-rise residential and commercial mixed-
use building. It compares the fire safety protection requirements for distribution substations 
from the NZFS to other relevant documents worldwide: the regulatory standards in New 
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Zealand, Australia and United States of America, as well as the non-regulatory guidelines 
from other stakeholders, such as electrical engineering organisation, insurance companies and 
electricity providers. This report also examines the characteristics of historical data for 
transformer fires in distribution substations both in New Zealand and United States of 
America buildings. Reliability of active fire safety protection systems, such as smoke 
detection systems and sprinkler systems is reviewed in this research. 
 
Based on the data analysis results, a fire risk estimate is determined using an Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) for a total of 14 scenarios with different fire safety designs and transformer 
types for a distribution substation in a high-rise residential and commercial mixed-use 
building. In Scenario 1 to 10 scenarios, different combinations of fire safety systems are 
evaluated with the same type of transformer, Flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated 
transformer. In Scenario 11 to Scenario 14, two particular fire safety designs are selected as a 
baseline for the analysis of transformer types. Two types of transformer with a low fire hazard 
are used to replace the flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer in a distribution 
substation. These are less flammable liquid (silicone oil) insulated transformers and dry type 
(dry air) transformers. The entire fire risk estimate is determined using the software package 
@Risk4.5. 
 
The results from the event tree analysis are used in the cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit 
ratios are measured based on the reduced fire risk exposures to the building occupants, with 
respect to the investment costs of the alternative cases, from its respective base case.  
 
The outcomes of the assessment show that the proposed four hour fire separation between the 
distribution substations and the interior spaces of the building, when no sprinkler systems are 
provided, is not considered to be the most cost-effective alternative to the life safety of 
occupants, where the cost-benefit ratio of this scenario is ranked fifth. The most cost-effective 
alternative is found to be the scenario with 30 minute fire separation and sprinkler system 
installed. In addition to the findings, replacing a flammable liquid insulated transformer with 
a less flammable liquid insulated transformer or a dry type transformer is generally 
considered to be economical alternatives.  
 
From the QRA analysis, it is concluded that 3 hour fire separation is considered to be 
appropriate for distribution substations, containing a flammable liquid insulated transformer 
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and associated equipment, in non-sprinklered buildings. The fire ratings of the separation 
construction can be reduced to 30 minute FRR if sprinkler system is installed. This conclusion 
is also in agreement with the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA).  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
Abbreviations 
 
NZBC New Zealand Building Code 
NZFS New Zealand Fire Service 
FIRS Fire Incident Reporting System 
NFPA National Fire Protection Association 
BCA Building Code of Australia 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
EMV Equivalent Monetary Value 
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 
HV/ LV High Voltage/ Low Voltage 
AC Alternative current 
e.m.f Electromagnetic field 
PCB Polychlorinated biphenyl 
FHC Fire Hazard Category 
FRR Fire Resistance Rating 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
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Definitions 
 
Flash point Minimum temperature of a liquid at which it produces a flammable vapour  
Fire point 
The lowest temperature of a liquid at which it produces a sufficient vapour 
that can sustain a continuous flame 
Risk 
estimate 
Process used to assign values to the probability and consequences of a risk as 
defined by the international standard organisation ISO [2] 
Purpose 
group 
The classification of spaces within a building according to the activity for 
which the spaces are used as defined by the compliance document C/AS1 [3]. 
Fire hazard 
category 
The number (grade 1 to grade 4 in order of increasing severity) used to 
classify purpose groups or activities having a similar fire hazard, and where 
fully development fires are likely to have similar impact on the structural 
stability of the building as defined by the compliance document C/AS1 [3]. 
Firecell 
Any space including a group of contiguous spaces on the same or different 
levels within a building, which is enclosed by any combination of fire 
separations, external walls, roofs, and floors as defined by the compliance 
document C/AS1 [3]. 
Escape 
height 
The height between the floor level in the firecell being considered and the 
floor level of the required final exit which is the greatest vertical distance 
above or below that firecell as defined by the compliance document C/AS1 
[3].  
Distribution 
substation 
The substation that converts the voltage to a level adapted for household use 
(i.e. 415V in 3 phases or 240V in one phase), which contains transformers, 
power cables, electrical components and protection devices. In this research, 
distribution substation is defined as a substation containing a 750kVA 
transformer and the associated electrical equipment in a single room inside a 
residential and commercial mixed-use building. Noted that other articles may 
use the name of “transformer rooms” or “transformer vaults”. These are 
considered to be equivalent to distribution substations.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Impetus for Research  
 
Nowadays, electricity has become part of our life. Lighting, air conditioning, heating, 
computers, phones and cooking appliances, these power consumers can be easily found 
around us. According to the annual report 2004/ 2005 by Transpower New Zealand Ltd. [4], 
each New Zealand household uses about 8.12kWh per day in average and the power 
consumption is increasing each day.  
 
Generally, a 750kVA transformer can support about 60 to130 families or shops depending on 
the weather, the season, the number of occupants and the power usage of occupants. Due to 
the increasing population and higher loading density in New Zealand each year, more and 
more high-rise buildings are built. Typically, a high-rise building containing more than 40 
families or shops is likely to have their own transformer installed inside or adjoined to the 
building. In this case, the fire safety design of distribution substations may become an 
important issue to be addressed for minimising the potential risk to the members of public. 
 
Currently, three types of transformers are commonly used in the market. These include (1) dry 
type transformers; (2) less flammable liquid insulated transformers and (3) flammable liquid 
insulated transformers. Dry type transformers are transformers containing solid or gas 
insulation material. The fire hazard of dry type transformers is generally considered to be low 
compared to liquid type transformers due to the limited amount of combustible materials 
present in the transformers. For liquid type transformers, less flammable liquid is expected to 
have a high fire point (above 300°C) and hence, is more difficult to ignite (Refer to 
Section  4.8). From a fire hazard point of view, transformers insulated with flammable liquid 
is considered to have the highest fire hazard out of the three types of transformers due to the 
combustible liquid oil present and their relatively lower fire point (100°C to 170°C).  
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From the literature, it is understood that transformers are reliable. Failure of transformers as a 
result of fire is considered to be very unlikely. However, once transformer fire occurs, the 
potential impact on life safety, property and the environment would be very high. This 
phenomenon is recognised as a low frequency and high consequence event.  
 
Fire risk is generally measured based on the size of the fire loads in the designated area. In 
distribution substations, the fire load density may vary significantly depending on the types of 
transformers. For example, distribution substation consists of a dry type transformer is 
expected to have low fire load density, including power cables and electrical components, and 
hence, the fire risk in the distribution substation is low. On the other hand, when distribution 
substation consists of a liquid type transformer, high fire load density is expected due to the 
presence of transformer oils. In this case, the fire risk in the distribution substation is 
considered to be high. The ranking of different transformer types with respect to the fire risk 
is shown in ascending order as follow: 
 
1. Low risk:  Distribution substation consists of dry type (e.g. dry air) transformers 
and associated electrical equipment 
2. High risk:  Distribution substation consists of less flammable liquid (e.g. 
silicone oil) insulated transformers and associated electrical 
equipment 
3. Very high risk:  Distribution substation consists of flammable liquid (e.g. mineral oil) 
insulated transformers and associated electrical equipment 
 
In New Zealand, a compliance document (C/AS1) [3] for fire safety is developed by the 
Department of Building and Housing. This compliance document describes solutions for a 
wide range of buildings deemed to comply with the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) [5]. 
Fire safety design must be accepted by the Building Consent Authority if it satisfies the 
provisions of the compliance document. However, the requirements of fire safety protection 
systems for distribution substations are not stated in this compliance document. Therefore, the 
New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) has produced a list of fire safety protection requirements 
for distribution substations in a letter, dated 10th July 2002. The list of fire safety protection 
requirements for distribution substations proposed by the NZFS is shown in Appendix B.  
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A review by Nyman [1], has considered the fire safety requirements proposed by the NZFS 
and discussed the issues with a number of fire engineers over the last three years. Nyman has 
spoken to the NZFS and he found that the NZFS fire safety requirements for distribution 
substations are proposed on the basis of a review of their experience and knowledge 
accumulated over the years. However, there has been no significant study conducted in this 
fire safety requirement development. Nyman concerned that one of the requirements 
regarding the four hour fire separation between the distribution substation and the interior 
spaces of the building may not be necessary when considering the risk exposure to the 
building occupants in different situations, such as the involvement of the sprinkler systems 
and the use of transformers with a lower fire hazard. As a result, the correct approach to the 
fire safety design of distribution substations has become a subject of debate between 
stakeholders, without agreement on the appropriate level of fire protection for the risk posed 
by transformer installation.  
 
Indoor distribution substations are often recommended to be located on the ground level, 
providing direct access to outside the building, and to be fire separated from the interior 
spaces of the building. Internal access may or may not be provided depending on the site 
restriction. The potential hazard of transformer fires to the building occupants is that the fire 
and smoke may spread out of the distribution substation through the separation due to 
construction failure, improper sealed penetration or leakage through the doorway. Hence, it is 
important to control or confine the transformer fire and smoke to the room in order to provide 
sufficient time for the building occupants to escape safely without exposing them to any 
untenable conditions.  
 
This research conducts a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of a transformer fire in a 
typical New Zealand high-rise residential and commercial mixed-use building when different 
fire safety designs and transformer types are applied to the indoor distribution substation. At 
the conclusion of the report, a recommendation on the most appropriate fire protection 
systems for an indoor distribution substation will be provided as a result of the cost-benefit 
analysis. The cost-benefit ratios are measured based on the Equivalent Monetary Value of the 
fire risk reduction, with respect to the costs of the combinations of the fire safety systems for 
the alternative cases, from its respective base case. Note that in this research the cost-benefit 
analysis does not consider property damage, loss of business or environment damage due to 
transformer fires and the fire suppression.  
 4
1.2 Objective of this Research 
 
The primary objective of this research is to evaluate whether the four hour fire separation 
between distribution substations and the interior spaces of the building proposed by the NZFS 
is a cost-effective solution to safeguard occupants from injury or illness in the event of a 
transformer fire in a typical New Zealand high-rise building. The following work statements 
were formulated to accomplish this objective: 
 
• Examine and summarise the national and international regulation standards and non-
regulation guidelines for the fire safety design of distribution substations;  
• Study the fundamental theory of transformers and the like, such as transformer failure 
protection systems, dielectric fields, etc; 
• Examine and summarise the characteristics of historical incidents and data for 
transformer fires in distribution substations; 
• Examine and summarise the reliability of active fire protection systems, such as 
sprinkler systems and smoke detection systems; 
• Analyses and estimate the transformer fire risks in different scenarios using 
Quantitative Risk Analysis, such as Event Tree Analysis; 
• Analyses and estimate any cost benefit of the alternative fire safety designs; 
• Propose appropriate fire safety designs of distribution substations in a typical New 
Zealand high-rise residential and commercial mixed-use building. 
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1.3 Scope of this Research 
 
The scope of this research is to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed fire 
safety design solutions to the building occupants’ safety only. Assumptions and limitations 
made for this research are illustrated as follow: 
 
General:   
 
• Deflagration and detonation may cause room-boundary failure. However, it is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
• Property damage, loss of business or environment damage due to transformer fires and 
the fire suppression is not a subject of this study.  
• Transformers are assumed to be the first item ignited in the distribution substation.  
• Where uncertainties are not considered explicitly, conservative assumptions are made.  
 
Source of data :  
 
• Accuracy of data may significantly affect the output of this assessment. Fire incident 
data recorded to the Fire Incident Reporting System (FIRS) between 2000 and 2006 is 
provided from the NZFS and is used for the assessment in this research. Uncertainty 
may be introduced to this data during data collection, manipulation and the application 
of the data 
• Due to the lack of information on the reliability of sprinkler systems and smoke 
detection systems specifically for distribution substations, reliability of sprinkler 
systems and smoke detection systems for general buildings has been used instead.  
• An appropriately designed sprinkler system should be able to provide early fire 
suppression in cases of a fire and reduce the fire size and growth rate. Therefore, this 
assessment assumes a transformer fire is to be controlled and confined in the room 
once the sprinkler system is activated. 
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1.4 Report Outline 
 
This report consists of eight chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 provides a background study, which includes a brief description of the power 
network system and the fundamental theory of transformer systems. It also summarises the 
potential failure of transformers and the failure of fire safety protection systems. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature with respect to the subject of this research. The 
national and international regulation standards and non-regulation guidelines for the fire 
safety design of distribution substations are summarised.  A review of other relevant articles 
and papers is also included in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 provides the historical data analysis for distribution substation transformer fires. 
This chapter also discusses the reliability of sprinkler systems and smoke detection systems.  
 
Chapter 5 provides a fault tree analysis of transformer fire.  
 
Chapter 6 provides a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) for a transformer fire initiating in a 
distribution substation. This includes the methodology of the analysis, event tree analysis and 
discussion of the results.  
 
Chapter 7 provides a cost-benefit analysis of the risk reduction alternatives. This includes the 
methodology of the analysis, cost-benefit analysis and discussion of the results. The initial 
costs and annual costs of sprinkler systems, different types of transformers and the FRR 
construction are also provided.  
 
Chapter 8 provides the conclusions and findings of the research. Recommendations and future 
work are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Electrical Distribution  
 
2.1.1 Power Generation 
 
In New Zealand, power is primarily generated from three energy sources. These are (1) Hydro; 
(2) Thermal (natural gas and coal fired) and (3) Geothermal power generation. Hydro-power 
is the dominant source of electricity generation in New Zealand. Depending on the weather 
conditions, typically 60% to 70% of all electricity is produced by hydro power generation, 
about 24% by thermal (natural gas and coal fired) stations and the rest by geothermal stations 
as mentioned by Contact Energy Ltd. [6], Genesis Energy Ltd. [7] and  Meridian Energy Ltd. 
[8]. In addition to the power generation, some renewable resources also are used to produce a 
small amount of power, such as wind power generation.  
 
 
2.1.2 Electric Power Transmission  
 
Electric power is normally generated in a power station at 11 to 25kV. In order for the 
transmission lines to carry the electricity efficiently over long distances, the low generator 
voltage is increased to a higher transmission voltage by a step-up transformer, i.e. 400kV, 
220kV or 110kV as necessary. Supported by tall metal towers, lines transporting these 
voltages can run into hundreds of kilometres. The grid voltage is then reduced to a sub-
transmission voltage, typically 33kV or 66kV, in terminal stations (known as Power 
substations).  
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Sub-transmission lines supply power from terminal stations to large industrial customers and 
other lower voltage terminal stations, where the voltage is stepped down to 11kV for load 
points through a distribution network lines. Finally, the transmission voltage is reduced to the 
level adapted for household use, i.e. 415V (3-phase) or 240V (1-phase) at distribution 
substations adjacent to the residential, commercial and small to medium industrial customers. 
Figure  2-1 shows a typical electrical network system, in which power is transformed to the 
voltages most suitable for the different parts of the system. 
 
 
 
Figure  2-1: Typical electrical power network 
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2.2 Distribution Substation 
 
Distribution substations are a system of transformers, meters, and control and protection 
devices. Although the system design may be different from one to another, the basic principle 
for the operation of distribution substations should be similar. In order to control, protect and 
monitor the system, there is usually a set of switchgears and meters on both ends of the 
transformer which includes a control board, High Voltage (HV) switchgear and Low Voltage 
(LV) switchgear. Other equipment, such as lightning arrestors and power cables, will be 
placed together within a typical distribution substation.  
 
Depending on site specific constraints, distribution substations may be located outdoor; either 
fully exposed or in an enclosure, or in a room inside a building. A transformer fire in a 
residential and commercial mixed-use building may potentially expose a larger amount of 
people compared to an outdoor transformer fire. Therefore, this research will primarily focus 
on a transformer fire in a room inside a building. The regulation standards and non-regulation 
guidelines for the fire safety design of distribution substations are discussed in Section  1.1.  
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2.3 Overview of Transformers  
 
2.3.1 General Construction of Transformers 
 
The major components of a transformer are the coils (windings), the core, the tank or casing, 
the radiator, and the bushings as shown in Figure  2-2. Generally, transformer coils are made 
of copper because it has a lower resistance and is more efficient compared to other metals. 
Each winding is wrapped with an insulating material such as paper (the interturn insulation). 
The primary winding is usually wound around the transformer core and the secondary 
winding is then wound on top of the primary winding. Between each layer of the windings, 
another layer of insulating material is wrapped to provide extra insulation between the 
windings. (The information in this section is from Lin [9], Gibbs [10], Myers [11], Heathcote 
[12] and Zalosh [13]).  
 
The major transformer components are briefly described below:  
 
1) Core is a ferromagnetic material (commonly soft iron or laminated steel) that provides 
a path of high magnetic permeability from the primary circuit to the secondary circuit.  
2) Windings allow a secondary voltage to be induced in the secondary circuit from the 
alternating current (AC) voltage in the primary circuit. The change in magnetic field in 
the transformer core caused by applying primary AC voltage causes an induced 
magnetic field and, hence, voltage on the secondary winding. 
3) Tank or casing, which is usually a reinforced rectangular structure in these 
transformers, contains the dielectric material, the core and the windings.  
4) Dielectric material is a substance that is a poor conductor of electricity but an efficient 
supporter of electrostatic fields. It can be fluid oils, dry solids or gases (see also 
section  2.3.3) 
5) The expansion tank or conservator containing dry air or dry inert gas is maintained 
above the fluid level.  
6) Bushing is an insulating structure that provides a conducting path though its centre, its 
primary function is to insulate the entrance for an energised conductor into the tank.  
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7) Pressboard barriers, between the coils and between the coils and core, are installed to 
increase the dielectric integrity of the transformer.  
8) The tap changer is a connection point along a transformer winding that allows the 
number of turns to be selected, or so-called voltage regulating device.  
9) The radiator provides a heat transfer path to dissipate the internal heat generated in the 
transformer.  
10) The pressure relief device is used to protect the tank against excessive pressure release 
inside a transformer tank. (Refer to Section 2.3.4) 
 
Usually, a nameplate with the transformer details would be attached to a side of the tank. It 
helps in identifying the primary coil and the secondary coil ratings, its configuration, volume 
of oil and the weight. Photographs of transformer and associated facilities taken from site 
visits to two distribution substations in Christchurch, New Zealand are shown in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Figure  2-2: Schematic drawing of typical transformer 
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2.3.2 Transformer Fundamental Theory 
 
Transformers are electromagnetic devices that change values of voltage and current without 
changing the frequency and the power. By controlling the number of windings, or tapping into 
the windings, the output voltage can be adjusted to the design level of voltage.  
 
In a typical transformer, since all fluxes link both coils, the instantaneous induced 
electromagnetic fields (e.m.f) and the voltage in the various windings must be directly 
proportional to the numbers of turns, hence,  
 
Equation  2-1: 
2
1
2
1
||
||
N
N
V
V ≈  
 
where V1 is the primary winding voltage (v) 
 V2 is the secondary winding voltage (v) 
 N1 is the number of turns in the primary winding 
 N2 is the number of turns in the secondary winding 
 
On the other hand, the number of turns between the primary and the secondary windings is 
inversely proportional to the current in the various windings; hence, 
 
Equation  2-2: 
2
1
1
2
||
||
N
N
I
I ≈  
 
where I1 is the primary winding current (A) 
 I2 is the secondary winding current (A) 
 
As a result of substituting Equation  2-2 into Equation  2-1, an inverse relationship is found 
between the voltage ratio and the current ratio. 
 
Equation  2-3: 
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V ≈  
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Connelly [14] states that at normal power frequencies of 25 to 100 cycles, it is necessary to 
introduce some factors which may influence the voltage-current relationship. These factors 
may be one of the followings: 
 
• The winding resistance – I2R losses in either the primary or secondary coil;  
• Energy dissipation from hysteresis and eddy current in the core; 
• Leakage inductance;  
• Proximity effect and skin effect in windings; 
• Electromagnetic radiation; and 
• Effects of temperature  
 
The abovementioned factors are the fundamental theory of the voltage and current 
transformation. However, transformer operation can be an individual topic. The detail design 
of transformers is beyond the scope of this thesis and, therefore, is not provided. The details 
on the principle of transformers can be found in Heathcote [12], Connelly [14], Blume [15], 
Bean [16] and Mathew [17]. 
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2.3.3 Transformer Type  
 
Transformers are designed and built for both indoor and outdoor applications. Depending on 
the authority, they are often classified in terms of its power rating or its cooling medium 
(dielectric material).  
 
Dielectric material is a poor conductor of electricity. The purpose of using dielectric material 
is to insulate the current flow between the wires or the metals, preventing an unwanted 
conduction. In this research, a transformer power rating of 750kW is specified for the 
assessment. The transformer type is therefore, classified in terms of the dielectric material 
type rather than its power rating. Practically, there are four major types of dielectric material 
as follows: 
 
• Flammable liquid (such as mineral oil) 
• Less flammable liquid (fire point > 300°C, such as silicone oil and vegetable oil) 
• Non-flammable liquid (such as Askarels, which is a generic name for Chlorinated 
Hydrocarbon insulating liquids) 
• Insulating solids and gases (such as dry air) 
 
Josken [18] states that mineral oil is a combustible material and has been the most widely 
used fluid for electrical insulation and heat transfer in electrical equipment for more than 100 
years. The popularity of mineral transformer oil is due to its availability and its relatively low 
cost, as well as being an excellent dielectric and cooling medium. However, Oommen [19] 
has found that mineral oil has undesirable characteristics, such as a low fire point (110°C to 
185°C), environmental concerns and degradation of insulation paper. Hence, many other 
types of dielectric material have been developed as substitutes for mineral oils.  
 
Hallerberg [20] and Mcshane [21] state that during the 1920s, a family of liquids, the so-
called Askarels, were developed to solve the combustibility problem of mineral oil. However, 
their use was discontinued in the late 1970s due to the fact that Askarels are commonly 
composed of 60% to 70% polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s), which are now considered to be 
highly toxic and are an environmentally hazardous product. It is also recognised that the 
production and commercialisation of PCB’s was officially banned in 1977 by the U.S 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [22]. As a result, any transformers containing 
Askarels have been refilled with other dielectric materials. Bracco [23] reports that some 
existing liquid type transformers may still contain PCB’s at various concentrations, usually 
less than 10 parts per million (ppm), and hence, these units are often called Askarel insulated 
transformers. Some typical trade names for Askarel are as follows (More information of 
Askarel (PCB) transformer can be found in Myers [11]). 
 
• Asbestol • Aceclor • Apirolio • Aroclor 
• Bakola 131 • Chlorextol • Chlorophon • Diaclor 
• Dycanol • Elemex • Eucarel • Hyvol 
• Inerteen • Kanechlor • No-flamol • Pyralene 
• Pyroclor • Saf-T-Kuhl • Soviol/Sovol/Solvol • Ugilect 
 
Since the use of Askarel is prohibited, other high fire point liquids (also known as less 
flammable liquids) have been developed as the replacement fluids, such as polydimethyl-
siloxane (PDMS or silicone oils), polyalphaolefins (PAO), High Molecular Weight 
Hydrocarbon (HMWH), Vegetable oil, etc. These dielectric fluids are formulated to withstand 
fairly large amounts of electrical arcing and generally have a higher fire or flash point in 
comparison to mineral oils. As defined by Technologies [24] and McCormick [25], less 
flammable liquids must have a minimum fire point of 300°C. More details about the 
properties of transformer dielectric fluids can be found in Section  4.8.  
 
Dry type transformers are transformers where the core and windings are not immersed in an 
insulating liquid, but in either an inert gas or solid. Dry type transformers are usually larger 
and hotter than the liquid filled transformers with the same power rating. Due to the cost 
issues, dry type transformers are more frequently used in distribution substations than the 
power or terminal stations. In most gas insulated transformers, Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6) gas 
or dry air, is often used as a cooling medium since it has an excellent dielectric strength, 
chemical stability, thermal stability and non-flammability as mentioned in Toda [26].  
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2.3.4 Potential Transformer Problems and Protections 
 
Potential problems 
 
As Gajic [27] stated, 70% to 80% of the total number of transformer failures are due to 
internal winding insulation failure. Winding insulation faults may cause a short circuit. Even 
if it occurs at a very small point, the energy released at that point can be large within a short 
time period. The energy can be large enough to melt the coils and to char or ignite the 
insulating material. In such cases, if the protective devices are effective, the damage can be 
confined to the object of origin; otherwise, a more serious and costly impact, such as fire and 
explosion, may result as mentioned in Hattangadi [28].  The cause of transformer failures can 
be classified as one of the following:  
 
• Failure due to defects in internal connections and terminals   
• Failure due to interturn insulation in the main windings 
• Failure of the main insulation between the windings and the transformer tank 
 
These failures are discussed in detail below:  
 
Failure due to defects in internal connections and terminals: 
As a result of bad connections, the contact resistance will be increased. Since the heat 
developed in the joint between conductors is directly proportional to the product of the square 
of the current and the contact resistance, the temperature of the conductors will also be 
increased if this occurs. A circle of increasing temperature and increasing contact power loss 
is established. Although there is equipment developed to protect transformers against external 
surge voltage, to prevent overloading or to monitor the conditions of the transformer oil, it is 
not practicable to detect the local overheating at defective internal connectors and terminals. 
When such defects occur, failure of the transformer is almost certain. Hence, the only way of 
preventing this failure from occurring is by taking certain precautions in the design, 
manufacture and installation of the transformer.  
 
 17
 
Failure due to interturn insulation in the main windings: 
Bartley [29] states that interturn insulation faults, such as the paper wrapping, are most likely 
as a result of the degradation due to thermal, electrical and mechanical stress or moisture. The 
main cause for the interturn insulation failure (insulation breakdown) is due to damage to the 
paper insulation or to the loose spacers dropping out. Such defects may occur due to one of 
the following reasons: 
 
• Physical damage caused by constant abrasion with the flowing oil and the substances 
in the fluid 
• Damage caused by thermal damage due to excessive oil temperature 
• Degradation of insulation material properties during exposure to moisture (absorbed 
from oils) 
• Paper insulated conductors that have sharp edges on the corners may get shorted 
during service under the effect of vibration, thermal expansion and contraction, 
movements caused by electromagnetic force or even the static assembly force between 
the coils 
 
Degradation or damage of interturn insulation causes an insulation breakdown between turns 
or layers. As a result of insulation breakdown, a high-impedance low-current fault develops in 
the windings. At this point, if the protection systems do not quickly detect the fault and isolate 
the transformer from the power grid immediately, the fault current will continuously increase 
due to decreasing coil impedance and the constant power supply (P = IR2). The high current 
will result in an electrical breakdown in the transformer oil and so-called arcing. The arc 
decomposes and vaporises the oils and causes the formation of gas bubbles. These gas 
bubbles will cause the liquid pressure in the confined tank to increase. If the rate of pressure 
increase exceeds the capability of the pressure relief device and other protection devices are 
not properly functioning, overpressure may rupture the tank. The escaping gas and liquids 
may ignite and fire may result.   
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Failure of the main insulation between the windings and the transformer tank: 
There are two main insulation layers between the windings and the transformer tank which 
are the mass of the dielectric fluid and the liquid impregnated paper-board laminates. The 
failure of the main insulation can be avoided by providing an adequate clearance between the 
windings and the transformer tank. Such defects are rare due to the insulation being inspected 
during the regular maintenance process and any obstructions or failures can be easily verified 
visually.  
 
Hence, a fault tree of transformer failure has been developed as illustrated in Figure  2-3. 
 
 
Figure  2-3: Fault tree for the transformer fault 
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Furthermore, transformer ageing has not been classified as the cause of failure above. 
However, it should be noted that the ageing of the insulation reduces both the mechanical and 
dielectric-withstand strength. William H. Bartley, who is a senior member of Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), has been looking into this particular issue since 
2000. Some of his published work is reviewed in Section  4.6.1. 
 
Electrical Protections 
 
Transformers are reliable devices which have low electrical failure rates. Moss [30] states that 
the failure rate of distribution transformers is 0.02 to 16 failures per 106 operation hours, 
which is about 180 x 10-6 to 140 x 10-3 failures per year. However, transformer faults are 
considered as a low frequency and high consequence events, explosion and fire may cause 
catastrophic damage to property and high numbers of casualties. Depending on the required 
level of safety and the economic factors, the level of transformer protection may be varied. 
The general electrical devices used to protect against transformer faults are listed below: 
 
1) Circuit breaker or fuses: provides protection for both internal and external faults and 
limitation of fault current level 
2) Thermal device (thermal relay): monitors the liquid (windings) temperature and 
operates when it exceeds a predetermined value 
3) Overcurrent relay: operates when there is a short circuit between phases or between 
phase and ground.  
4) Liquid level gauge: measures the insulating liquid level in the tank 
5) Differential relay: operates when the difference between the primary and secondary 
side current is over the predetermined value.  
6) Lightning arresters: prevents high voltage surges in the system 
7) Pressure relief device: reduces excessive pressure created by arcing 
8) Sudden pressure relay: operates when it detects the accumulation of pressure in the 
tank 
9) Gas and oil actuated (Buchholz) relay: operates when it detects the accumulation of 
gas in the tank 
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CHAPTER 3 REVIEW OF CODES AND STANDARDS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter studies the prescriptive fire safety solutions for distribution substations in 
different countries, such as the acceptable solution (C/AS1) in New Zealand, the Building 
Code of Australia (BCA) and the NFPA in U.S. In addition to the safety requirements, non-
regulation guidelines from other stakeholders, such as fire service, electrical engineering 
organisation, insurance companies and electricity providers, are also reviewed in this section.  
 
The main purpose of this standards and guidelines review section is to summarise the fire 
safety requirements for distribution substations recommended by different authorities and 
industries and to compare them with the requirements proposed by the NZFS. It should be 
noted that due to the lack of information provided by these stakeholders, the detail studies on 
the fundamental concepts and theoretical foundations of these requirements are not provided 
in this research.  
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3.2 New Zealand Building Regulations 1992 and Amendments 
 
As the regulatory objective, all buildings in New Zealand must comply with the New Zealand 
Building Code (NZBC), which is a schedule to the Building Regulations 1992 and the 
subsequent amendments [5]. The NZBC is a performance based code which has mandatory 
provisions to comply with The Building Act 2004. Out of the 37 performance clauses in the 
Building Regulations, there are four relevant clauses to the fire safety in buildings. These are: 
 
? C1 - “Outbreak of Fire”,  
? C2 – “Means of Escape”,  
? C3 – “Spread of Fire” and  
? C4 – “Structural Stability during Fire”. 
 
A compliance document (C/AS1) [3] is developed by the Department of Building and 
Housing. It is one way to satisfy the performance requirements of the NZBC. However, the 
fire safety design of distribution substations is not clearly specified in the C/AS1. Relevant 
clauses to the model building as defined in Section  7.2 are discussed below: 
 
Purpose groups and Fire Hazard Category (FHC)  
Residential apartment, which is a space for sleeping, is defined as being purpose group SR 
and the FHC is one as per Table 2.1 of the C/AS1. Retail shop, which is a space for selling 
goods, is defined as being purpose group CM and the FHC is two as per Table 2.1 of the 
C/AS1.  
 
Vector Ltd [31] states that distribution substations shall be considered as a space for providing 
intermittently used support functions, known as purpose group ID within the C/AS1. 
According to the Fire Engineering Design Guide [32], a typical power station and transformer 
winding occupancy has a fire load of 600MJ/m2. This fire load density is equivalent to FHC 
of two as described in the C/AS1 Clause 2.1.3.  
 
Fire safety precautions 
The relevant clauses of the C/AS1 are listed below: 
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Clause 4.5.11– “Where any upper floor contains a sleeping purpose group, all floors below 
shall have an appropriate alarm system which shall activate alerting devices in all sleeping 
areas within the building. …For SR purpose group where any lower floor contains a purpose 
group other than SR, all lower floors shall have heat or smoke detectors or sprinklers (Types 
3, 4 or 6).” (See below for descriptions of the fire safety precautions types) 
 
Clause 6.2.1 – “Where adjacent firecells on the same floor level are permitted by Table 4.1 to 
have a F rating of F0, they shall be fire separated from one another. The fire separations 
shall have a FRR of no less than that required by Part 6 or Part 7 (for a specific purpose 
group or situation), or 30/30/30, whichever is the greater.” 
 
Clause 6.8.1 – “Purpose Groups SR – Every household unit in purpose group SR shall be a 
single firecell separated from every other firecell by fire separations having a FRR derived 
from the F rating in Table 4.1/5, or 30/30/30, whichever is the greater.” 
Clauses 6.11.1 –“Firecells in which ID is the primary purpose group, shall meet the same fire 
safety precautions as specified in Table 4.1 for purpose group WM, and shall be separated 
from adjacent firecells by fire separations having a FRR of no less than 60/60/60.” (Purpose 
group WM is a spaces used for working business or storage with medium fire load and 
slow/medium/fast fire growth rates). 
 
Clause 6.11.4 –“Where plant is contained in a building separated by 3.0 m or more from any 
adjacent building, only Paragraph 6.11.3 c) shall apply.” 
 
Clause 6.11.3 (c) –“Its floor level no lower than the ground level outside the external wall if 
gas is the energy source.” (It should be noted that substation is a plant room but the 
flammable liquid is not used as an energy source. Hence, Clause 6.11.3 (a) and (b) is not 
applicable.) 
 
Depending on the purpose group, the FHC, the escape height and the occupant load, the fire 
safety precautions for the firecell can be found from Table 4.1 of the C/AS1. Table  3-1 shows 
the fire safety precautions for purpose group SR, CM and WM (the same fire safety 
precautions are required for purpose group ID as per Clause 6.11.1 of the C/AS1).  
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Table  3-1: Fire safety precautions from Table 4.1 of the C/AS1 
Firecell Residential apartment levels Retail shops Distribution substation 
Purpose group SR CM WM (ID) 
FHC 1 2 2 
Escape height 10m - 25m 0m 0m 
Occupant load Less than 40 occupants Less than 100 occupants Less than 100 occupants
FRR of 45/45/45 
(Table 4.1/5 & Clause 6.8.1)
FRR of 30/30/30 
(Table 4.1/1 & Clause 6.2.1)
FRR of 60/60/60 
(Clause 6.11.1) 
Type 4 (Table 4.1/5) Type 3, 4 or 6 (Clause 4.5.11) 
Type 3, 4 or 6 
(Clause 4.5.11) 
Type 14 (Table 4.1/5) Type 2 (Table 4.1/1) Type 3 (Table 4.1/1) 
Type 16 (Table 4.1/5) Type 18 (Table 4.1/1) Type 16 (Table 4.1/1) 
Fire Safety 
Precaution 
Type 18 (Table 4.1/5)  Type 18 (Table 4.1/1) 
Where  Type 2 = Manual fire alarm system 
 Type 3 = Automatic fire alarm system with heat detectors and manual call point 
 Type 4 = Automatic fire alarm system with smoke detectors and manual call point 
 Type 6 = Automatic fire sprinkler system with manual call point 
 Type 14 = Fire hose reel 
 Type 16 = Emergency lighting in exitways 
 Type 18 = Fire hydrant system 
 
3.3 New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) Recommendation 
 
An interpretation of distribution substation fire protection requirements was made by the 
NZFS in a letter, dated 10th July 2002. This letter is reproduced in Appendix B. Issue two 
states that the construction separation between the distribution substation and the interior 
spaces of the building, including ceiling and floor, shall have FRR construction of no less 
than four hours. It goes on to state that distribution substations, the exterior access shall have 
a minimum clear opening area of 800 x 2100mm wherever possible and that if the building is 
a non-sprinklered building, no sprinkler system is required in the distribution substation but 
heat detectors are recommended. 
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3.4 New Zealand Automatic Fire Sprinkler Standard 
 
New Zealand Automatic Fire Sprinkler Standard NZS 4541:2003 [33] is the standard for the 
installation of sprinkler systems in New Zealand. As specified in Clause 203.5.2, sprinkler 
systems are required for liquid type transformers within building. For liquid type transformers, 
sprinkler systems are required to provide a design density of discharge of at least 10 mm/min 
over all transformer surfaces. From Table 2.1 of NZS 4541:2003, dry type transformers may 
fall into an ordinary hazard group one or two (OH1 & OH2) based upon an occupancy 
classification of either industrial or commercial plant rooms or electricity generation and 
distribution. The required sprinkler systems design density of discharge for dry type 
transformer is 5mm/min at minimum.  
 
3.5 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is an international organisation (U.S. based) 
established in 1895. It has developed a series of recommendations or standards providing 
design advice on fire, electrical and life safety to the public. The recommendations, codes and 
standards produced by the NFPA that may apply to transformer fire protection and associated 
electrical facilities are shown below: 
 
• NFPA 70,  National Electrical Code (NEC): Article 450-Transformers and Transformer 
Vaults 2005 Edition 
• NFPA 850, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants 
and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations 2005 Edition 
• NFPA 13,  Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler systems 2002 Edition 
• NFPA 15,  Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection 2001 Edition  
• NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Bases Fire 
Protection System 2002 Edition 
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 2003 Edition 
• NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction 2006 Edition  
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NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (NEC) [34] 
 
The National Electrical Code (NEC) is a safety standard for the installation process of 
electrical systems. The fire safety design for different types of transformers, such as dry type, 
less flammable liquid insulated, non-flammable liquid insulated, Askarel insulated and oil 
insulated transformer, are covered in Article 450. The relevant clauses in relation to 
distribution substations are extracted from this standard and re-written as follow: 
 
Clause 450-21 b) & c) Dry type transformers installed indoors  
Individual dry type transformer of more than 112.5kVA shall be installed in a transformer 
room (distribution substation) of fire resistant construction with a minimum FRR of 1 hour. 
For dry type transformer up to 35,000 volts, no transformer vault is required, where the 
characteristic of the transformer vault are specified in part 3 of Article 450.  
 
Transformer Vault: Part 3 of Article 450 states that the minimum fire resistance for the 
transformer vault construction, such as walls, roof, floor and doorway, should have a FRR of 
no less than 3 hour or it can be reduced to 1 hour FRR if an automatic sprinkler suppression 
system, water spray, carbon dioxide or halon, is installed. In addition to the requirements, 
only qualified persons are allowed to access the transformer vault. Ventilation systems are 
required in this case, in which an automatic closing fire damper shall also be included. If 
natural ventilation is used, the combined net area of all ventilating openings shall be not less 
than 1900mm2 per kVA of transformer capacity in service (1.425m2 for a 750kVA 
transformer). Practically, a concrete wall with overall thickness of 211mm and 311mm shall 
have 3-hour and 4-hour fire resistance, respectively. Note that transformer vault in the NEC 
may imply they are distribution substations as defined in this research. 
 
Clause 450-23) Less flammable liquid insulated transformers installed indoors: 
If the transformer is up to 35,000 volts, no transformer vault is required. Indoor installations 
shall be permitted with one of the following cases: (Note that less flammable liquid means the 
liquid has a fire point of not less than 300°C) 
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Case 1: • In Type I and Type II buildings  
o As stated in Clause 4.3 of NFPA 220 [35], both Type I and 
Type II building structural components are non-combustible or 
limited combustible materials. The difference between Type I 
and Type 2 building is that the entire construction of Type I 
building must have fire rating of no less than 90 minutes 
except the interior and exterior non-load bearing walls, while 
Type II construction may not have any FRR construction.  
• In areas which no combustible materials are stored;  
• Provided a liquid confinement area; 
Case 2: • Provided with an automatic fire extinguishing system 
• Provided a liquid confinement area 
Case 3: • In accordance with Clause 450.26 as described below (Installed in a 
transformer vault). 
 
 
Clause 450-24) Non-flammable liquid insulated transformers installed indoors: 
If the transformer is up to 35,000 volt, no transformer vault is required but a liquid 
confinement area and a pressure relief vent shall be provided.  
 
Clause 450-25) Askarel insulated (PCB contaminated) transformers installed indoors: 
If the transformer is up to 35,000 volt, no transformer vault is required. Pressure relief vent 
should be provided for transformer rated over 25kVA. 
 
Clause 450-26) Oil insulated transformers installed indoors 
This type of transformers should be installed in a transformer vault. 
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NFPA 850 Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High 
Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations [36] 
 
Clause 5.2.5 of the NFPA 850 states the design criteria regarding the fire protection systems 
for distribution substations. These recommendations are in relation to Clauses 450-26 of 
NFPA 70. For oil insulated transformers containing more than 379 L of oil, a construction 
having a FRR of no less than 3 hour shall be used for the transformer vaults or it can be 
reduced to 1 hour FRR if a sprinkler system is installed. 
 
Dry type transformers are suggested for indoor installations under this document. Openings in 
fire barriers are mentioned in Clause 5.2.2, it states that “All openings in fire barriers should 
be provided with fire door assemblies, fire dampers, through penetration seals (fire stops), or 
other approved means having a fire protection rating consistent with the designated fire 
resistance rating of the barrier…”. Moreover, in an area containing switchgears and relays, 
smoke detectors are required under Clause 7.8.4.  
 
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code [37] 
 
According to Clause 3.3.25 of NFPA 30, liquids can be classified based on their flash points 
as shown in Table  3-2. Additionally, the liquid classification scheme from the Hazardous 
Waste (Wales) Regulations 2005 [38] is also included in the table for comparative purpose. 
Note that typical mineral oil have the lowest flash point at 100°C; it is therefore considered as 
a Class III combustible liquid. 
 
Table  3-2: NFPA/Wales regulations liquid classification scheme 
 Liquid classification Flash point range 
NFPA - Class I Flammable liquid < 37.8°C 
NFPA - Class II Combustible liquid > 37.8°C and < 60°C 
NFPA - Class III Combustible liquid > 60°C 
      
Wales regulation Highly Flammable liquid < 21°C 
Wales regulation Flammable liquid > 21°C and < 55°C 
 
 
 
 28
 
NFPA 13 The Installation of Sprinkler systems [39] / NFPA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems 
for Fire Protection [40] / NFPA 25 Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Bases Fire 
Protection System [41] 
 
According to Clause 5.4 and Clause 13.31.1 of NFPA 13, distribution substations shall be 
categorised as Extra Hazard Group 2 occupancy. For a mineral oil insulated transformer, 
automatic sprinkler suppression systems with discharge density of 10.2mm/min covering area 
up to 325m2 are required. The installation of nozzles is required in NFPA 15 to cover areas 
where spills may travel or accumulate. NFPA 25 provides detailed criteria to be followed 
when fire protection systems are damaged.  
 
3.6 Building Code of Australia (BCA) 
 
The BCA is a prescriptive standard in Australia. In clause C.2.13 (a) and (b) of the BCA, an 
electricity substation and a main switchboard located within a building (known as an 
distribution substation in this research) must –  
 
(i) be separated from any other part of the building by construction having a fire 
resistance level of not less than 120/120/120 and; 
(ii) have any doorway in that construction protected with a self-closing fire door 
having a fire resistance level of not less than -/120/30. 
 
In the Building Code of Australia, the fire safety precaution is dependent on the type of 
building, and the escape height and floor area of the compartment. In cases where distribution 
substation is installed in a high-rise residential and commercial mixed-use building having an 
escape height of less than 25m and the floor area of less than 2,000m2, an automatic smoke 
detection and alarm systems and sprinkler systems are required. 
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3.7 Non-Regulation Fire Protection Guidelines for Distribution 
Substation 
 
Many stakeholders, such as electrical engineering organisation, insurance companies and 
electricity providers, have developed their own guidelines applicable to the fire protection of 
distribution substations. These guidelines have been widely used by many industries as 
references to select the fire protection systems for distribution substations. Four guidelines are 
examined in this research. Note that as required by the electricity providers for commercial 
purposes, the names of the companies are not given in this research. 
 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
 
IEEE is an international organization that develops standards for electronic and electrical 
technologies. An IEEE standard, IEEE 979-1994[42], related to substation fire protection is 
examined. IEEE 979-1994 is a revision of IEEE 979-1984. The title of the standard is “IEEE 
Guide for Substation Fire Protection”, in which the fire protection for distribution substations 
is described in Clause 9.1 through Clause 9.6.  
 
In this guideline, low smoke cables are recommended for use in distribution substations. 
Unless installed cables comply with the flame test parameters specified in IEEE Standard 
383-1974 and are properly sealed to the fire rated barriers, the cables shall be installed in trays 
or trenches cast with removable metal or fire-retardant material coverings. As stated in 
Clause 9.3, the use of oil filled equipment inside a building is not recommended. If it is used, 
it shall be installed in transformer rooms (distribution substations) or vaults constructed with a 
fire rating sufficient to withstand the largest possible fire that may occur, and a minimum of 
two exits is expected. However, the fire ratings for transformer vault construction are not 
provided in this standard. In addition to the fire safety protection system, fixed fire 
extinguishing systems and oil containment are recommended in this standard.  
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Factory Mutual Insurance Company (FM Global): 
 
FM Global is a U.S. based insurance company, which provides property insurance protection 
for commercial and industrial risk and risk management services. One of their datasheets, FM 
Global Property Loss Prevention Datasheet 5-4 (2005), provides the fire protection guidelines 
for substations. FM Global is known as a Highly Protected Risk (HPR) insurer; their design 
criteria have been established not only to the fire exposure of a transformer, but also the 
potential damage to the transformer and the possible business interruption effects that a 
transformer fire can cause. Some loss histories are also covered in the datasheet.  
 
As recommended in the datasheet, indoor transformers shall have a minimum of 0.9 m 
separation from the building walls. Smoke detection and fire alarm systems that are connected 
to the Fire Service and the electrical providers shall be installed in distribution substations. An 
appropriately designed mechanical ventilation system is also required. More specifically, the 
datasheet also provides the specific fire protection requirements for different types of 
transformers installed, which are listed as follow: 
 
For oil insulated transformers containing more than 378.5 litres of oil, the transformer rooms 
(distribution substations) shall have at least one external wall and the constructions shall be 
fire rated with a minimum of 3 hour FRR or it can be reduced to 1 hour FRR if an automatic 
sprinkler system with discharge density of 15 mm/min over the room area is installed. 
 
For less flammable liquid insulated transformers, the transformer room (distribution 
substation) shall be constructed with a minimum of 1 hour FRR or sprinkler systems with a 
discharge density of 10 mm/min over the transformer room (distribution substation) is 
required to be installed. 
 
For dry type transformers, there are no specific fire protection requirements more than 
keeping the transformers away from other combustible materials by a non-combustible barrier 
or a distance of 1.5 m horizontally and 3 m vertically. However, air-cooled transformers are 
recommended to be in a pressurised room when they are exposed to dusty or corrosive 
atmospheres.  
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Askarel insulated transformers containing more than 50 ppm PCB’s are not allowed under 
this organisation; hence, a liquid replacement is required when the PCB concentration is more 
than 50 ppm. Furthermore, four additional requirements are prescribed for the Askarel 
insulated transformer rooms, which include (1) the installation of oil containment, (2) keeping 
the room free of combustibles, (3) properly seal the wall penetrations and (4) exhausting air 
directly to the outside.  
 
Electricity provider (1): 
 
This organisation is one of the largest electricity network management companies in the 
South Island of New Zealand. The fire protection requirements for distribution substations are 
found in one of their electricity network design standards produced in 2001. This guideline 
recommended distribution substations to be located at ground level with at least one wall is an 
external wall. When liquid type transformers are used in the building, it shall be installed in a 
vault constructed with a minimum of 2 hour FRR. Any openings and penetrations within the 
FRR barrier shall be properly sealed or an automatic closing damper shall be provided. 
Ventilation systems are also recommended. If natural ventilation is used, the combined net 
area of all ventilating openings shall be not less than 2000mm2 per kVA of transformer 
capacity in service (1.5m2 for a 750kVA transformer). If mechanical ventilation is used, the 
airflow rate at 40m3/min per transformer is required. 
 
Electricity provider (2): 
 
This organisation is another electricity network company in New Zealand but their major 
customers are in the North Island. They created a fire protection guideline for distribution 
substations in 1997. Their fire protection requirements are based on the Electricity 
Regulations 1997 and the Building Act 1991. As recommended in this guideline, the fire load 
density in a distribution substation shall be considered to contain a total of 3500MJ/m2 with 
FHC of 4. It is recommended that the distribution substation should be constructed with a 
minimum of 2 hour FRR or it can be reduced to 1 hour FRR if sprinkler system is installed. 
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3.8 Comparison of Transformer Fire Protection Requirements 
 
A summary of fire protection requirements for distribution substations in typical residential and commercial mixed-use buildings from the above 
standards and guidelines is illustrated in Table  3-3 through to Table  3-7: 
Table  3-3: Summary of the general fire protection requirements for a distribution substation in a typical residential and commercial mixed-use building 
Fire protection 
requirements C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global 
Electricity 
provider (1) 
Electricity 
provider (2) 
Detection system Heat/ Smoke detector 
Heat 
detector 
Smoke 
detector 
Smoke 
detector 
Heat/ smoke 
detector 
Smoke 
detectors 
Smoke 
detectors Not Spec. 
Sprinkler system See tables below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
FRR construction See tables below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
See tables 
below 
Smoke management system 1 Not Spec. Not Spec. Req. Not Spec. Req. Req. Req. Not Spec. 
- Natural venting 
(Venting openings) 
>1.425 m2 >1.5 m2 
- Mechanical venting 
(Airflow rate) 
Not Spec. >40 m3/min 
- Auto closing damper 
N/A N/A 
Req. 
N/A Not Spec. Not Spec. 
Req. 
N/A 
Location of distribution 
substation (on an external wall) Not Spec. Rec. Rec. Not Spec. Not Spec. Rec. Rec. Rec. 
Oil containment 2 Not Spec. Rec. Rec. Not Spec. Rec. Rec. Rec. Not Spec. 
1 Either natural venting or forced venting is installed   
2 For liquid type transformer only 
Where Spec. = specified; Req. = required; Rec. = recommended; N/A = Not Applicable  
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Table  3-4: Summary of the specific fire protection requirements for flammable liquid insulated transformers in a distribution substation 
Specific requirements for 
flammable liquid insulated 
transformers 1 
C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global Electricity provider (1)
Electricity 
provider (2) 
Option 1: Provide FRR construction and no sprinkler system  
FRR construction  1 hour 4 hour 3 hour Not Spec. Not Spec. 3 hour 2 hour 2 hour 
Option 2: Allow the reduction to FRR construction by providing sprinkler system 
FRR construction 1 hour 2 hour 1 hour 1 hour 
Sprinkler system (Discharge density) 
Not Spec. Not Spec. 
Req.  
(10.2 mm/min)
Req.  
(Not Spec.) 
Not Spec. 
Req.  
(15 mm/min) 
Not Spec. 
Req. 
(Not Spec.) 
1 Two alternative fire safety designs to meet the standards and guidelines when a flammable liquid insulated transformer is installed.  
 
Table  3-5: Summary of the specific fire protection requirements for less flammable liquid insulated transformers in a distribution substation  
Specific requirement for less 
flammable liquid insulated 
transformers 2 
C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global Electricity provider (1)
Electricity 
provider (2) 
Option 1: Provide FRR construction and no sprinkler system 
FRR construction  Not Spec. Not Spec. 3 hour Not Spec. Not Spec. 1 hour Not Spec. Not Spec. 
Option 2: Allow the reduction to FRR construction by providing sprinkler system 
FRR construction 1 hour No FRR req. 
Sprinkler system (Discharge density) 
Not Spec. Not Spec. 
Req.  
(Not spec.) 
Not Spec. Not Spec. 
Req.  
(10 mm/min) 
Not Spec. Not Spec. 
2 Two alternative fire safety designs to meet the standards and guidelines when a less flammable liquid insulated transformer is installed.  
Where Spec. = specified; Req. = required; 
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Table  3-6: Summary of the specific fire protection requirements for Askarel/ non-flammable liquid insulated transformer in a distribution substation  
Specific requirement for 
Askarel/ non-flammable liquid 
insulated transformers 
C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global Electricity provider (1)
Electricity 
provider (2) 
FRR construction  Not Spec. Not Spec. No FRR req. Not Spec. Not Spec. No FRR req. Not Spec. Not Spec. 
 
 
Table  3-7: Summary of the specific fire protection requirements for dry type transformer in a distribution substation  
Specific requirement for dry 
type transformers C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global 
Electricity 
provider (1)
Electricity 
provider (2) 
FRR construction  Not Spec. Not Spec. 1 hour Not Spec. Not Spec. No FRR req. Not Spec. Not Spec. 
 
Where Spec. = specified; Req. = required; 
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CHAPTER 4 REVIEW OF TRANSFORMER FIRE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, several literature sources have been reviewed in relation to transformer fires, 
the health effect of a transformer fire, the fire resistance rating of construction, evacuation 
from high rise buildings during a fire, characteristics of transformer fires and the properties of 
the major combustible material in transformer i.e. dielectric material. Other informative 
studies, such as transformer ageing and cost comparison between different types of 
transformer are also reviewed to provide background information for the cost benefit 
assessment.  
 
This chapter does not provide the literature review on the specific factors and parameters used 
in the risk assessment i.e. event tree analysis and cost-benefit analysis. These reviews are to 
be provided in the relevant sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
 
4.2 Fire Resistance Rating of Construction  
 
At the Building and Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ), the fire resistance time 
of building elements is commonly determined by the ASTM or NFPA fire endurance test 
using the standard ISO fire curve as described in Australia standard AS1530.4-2005, which is 
similar to ISO 834 or British Standard BS 476 part 20-22 and ASTM E119, to provide a fire 
rating. However, research has been performed to study the behaviour of structures in the case 
of ISO fire exposure and a real fire exposure. It is found that the actual fire resistance time of 
building elements exposed to real fire conditions could have significantly different times from 
the fire rating derived from standard tests, depending on the characteristics of real fire, such as 
fire growth rate, fire load density, location of fire, and the geometry of the fire compartment, 
such as compartment size, ventilation conditions, opening definition, glass breaking. 
 
Nyman [43] has recently studied the equivalent FRR of construction elements exposed to 
realistic fires. In the research, three full-scale compartment tests were experienced, 
establishing the actual times to failure of construction with real fire exposure, and compared 
the results with the fire resistance rating of the construction derived from standard tests. The 
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outcome of the research shows that standard fire test method with ISO fire curve is considered 
not conservative for use on load-bearing building elements. It has found that real fire 
exposure can be more severe than the AS1530.4 standard furnace test exposure. It can grow 
quicker than standard ISO fire, increase the compartment temperature in the fire growth phase 
and cause the failure of building elements, such as integrity, insulation and stability, to occur 
earlier than the fire resistance rating. In the conclusion, it stated that the failure times of the 
test assemblies in the compartment tests confirms that construction exposed to realistic fires 
will fail at times significantly less than the FRR derived from standard tests, for fires which 
are more severe than the standard test fire exposure. 
 
A fire curve for Hydrocarbon heating regime, which has a more rapid fire growth in the 
earlier stage, is introduced in the AS1530.4-2005 standard for measuring the FRR. This fire 
curve can predict the FRR construction in a more severe fire environment. However, since the 
use of alternative heating regime is optional in accordance with Appendix B of the AS1530.4-
2005 standard, fire curve for Hydrocarbon heating regime is not commonly used. 
 
4.3 Evacuation in High Rise Building 
 
In a high rise building occupied with residential and commercial space, the evacuation time of 
the occupants could potentially take more than couple hours to evacuate the building. 
Technically, the required safe egress time (RSET) is defined as the time required for 
evacuation of occupants to a place of safety. As stated in the fire engineering design guide 
[32], the RSET can be determined by sum of fire detection time, pre-movement time, travel 
time and queue time. In residential buildings, occupants may or may not be alert, awake and 
familiar with the building fit-out and the location of exits (e.g. new tenants or guests). As the 
result, the RSET of these buildings could potentially be very long. Several studies have 
conducted a great deal of research into human behaviour and evacuation in high rise 
apartment (residential) buildings. The major findings are summarized as follows: 
 
• Proulx [44] & [45]: The pre-movement time in an actual apartment (residential) 
building fire are found to be in a range of 0.5 minutes with good alarm and 
192 minutes with no alarm (more than 3 hours), depending on the following factors: 
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o Alarm type and audibility.  
o Visual access 
o Responsibility for others 
o Training 
o Weather 
 
In Proulx’s studies, some occupants did not evacuate i.e. chose not to evacuate and 
waited for fire brigade. 
 
• Brennan [46]: The pre-movement time in a night time apartment (residential) building 
fire is in a range of 0.5 – 20 minutes. However, almost half of the building occupants 
did not evacuate for first few hours; i.e. did not know (are not alert or awake), did not 
respond to door knocking, or chose not to evacuate.  
 
• VUT [47]: 50% of occupants in a residential building did not evacuate for first few 
hours in a case of a real fire. 
 
• SFPE [48] stated that “Alertness and limitation: A fire in the middle of the night in a 
hotel or residential building will require a longer time to respond since most 
occupants will be asleep. Another dimension to this characteristic is the possibility 
that occupants may have some limitation that will extend their response time. These 
limitations could be perceptual, physical, or intellectual, or might be due to the 
consumption of medication, drugs, or alcohol. It is important to estimate the 
proportion of occupants who will have a longer delay time to start due to alertness 
conditions or a limitation.” In addition, the SFPE also stated that if the building often 
has false alarms, it could be expected that the delay time to start will be extensively 
extended since building occupants are unlikely to look for information and will be less 
receptive to other cues. 
 
From the literature, it is understood that, in the worst case scenario, occupant evacuation in a 
high-rise building could potentially take up to several hours to the outside of the building due 
to poor alarm notification, lack of training, frequency of false alarms, alertness and limitation, 
unfamiliarity with the building fit-out. 
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4.4 Study on the Health Effect of Exposure to A Transformer Fire 
 
4.4.1 Fitzgerald et al. (1981) 
 
The American medical association, and the American Academy of occupational medicine and 
society for occupational and environmental health studied the health effects to patients, who 
were potentially exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s), and polychlorinated dibenzo-
p-dioxins (PCDF’s) from an electrical transformer fire in New York on February, 1981 [49]. 
The transformer fire occurred in the basement mechanical room of an 18-story structure in the 
city centre. Approximately 681 litres of Askarel oil (65% PCB’s – Aroclor 1254 and 35% 
polychlorinated benzenes) leaked from a transformer. The toxic gases produced by the 
transformer were spread throughout the building via the two ventilation shafts.  
 
A health survey was conducted three years after the fire and a total of 479 occupants of the 
building and firefighters were studied in the research. The survey has achieved an excellent 
response rate from the participants; almost 80% returned their questionnaire. As the results 
were analysed, it was found that skin itching (23.7%) was the most commonly reported 
symptoms after the fire and other symptoms included headaches (22.5%), nervousness or 
sleep problems (20.3%), rashes or dermatitis (20.1%) and vision changes (17.4%). In addition, 
several occupants were diagnosed to have an invasive cancer after the fire, which included a 
thyroid cancer diagnosed in 1982, a lung cancer and a brain tumour diagnosed in 1984.  
 
4.4.2 Eschenroeder & Faeder (1988) 
 
The objective of Eschenroeder and Faeder’s study [50] is to estimate the risk of health effects 
due to the inhalation of combustion products from mineral oil transformer fires using Monte 
Carlo analysis. This is a means of statistical evaluation of mathematical functions using 
random samples. In the research, Eschenroeder and Faeder have considered polychlorinated 
dibenzofurans (PCDF’s) from the pyrolysis of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s) as the main 
toxic products that would be produced in an event of accidental fires involving mineral and 
Askarel mixture oil insulated transformers. The two main findings of the report were the 
cancer risk and the birth defect (health hazard) associated with a mineral and Askarel mixture 
oil transformer fire.  
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As defined in the report “the definition of risk is based on a chance event derived from model 
uncertainties rather than physical events”. Therefore, estimation is highly dependant on the 
existing statistical data. Hence, this report has included the uncertainty study which can 
provide quantitative measures of health conservatism by assigning confidence levels to 
different numerical estimates. As a result of the analysis, the health risk from PCB-
contaminated mineral oil transformer fire was found to be insignificant both in case of cancer 
burden and in the case of birth defects. Based on the Monte Carlo results, the probability of 
the occurrence of a cancer burden of unity and to the health hazard burden of unity was found 
to be 1.6 x 10-9 and 1.7 x 10-14, respectively. 
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4.5 Experiment on Transformer Oil Fire 
 
4.5.1 Heskestad & Dobson (1997) 
 
Heskestad and Dobson [51] reported two experiments on pool fires of transformer oil burning 
over a rock bed in a 1.2 m diameter pan and the report was published in the Fire Safety 
Journal 1997. The difference between the two tests was that one had drainage at regression 
rates of 16 to 26 mm/min from the bottom of the plan and one was without drainage. The 
simple transformer oil used for the experiments has a flash point of 157ºC (See Section  4.8 for 
the comparison of the transformer dielectric fluids properties). As the results of the 
experiments, the peak convective heat release rate from the transformer oil burning was found 
to be between 750kW and 1MW. The HRR curve from both tests is shown in Figure  4-1 and 
Figure  4-2. 
 
Figure  4-1: Convective HRR of transformer oil with no drainage, extracted from Heskestad & Dobson 
(1997) 
 
Figure  4-2: Convective HRR of transformer oil with drainage, extracted from Heskestad & Dobson 
(1997) 
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4.6 Transformer Ageing 
 
4.6.1 Bartley (2000, 2002 & 2003)  
 
William H. Bartley has been investigating transformer failure, transformer ageing and 
transformer life cycle management with Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. 
U.S. since year 2000. Five of the relevant articles are: 
 
• Analysis of Transformer Failures – A Twenty Year Trend,  (Bartley 2000 [52])   
• Life Cycle Management of Utility Transformer Assets (Bartley 2002 [53]) 
• Analysis of Transformer Failures (Bartley 2003 [29]) 
• Investigating Transformer Failures (Bartley 2003 [54]) 
• Transformer Asset Management (Bartley & James 2003 [55]) 
 
Bartley has highlighted that transformer ageing is one of the main issues causing transformer 
failures. Unlike other common causes of failure, such as failure due to electrical disturbances, 
insulation issues, maintenance issues, lighting, loose or high resistance connection, 
overloading and sabotage, transformer failure due to transformer age is very difficult to 
identify. Based on Bartley’s studies, the mean age at failure for utility transformers was found 
to be 17.7 years as shown in Figure  4-3.  
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(Note that the number of failures was missing in the original report) 
Figure  4-3: Number of transformer failures, reproduced from Bartley 2000 [52] 
 42
Further to Bartley’s discussion [52], an equation was developed to predict the future 
transformer failure as follow: 
 
Equation  4-1: t
t
t e
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where f(t) is the instantaneous failure rate 
 ω  is a constant for random events (0.005) 
 α is a constant 
 µ is a constant 
 β is a time constant 
 t is time (year) 
 
Based on the data recorded by Hartford Steam Boiler Company, the property damage due to 
transformer failure and fire, excluding business interruption losses, was found to be 
approximately USD$9 per kVA in an average five years period. This extrapolates to 
USD$6,750 for a 750kVA transformer. 
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4.7 Cost Effective Comparison between Different Types of 
Transformers 
 
4.7.1 Goudie & Chatterton (2002) 
 
Goudie and Chatterton [56] reported a comparison between the use of dry (solid or gas) type 
and liquid type transformers in distribution substations at the standpoint of economics and the 
environment with regards to the transformer lifetime. This report also compared the common 
transformer dielectric fluids in terms of the economic, environmental and life safety factors.  
 
Overall, the report concluded that the use of liquid type transformers would have more benefit 
than dry type transformers and the main discussions are summarised as follow: 
 
• Liquid type transformers are more efficient then a dry type transformer; in other words, 
the energy loss by using a dry type transformer is much higher than a liquid type 
transformer  
• Less carbon dioxide would be produced by using liquid type transformers 
• Dry type transformers may require higher maintenance cost due to periodic cleaning 
since the coils are open to dust and pests.  
• Typically, dry type transformers are physically larger than liquid types and, hence, 
larger cores may be required that would lead to have a higher iron or core loss.  
 
Furthermore, the report also provided an initial cost relationship of transformer. It used the 
cost of a mineral oil filled transformer as a base point and measure the relative initial cost for 
other type of transformers. The table is extracted from the original article and shown in the 
following figure:  
 
Figure  4-4: Initial cost for transformer dielectric materials, reproduced from Goudie & Chatterton 
(2000) 
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4.8 Studies on the Dielectric Fluids 
 
The properties of transformer dielectric fluid have been summarised in the table below from 
the relevant literature. These literature include Oommen [19], Mcshane [21], Goudie and 
Chatterton [56], Babrauskas [57], Bertrand [58], ASTM D4652-92 [59], ASTM D3487-00 
[60], ASTM D2283-86 [61], Trabulus [62] and Patel [63].  
 
Table  4-1: Properties of transformer dielectric fluid: Typical Values/ Limits   
Properties Units Mineral Oil Silicone Oil 
Vegetable 
Oil Askarels 
Dielectric Breakdown kV 30 - 85 35 - 60 82 - 97 35 
Relative Permittivity 
at 25°C   2.1 - 2.5 2.6 - 2.9 3.1 - 3.3 3.7 - 4.9 
0 °C mm2.s-1 <76 81 - 92 43 - 77 Not stated 
40 °C mm2.s-1 3 - 16 35 - 40 16 - 37 31 - 92 Viscosity 
100 °C mm2.s-1 2 - 3 15 - 17 4 - 8 Not stated 
Pour Point °C -30 - -60 -50 - -60 -19 - -33 -14 - -44 
Flash Point  
(open cup test) 
°C 100 - 170 300 - 310 310 - 328 None to boiling 
Fire Point  
(open cup test) 
°C 110 - 185 340 - 350 350 - 360 None to boiling 
Density at 20°C 
(specific gravity)  
kg.m-3 830 - 890 960 - 1100 870 - 920 1380 - 1570 
Specific Heat 
capacity kJ.kg
-1K-1 1.6 - 2.39 1.5 - 2.04 1.5 - 2.1 Not stated 
Thermal Conductivity W.m-1 K-1 0.11 - 0.16 0.15 0.16 - 0.17 Not stated 
Expansion 
Coefficient 10
-4.K-1 7 - 9 10 - 10.4 5.5 - 5.9 7 
Heat of combustion MJ.kg-1 45.9 28 35 Not stated 
Moisture content, dry 
oil ppm 10 - 25 50 50 - 100 30 
Volume resistivity at 
25°C Ω.cm 10
14 - 1015 10 14 10 14 10 11 
Interfacial tension at 
25°C dynes/cm 40 – 45 25 25 Not stated 
Heat release rate 1 kW/m2 >1000     (1538 - 1625) < 1000 Note stated Not stated 
1 Typical HRR for mineral oil is found as indicated in the bracket 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA COLLECTION 
 
5.1 Statistical Studies 
 
5.1.1 Sources of Data 
 
The statistical data given in this section is based on three databases: (1) the annual statistics 
from the Ministry of Commerce in New Zealand, (2) the fire incidents statistical data from the 
Fire Incident Reporting System (FIRS) managed by the New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) 
and (3) the fire incidents statistical data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS) managed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).  
 
The Ministry of Commerce, now known as the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), is 
a government department responsible for the government ownership of public properties. The 
number of distribution substations and the population in New Zealand are provided in their 
annual statistics reports (Refer to Section  5.1.3). It was found that the population in New 
Zealand is increasing with an average growth rate of 1.5% per year over the past 50 years. 
This information implies that increasing number of high-rise buildings is required due to the 
growing population in New Zealand. As a result, distribution substations are expected to 
become more commonly built in buildings due to the higher loading density. The statistical 
data on the number of distribution substations in New Zealand was obtained from the MED 
between 1946 and 1995. Since the statistical data after 1995 was not available, the number of 
distribution substations between 1995 and 2006 is estimated based on the growth rate 
measured in the previous 50 years. 
 
The purpose of the FIRS system is to collect and analyse data on fire incidents from the Fire 
Services throughout New Zealand. Generally, the fire incidents can be classified mainly in 
terms of their property types, location of fire origin, item first ignited and heat source. 
According to the NZFS FIRS instruction and coding manual [64], the specific property use of 
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“6401- substations, transformers and power lines” is found under Code 64: Utilities and 
Energy distribution. As the location of fire origin, the switchgear areas and transformer vaults 
are found in Code 173. Based on these two criteria, 24 fire incidents were selected from the 
NZFS FIRS database during the 6 years period from January 2000 to January 2006 [65]. Out 
of the 24 fire incidents, 20 fire incidents are related to distribution substations and 4 fire 
incidents are related to power or terminal substation. It is noted that the statistical data from 
the NZFS FIRS provided only the significant information to the fire incidents, such as the 
incident time frame, the incident type, the fire cause and the consequence. No specific 
information was recorded in these incident reports, such as the characteristic of the properties, 
the number of fatalities and the cost of property damages. Therefore, the consequence of 
structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer vaults reported to the NFIRS [66] 
is also examined in this research for reference.  
 
5.1.2 Historical Case Study for Transformer Fires 
 
Two critical distribution substation fire incidents reported between 2000 and 2006 in New 
Zealand are discussed in this section. These fire incidents were all involved with transformer 
fluid. Since no further investigation reports were found, the discussions are based on the 
incident reports provided by the NZFS. These reports briefly record information about the fire 
and the message log during the incident; however, the consequence of these fires was not 
clearly stated. Due to the low number of transformer fire incidents occurred in New Zealand, 
three additional transformer fire incidents in U.S. are discussed in this section for reference.  
 
On the 24th January 2002, a distribution transformer in Napier caught fire. The heat source 
was estimated to be electrical arcing and the first ignited material was transformer fluid. Of 
the 20 fire incidents involving distribution substations, this incident was the only one that 
mentioned the performance of the detection system. According to the incident report, a smoke 
detector was installed in the building and was monitored. However, although the detector was 
installed so it operated in an event of fire, it was not a factor in discovery of this fire. In this 
case, the Fire Service was alerted by an emergency call 111 from an occupant. No information 
about casualties and property damages was found in the incident report.  
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On the 21st June, 2003, an 11kV/415V step-down transformer was totally involved during a 
fire in Christchurch. It is different to the previous incident as the ignition source in this case 
was arcing from a faulty, loose or broken conductor and the first ignited object was the 
electrical wire and wiring insulation, followed by the transformer fluid. When the Fire Service 
arrived at the scene, the fire was already fully developed in the distribution substation. 
Therefore, the firefighters decided to take no action until the power for the whole street was 
turned off as it was extremely dangerous. Later, the fire was confined to the structure of origin. 
As a result of the fire, the structure was badly damaged but no injuries were recorded. 
 
In the morning of 24th July, 1984, a transformer fire occurred at the New York University 
Medical Centre and was followed by an explosion. As Ragusa [67] stated, there were a total 
of four transformers on the site. These transformers were 13.8kV/ 460V step-down 
transformers. Mineral oil was used as the cooling medium and the units were installed in a 
distribution substation. The cause of the fire was believed to be that the unit was overheated 
and ignited the leaked transformer oil. There were no injuries in the event. Damage to the 
equipment was not given in this article.  
 
Another distribution transformer fire was discussed by Courtney [68]. The transformer fire 
occurred in 1988 when the power was restored after a shut down for repairs. The fire ignition 
source is believed to have been electric arcing inside the oil insulated transformer. As a result 
of this transformer fire there were a total of four casualties; one minor and three serious 
injuries, and property damage of USD$23,000 (1988).  
 
A distribution transformer caught fire in a hospital in 1996 as Tremblay [69] stated. The 
hospital is a three storey building with FRR construction, however the nature of the fire rated 
construction was not recorded. Smoke detection systems and sprinkler systems were installed 
throughout the building. The transformer fire was detected by the detection systems soon after 
the fire started and was successfully extinguished by the sprinkler systems, which was 
activated by the Fire Service. The cause of the fire was that the unit was overheated and 
ignited the leaked transformer oil. Due to the early occupant warning alarm, there were no 
injuries as a result of this transformer fire. The fire was confined to the room of origin and 
property damage was estimated to be USD$10,000 (1996).  
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5.1.3 Number of Distribution Substations in New Zealand 
 
According to the data from the MED database: the New Zealand Energy and Resources 
Division and Market Information and Analysis Group [70], the New Zealand Energy 
Modelling and Statistics Unit [71] and [72], and the New Zealand Ministry of Energy [73], 
the number of distribution substations in New Zealand increased from a total of 24,000 in 
year 1946 to 140,000 in 1995 as shown in Figure  5-1. These distribution substations might 
contain a single or multiple transformer(s) with a voltage rating of 11kV or less. Based on the 
available data, the growth rate is estimated to be 1.71% per annum as the solid line shown in 
Figure  5-1. Following the estimated growth rate, the number of distribution substations in 
2006 is determined to be 167,000. The data is listed in Appendix C. 
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Figure  5-1: Number of distribution substations in New Zealand from 1946 to 2006 
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5.1.4 Fire Incidents Reported to the NZFS FIRS 
 
Each year between 2000 and 2006, an estimated 4 fire incidents were reported to the NZFS 
FIRS in relation to the specific property use of substation and the fires originating in 
switchgear areas or transformer vaults as shown in Figure  5-2. Of the 24 fire incidents during 
the 6 year period, 20 involved indoor transformers. With these fires, only one injury was 
reported to the NZFS FIRS. In addition, the property losses associated with the fire incidents 
could not be found from these incident reports. The statistical data addressed in this section 
include:  
 
? Number of distribution substation fires 
? Monthly trends 
? Time of day 
? Equipment involved 
? Source of ignition 
? Primary ignition object 
? Indicated cause 
? Avenue of flame/ smoke travel and their extent damage  
 
Note that the statistical data of the above phases are attached in Appendix C. 
 
 
Number of distribution substation fires: 
 
There are a total of 20 fires originating in distribution substations reported to the NZFS FIRS 
during the 6 year period between 2000 and 2006 with a peak of five incidents in the year 
2002/03. The best year is found to be the year 2001/02. No fires originating in distribution 
substations were reported in this period. An average of three to four fire incidents in 
distribution substations is determined based on the data.  
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Figure  5-2: Number of distribution substation fires in 2000/06 (Source NZFS FIRS) 
 
 
Monthly trends 
 
As illustrated in Figure  5-3, the majority of such fires occurred between June and August with 
a peak in the winter month of June. It was followed by the summer season (December - 
February). The frequency of the fires is less in spring and autumn (March - May and 
September - November). This result can be explained by the power consumption. In general 
buildings, heating and air-conditioning equipment, such as heaters, are often the largest power 
consumers. As the power consumption increases, the probability of overloading will also 
increase. According to Hattangadi [28], even though overloading may not directly cause the 
failure, it may reduce the equipments useful lifetime (Refer to Section  5.2). Specifically, it 
may be dangerous when overloading equipment that has been in service for more than 30 
years. The accuracy of the analysis could be improved when more data is available.  
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Monthly trends for distribution substation fires in 2000/06
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Figure  5-3: Monthly incidence of distribution substation fires in 2000/06 (Source NZFS FIRS) 
 
 
Time of day 
 
Figure  5-4 shows the hourly trends for distribution substation fires in the period between 2000 
and 2006. Typically, these fires are equally distributed into six periods of time. As can be 
seen, these fires are most likely to occur during ‘work’ hours; between 7am and 3pm, as 9 out 
of 20 fire incidents occur during these times. It may be again due to higher power 
consumption during the day than at night.  
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Figure  5-4: Hourly trends for distribution substation fires in 2000/06 (Source NZFS FIRS) 
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Supposed Causes 
 
According to the NZFS FIRS data, the supposed cause of distribution substation fires can be 
classified into five groups: (1) Electrical failure, (2) Mechanical failure, (3) Equipment 
overload, (4) Lack of maintenance and (5) Unknown causes. Figure  5-5 illustrates the leading 
causes of these fires. The dominant causes are electrical failure (60%); of which 20% were 
due to short circuits or earth faults and 40% from other electrical failure. The second leading 
cause of these fires is equipment being overloaded (20%).  
 
Supposed cause 
Equipment overloaded 
(includes electric 
cords serving too 
many appliances)
20%
Mechanical failure, 
malfunction
10%
Unknown
5%
Electrical failure
60%
Lack of maintenance
5%
 
Figure  5-5: Causes of distribution substation fires (Source NZFS FIRS) 
 
 
Primary ignition object 
 
Generally, the combustible materials in distribution substations may include the electrical 
wire or cable insulation, transformer (e.g. transformer fluids) and other known items (e.g. 
wood board and chairs). As a result of the data analysis, 65% of these fires had the electrical 
wire or cable insulation as the object first ignited (Figure  5-6). Compared to the cable 
insulation, the probability of having transformer or transformer fluid as the object fist ignited 
is much lower (20%); however, the consequence of transformer fluid fire could be worse.  
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Figure  5-6: Object first ignited (Source NZFS FIRS) 
 
 
Equipment involved 
 
According to the NZFS FIRS instruction and coding manual [64], the term of equipment 
involved represents “the equipment that provided the heat for the fire to start, or was involved 
in the release of hazardous substances”. It may sometimes be very difficult to define the 
equipment involved in some incidents. Out of the 20 fires, there were 6 fires where the 
equipment involved was not recorded (30%). For the known equipment, there were 7 fires 
(35%) involving transformer and associated equipment with distribution type recorded. It is 
followed by the circuit breakers associated with transformers (20%) as the leading type of 
equipment involved. Other known equipment include the power cables, controlling switches 
and other not classified items (15%).  
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Figure  5-7: Equipment involved (Source NZFS FIRS) 
 
 
Source of ignition (Heat source) 
 
As the source of heat causing ignition, 70% of these fires involve arcing, either from the short 
circuit (60%) or from another faulty, loose or broken conductor (10%). Out of the 60% of 
fires that involved short circuit arcing as the heat source, 5% were caused by water, 10% were 
from the defective or worn insulation and 45% were unspecified. There are 10% of these fires 
that have the source heat recorded as overloaded equipment.   
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Figure  5-8: Source of ignition (Source NZFS FIRS) 
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Extent flame/ smoke damage  
 
Figure  5-9 illustrates the extent of flame and smoke damage for the 20 fire incidents analysed. 
As can be seen in the figure, there are only 12 fires reported to the NZFS FIRS that report the 
extent of damage. For the extent of flame damage, five incidents were confined to the object 
of origin and six incidents were confined to the structure of origin. Out of these 6 fires 
confined to the structure of origin, four incidents involved a transformer, with the transformer 
fluid as the ignition object. This information supports the concept of having transformer fluid 
involved in the ignition of a fire being a low occurrence and high consequence event. The 
avenue of flame travel includes the flammable liquid (2 fires), furniture and fixtures (1fire) or 
structural member allowing vertical (1 fire) or horizontal travel (1 fire), such as a wall burned 
through, inadequate fire stopping, air handling ducts, service/pipe shaft or failure of rated 
assembly. Smoke may not cause any damage if the fire is small enough and the smoke is well 
controlled by the ventilation system. Similar to flame damage, the fires confined to the 
structure of origin often had transformer fluid involved as the object ignited.  
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Figure  5-9: Extent of flame/ smoke damage (Source NZFS FIRS) 
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5.1.5 Fire Incident Reported to the NFIRS (U.S.) 
 
Number of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer vaults 
 
Figure  5-10 illustrates the number of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or 
transformer vaults during the 22 years period between 1980 and 2002 [66]. As can be seen, 
there are a total 1890 structure fires originating in distribution substation recorded by the 
NFIRS in 1980. Since then, the number of fires is decreasing every year with an average 
decline rate of 55 fires per year as shown by the solid line in Figure  5-10. Until recently in 
2002, the number of fires reduced to 680 fires.  
 
Boykin [74] states that the total number of transformers in the U.S. is found to be 23.1 million 
in 1982. Using the same growth rate of 1.71% per annum as determined in Section  5.1.3, the 
number of transformers in the U.S. is estimated to increase to about 30 million in 2006.  
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Figure  5-10: Number of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer vaults between 
1980 and 2002 (Source NFIRS) 
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Life safety consequence 
 
The life safety consequence is categorised into two types in the NFIRS data: civilian injuries 
and civilian deaths. Figure  5-11 and Figure  5-12 illustrate the number of civilian injuries and 
civilian deaths, respectively, of the structure fires originating in switchgear areas or 
transformer vaults between 1980 and 2002 in U.S. The data is also attached in Appendix C. 
While the number of fires is decreasing every year as shown in Figure  5-10, the number of 
civilian injuries also decreased from an average of 88 injuries before 1995 to an average of 33 
injuries after 1996 as shown in Table  5-1. Moreover, although the average number of injuries 
per fire decreased from 0.06 to 0.04, the number of deaths per fire increased from 0.002 to 
0.003 after 1996.  
 
Table  5-1: Life safety consequence of distribution substation fires between 1980 and 2002 reported to 
the NFIRS 
Year Number of fires 
Civilian 
deaths  
Deaths per 
fire  
Civilian 
Injuries 
Injuries per 
fire 
Before 1995 (per year) 1421 3 0.00194 88 0.06177
After 1996 (per year) 863 2 0.00281 33 0.03874
Overall (per year) 1251 3 0.00212 71 0.05693
 
In regards to life safety, 1999 and 2002 were found to be the worst and the best year 
respectively, out of the 22 year period. There were a total of 41 civilian injuries and 6 civilian 
deaths in 880 fires in 1999 and a total of 18 injuries and no deaths in 680 fires in 2002.  
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Figure  5-11: Civilian injuries as a result of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or 
transformer vaults between 1980 and 2002 (Source NFIRS) 
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Figure  5-12: Civilian deaths as a result of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer 
vaults between 1980 and 2002 (Source NFIRS) 
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Property damage 
 
For the structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer vaults reported to the 
NFIRS between 1980 and 2002, the average property loss is determined to be NZD$50.5 
million per year and NZD$40,400 per fire. Note that the costs given in the original data [66] 
is in USD$ and are converted to NZD$ using the average currency exchange rate of 1.54 [75]. 
Figure  5-13 illustrates the direct property damage of these structure fires originating in 
switchgear areas or transformer vaults between 1980 and 2002 in the U.S. in terms of the total 
property damage costs per year (bar chat), as well as the cost per fire in each year (line curve). 
The data of these structure fires is referred in Appendix C.  
 
 
Figure  5-13: Directly property damage as a result of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or 
transformer vaults between 1980 and 2002 (Source NFIRS) 
 
 
As can be seen, the largest total direct property damage costs of NZD$76.2 million is found in 
1993, while the lowest total costs of NZD$20 million is in 1999. However, when determining 
the average cost per fire, 2001 is shown to be the worst year and the cost per fire is 
NZD$95,800. This is due to the relatively low number of fires in 2001 but high property loss 
from each fire. 
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5.2 Reliability Data 
 
5.2.1 Transformer and Associated Equipment 
 
Transformers impact distribution system reliability in two related ways: overloads and 
failures. Transformers may get overloaded from time to time and failures may occur when the 
transformer is operating with an overload. Overloads may cause the oil temperature to rise up 
to over the permissible limits, typically 90°C. Hattangadi [28] states that for every 6°C rise in 
the oil temperature above the permissible limits, the useful life of the transformer is reduced 
by a period of time which is double the period for which the transformer is operating under 
the normal temperature. In other words, when a transformer operates with oil temperature of 
102°C for one hour, the useful life of the transformer is reduced for approximately four hours. 
Other potential causes of transformer failure can be found in Section  2.3.4.  
 
From a literature, the typical failure rate of distribution transformers is found to be about 0.02 
to 16 failures per 106 operation hours as shown in Figure  5-14. This range of transformer 
failure rate also agrees with the failure rate found from other studies such as Green [76]  and 
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers [77]. Hence, the number of failures per year is 
determined to be in the range of 180 x 10-6 to 140 x 10-3 failures per year.  
 
 
Figure  5-14: Typical failure rates for various equipment (Extracted from Fig. 11.1 of Moss [30]) 
0.02 16
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The failure rates for the distribution transformer and associated equipment, such as the circuit 
breaker, power cable, capacitor, fuses and the relevant fire protection systems, are obtained 
from Moss’s reliability data handbook [30] as shown in Table  5-2. Failure rate, which is 
known as a function of time, can generally be defined as the number of failures for a device 
within a unit of time. As can be seen, the failure rate of the transformer and associated 
equipment is generally low. The entire transformer systems are always protected and 
monitored by many protection systems. It is considered that transformer failures may not 
necessary result in a fire; hence, the probability of transformer fire can be expected to be 
lower. In addition, the reliability of fire protection systems is relatively low when compared to 
the transformer and associated equipment. Note that these failure rates are provided solely for 
information purpose and are not used in the analysis in the report. 
 
Table  5-2: Failure rate for transformer and associated equipment and some fire protection systems 
Failure per 10^6 hour Failure / year Transformer and associated 
equipment Lower Mean upper Mean 
Distribution transformer 0.02 2.53 16 22 x 10-3 
Circuit breaker 0.5 1.03 10 9 x 10-3 
Power cable 0.5 2 2.5 17 x 10-3 
Capacitor 0.0004 0.007 0.075 61 x 10-6 
Fuses 0.0265 0.634 2.36 6 x 10-3 
Fire protection systems  
Fire damper 5 13.7 29.6 120 x 10-3 
Fire fighting system 0.05 36 123 314 x 10-3 
Fire alarm Not stated 31.9 Not stated 279 x 10-3 
Smoke detection system 6 Not stated 6.7 56 x 10-3 
Sprinkler system Not stated 0.5 Not stated 4.4 x 10-3 
 
 
5.2.2 Fire Protection Systems 
 
Often, the reliability of fire protection systems can be classified into two types, operational 
and performance reliability. Operational reliability is an estimate of the probability that the 
system can successfully operate in a fire event. This reliability can be improved with a good 
maintenance programme. Performance reliability is an estimate of the system adequacy once 
it has operated. However, as the following reliability data is sourced from various studies, in 
which the scope, boundaries and breadth may vary significantly, it may not be precise but it 
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could provide an accurate representation of the trend. Note that Table  5-3 and Table  5-4 may 
consist of studies published in the late 1970’s. As expected, standards and codes are 
improving year-on-year in order to provide equivalent or even higher level of fire safety to the 
public. In other words, modern fire safety systems are likely to be more reliable and more 
effective than these fire safety systems maintained using the old standards and codes. 
Therefore, the analysis including these old data can result a conservative design. 
 
In addition to the reliability of the fire safety systems, the year shown in the tables indicates 
when these papers were published. Most of these published papers contained the statistical 
data from a couple years up to a period of 100 years. For system reliability, the more data 
being studied the better and more comprehensive results that can be obtained. Therefore, these 
data are considered to be relevant and appropriate for the analysis. 
 
Smoke detection system 
 
As per the prescribed requirements described in Section  1.1, more than half of the standards 
and guidelines studied have recommended smoke detection systems be installed in the 
distribution substations in lieu of heat detection systems. Thus, the reliability of smoke 
detection systems is used for the assessment and, hence, is discussed in this section.  
 
The reliability of smoke detector systems is expressed as the probability that the smoke 
detector will be activated in the event of a fire. Many researchers have studied the 
performance of smoke detection system in specific types of buildings or in any buildings in 
general. However, no information is found about the reliability of smoke detection systems in 
distribution substations specifically. Hence, the reliability of smoke detection systems for 
general buildings is used for the assessment in Section  7.6.2. Some of the articles that do not 
provided the reliability of smoke detection systems for general buildings, an average value 
will be used from the reliabilities of smoke detectors for commercial, residential and 
institutional occupancies. Table  5-3 shows the reliability of smoke detection systems for 
general buildings based on the following literature: Bukowski, Budnick, Schemel [78], and 
Yung et al. [79]. 
 
 
 63
 
Table  5-3: Reliability of smoke detection systems  
Type of detector Reliability of smoke detection system  Original reference 
Smoke detector 85.7% Warrington Delphi UK (1996) 
Smoke detector 82.5% Fire Engineering Guidelines Australia (1996) 
Smoke detector 94.0% Tokyo Fire Department (1997) 
Smoke detector 89.0% Watanabe (1979) 
Smoke detector 77.8% Bukowski, Budnick, Schemel (1999)  
Smoke detector 80.0% NRCC (2006) 
 
Automatic suppression systems 
 
As Thomas [80] stated, the performance of automatic sprinkler suppression systems can be 
defined into four categories, as follows: 
 
1. The fire is too small to activate the sprinkler system 
2. The sprinkler system should have been activated but did not 
3. The sprinkler system is activated and controlled the fire but did not extinguish the fire 
4. The sprinkler extinguished the fire 
 
The first category refers to a scenario where a small fire may self-extinguish due to lack of 
fuel or oxygen. In this case, the smoke layer temperature is expected to be low and not 
sufficient to activate the sprinkler heads. However, in the case of a transformer fire initiating 
in a distribution substation, a sufficient fuel load is expected to be in the room, such as 
dielectric material, electrical equipment, power cables and the transient combustible materials. 
Unless the distribution substation consists of oxygen control system, which may immediately 
reduce the oxygen level when fire is detected, transformer fires are expected to burn 
continuously and to be large enough to activate the sprinkler heads. Since the use of oxygen 
control system is not a subject of this study, the first class is not considered to be possible in 
the case of transformer fires.  
 
The three other categories are separated into two phases: success and failure. The sprinkler 
system is considered to have failed if it is not activated in a fire (Category 2), whereas the 
system is considered to be a success once it is activated regardless of it controlling or 
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extinguishing the fire (Category 3 and Category 4). Many previous reports have proved that 
the leading reason for the unsatisfactory sprinkler performance is due to human error, such as 
failure to maintain the operational status of the system, and failure to assure the adequacy of 
the system for complete coverage of the current hazard. Similar to smoke detection systems, 
the reliability of sprinkler systems for general buildings is used for the assessment in this 
research due to the unavailability of data about the performance of sprinkler systems in a 
distribution substation. Table  5-4 shows the reliability of sprinkler systems for general 
buildings based on the following literature: Bukowski [78], Yung [79], Taylor [81], 
Spearpoint [82], Koffel [83], Budnick [84], Rohr [85], Richardson [86], Risk Logic Inc. [87], 
Miller [88] and Marryatt [89].  
 
Table  5-4: Reliability of Sprinkler systems  
Building 
occupancy 
Reliability of sprinkler 
system Original reference 
General 95.0% Warrington Delphi UK (1996) 
General 99.0% Fire Engineering Guidelines Australia (1996) 
General 97.0% Tokyo Fire Department (1997) 
General 92.1% BRE (1973) 
General 96.2% Powers (1979) 
General 96.7%- 97.9% Finucane et al. (1987) 
General 96.0% Bukowski, Budnick, Schemel (1999) 
General 90.0% NRCC (2006) 
General 81.3% Taylor (1990) 
General 97.2% Yashiro et al. (2000) 
General 96.2% NFPA (1970) 
General 95.7% US Navy (1977) 
General 95.0% Smith (1983) 
General 87.0% Ramachandran (1998) 
General 86.1% Factory Mutual (1977) 
General 85.8% Oregon State Fire Marshal (1978) 
General 96.0% Budnick (2001) 
General 93.0% Hall (2005) 
General 96.0% Richardson (1985) 
General 82.0% Risk Logic Inc (2006) 
General 94.8% - 95.8% Miller (1974) 
General 99.5% Marryatt (1988) 
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CHAPTER 6 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is understood to be “a system engineering method for representing 
the logical combinations of various system states and possible causes which can contribute to 
a specified event (called the top event)” as defined in the standard for risk management 
AS/NZS 4360:1999 [90]. The tree structure, which is organised by logical dependency, 
generally begins with the definition of a top event and then determines the probability of that 
event through logical relationships, such as AND gates and OR gates. In general, AND gates 
represent a situation where the top event is true only if all the lower events are true and is 
false if one of the lower events are false. Inversely, OR gates represent a situation where the 
top event is true if any one of the lower events is true and is false only if all of the lower 
events are false. Typically, the probability of the lower events can be determined in three 
ways; by examining the historical data, by expert engineering judgement or by evaluating the 
scenario by using a model. As an output of FTA, the probability of the top event can be 
estimated.  
 
In this chapter, a typical fault tree is developed for a transformer fire in a distribution 
substation as the top event. It is a sequence of events that could lead to the transformer fire, 
which include the appearance of ignition sources, the appearance of combustible materials 
and the availability of oxygen to the fire. By providing the expected fault rate of these lower 
events, the probability of a transformer fire in a distribution substation can be estimated. 
However, due to the lack of information about the fault rate of these lower events, the 
probability of a transformer fire in a distribution substation is not determined but the structure 
of the fault tree is given for reference. 
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6.2 Fault Tree 
 
Based on the information discussed in Section  2.3.4, a typical fault tree for a transformer fire 
in a distribution substation is developed as illustrated in Figure  6-1 through to Figure  6-3. 
This fault tree is provided to show the necessary elements resulting in a transformer fire in a 
distribution substation. Generally, three primary contributing factors must be present to result 
in a transformer fire. These factors are: 
 
1. Source of fuel  
2. Source of oxygen 
3. Source of ignition 
 
Any materials that have the ability to combust are considered to be potential fuels for a fire or 
explosion when an ignition source is provided. In distribution substations, the following 
combustible materials are likely to be present. These include: 
 
• Power cables and electrical equipment directly connected to the transformer; 
• Dielectric material inside the transformer, including any substances inside them; 
• Transient combustible materials, such as the wooden boards and chairs; 
• Combustible vapour, which is generated by oil decomposition due to overheating.  
 
Essentially, the occurrence of the above combustion material may be affected by several 
factors, including the selection of materials for transformer system (e.g. non-combustible 
dielectric materials (dry air), high fire resistance rated cables and other electrical components), 
the reliability of protection systems and a good maintenance and management plan. All of the 
above described factors should play vital role in determining the probability of occurrence of 
the combustible material in the distribution substation. It should be noted that the presence of 
combustible material is not always sufficient to cause a fire. In terms of this study, the 
presence of fuel is considered to be effectively 100% otherwise no fire could occur.  
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As is known, fires may self-extinguish if there is not sufficient oxygen provided. The main 
source of oxygen for a fire or explosion is the general body of air. From the literature review, 
a new solution to limit transformer failure resulting in a fire has been developed and applied 
in many modern distribution substations. As Allan [91] stated, “Successful designs have 
involved the use of closed chambers where the transformers are immersed in an inert 
atmosphere of nitrogen or CO2”. This solution could potentially reduce the level of oxygen 
below that required to support combustion in the area. In this situation, the probability of 
oxygen availability may rely on the oxygen control system. In other words, the presence of 
oxygen may be reduced. Oxygen control system and its reliability are not studied in this 
report..  
 
As defined by Ainsworth et al. [92], “A source of ignition is anything that has the potential to 
get hot enough to ignite a material, substance or atmosphere in the workplace”. For 
distribution substations, the source of ignition can be classified into internal overheat and 
external overheat. Internal overheating indicates that the heat is generated internally by an 
equipment failure, such as electrical arc or sparking, and the protection devices are defective. 
External overheating may include any exposure fires, such as arson, lightning strike or cable 
overheat due to overload or cable degradation or the like. 
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Figure  6-1: Fault tree for the transformer fire 
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Figure  6-2: Fault tree for transformer internal overheat 
 
 
Figure  6-3: Fault tree for transformer external overheat 
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CHAPTER 7 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The definition of risk is found in Standard AS/ NZS 4360:1999 [90]. It states that “Risk is the 
chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is measured in 
terms of consequences and likelihood”. The standard further described that “Consequences 
may be expressed in terms of monetary, technical or human criteria …and likelihood is 
usually expressed as either a probability, a frequency or a combination of exposure and 
probability…”. 
 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), which is a primary Quantitative Risk Assessment tool, is defined 
in Standard AS/ NZS 4360:1999 [90]. It states that the ETA is “a technique which describes 
the possible range and sequence of the outcomes which may arise from an initiating event”. It 
is understood that ETA is a forward looking consequence technique. By identifying the event 
of hazard as a root, the following outcomes, usually two potential outcomes (success or 
failure), may develop in responding to the previous event and so on. Each branch probability 
can be obtained by the product of the probability along the pathways and life safety 
consequence is considered in the assessment. In order to allow a comparison between fire 
safety designs, the consequences are translated into equivalent monetary values (EMV). Note 
that the risk to building occupants is evaluated based on the number of fatalities, which is the 
expected maximum number of fatalities resulting from a certain accident in the scenario. 
 
As Barry [93] stated, risk can be estimated using the following equations: 
 
Equation  7-1: ( )(C) esConsequenc
branch  theofnumber   j where
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Equation  7-2: ∑ ⋅⋅= j j CPFRiskTotal  
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The steps for developing fire risk event tree are identified by Barry [93], as follow: 
 
1) Identifying the initiating event and the pathway factors; 
2) Structuring the event tree branches and evaluate the incident outcomes; 
3) Quantifying the probability for the pathway factors in each branch; 
4) Quantifying the consequences and translate them into the EMV; 
5) Determining the fire risk estimation and record it for the cost-benefit analysis. 
 
From the literature review, it is found that there are two major limitations of the ETA. The 
first limitation of the ETA is that each event tree can only evaluate one identified initiating 
event with the designed pathway factors. As stated in the Risk-based Decision-making 
guidelines [94], “an event tree is not an exhaustive approach for identifying various causes 
that can result in an accident. Other analysis techniques should be considered if the objective 
of the analysis is to identify the cause of potential accidents.” Generally, the initiating event 
and the sequence of outcomes in the event tree are to be primarily identified by other analysis 
techniques, such as What-if, Checklist, Hazardous Operation Assessment (HAZOP) and 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In the case of more than one initiating event or 
any changes of the pathway factors in the event tree, independent event trees are required. 
Based on this limitation, a total of 14 independent event trees are developed to assess the 
scenarios with different fire safety design and transformer types in this report.  
 
As the second limitation of the ETA, it is often difficult to define the probabilities 
independently because the occurrence of the root events is usually dependent on the outcome 
of prior events. The probability of success/ failure of the resulting events usually correlate to 
the previous event. For example, if the detection system is failed, it could potentially delay the 
arrival time of the Fire Service and result in influence of the success/ failure probability of 
manual firefighting. However, many currently available data are likely to be measured 
individually for the use of various systems and services. Therefore, these data may be 
inappropriate as each event has its specific dependency in the event tree. To overcome this 
limitation, significant literature review may be required to make sure the use of data is 
appropriate. 
 
 72
Uncertainty is expected in the risk estimate due to the assumptions made and the uncertainties 
of the data sources as discussed in Section  1.3. In the assessment, probability distributions 
with boundaries will be used for these uncertain input parameters in the risk estimate 
calculation. A software package, @Risk4.5, which is an additional function in Microsoft 
Excel for extending the analytical capabilities of Excel, is used to conduct the Monte Carlo 
simulations for the risk estimates.  
 
In addition, where an array of values is found for the pathway factors, such as the reliability 
of sprinkler systems and smoke detection systems, the Bestfit function in @Risk4.5 will be 
used to fit the best distribution to data.  
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7.2 Model Overview 
 
The primarily objective of this research is to evaluate whether four hour fire separation 
between the distribution substation and the interior spaces of the building proposed by the 
NZFS is a cost-effective solution to the occupants life safety in a typical New Zealand high-
rise building. Prior to the assessment, it is significant to define the characteristics of the model 
building and the specifications of the distribution substation. Two approaches were carried 
out to define a base building for the analysis. These include: 
 
1. Site visits to the existing high-rise buildings in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2006. 
2. Review of high-rise building plans. 
 
Based on the above information, a model building with specified characterisations is defined 
as a base building for the analysis in this research. A brief description of the model building 
and the specifications of the distribution substation are listed in Table  7-1 and Table  7-2, 
respectively.  
 
Table  7-1: Model building characterisation 
Location of the building - Central city 
Building use - Commercial and residential mixed-use building,  
Number of storeys and 
building height 
- The building contains 6 floors and has a total height of 21.6m with 
3.6m height on each floor.  
- The escape height is measured up to the floor of the top level and, 
therefore, is 18m.  
Purpose groups 
- CM (retail shop) and ID (substation) at ground floor;  
- SR (residential apartment) at 2nd floor up to the 6th floor (Refer to 
Section  3.2) 
Floor area - 800m2 per floor 
Number of occupants 
- Apartment floors: 6 apartments on each floor are estimated. As 
Haag [95] stated, the occupant density is about 2.4 persons per 
house. Total number of occupants in the apartments is therefore 
estimated to be 72 people (2.4 persons/house x 6 houses x 5 
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floors) 
-  The floor area of the retail shop is assumed to be 400m2. 
Therefore, the number of occupants in the building is determined 
to be about 67 occupants based on 6m2 per person for retail shop 
area as Bennetts et al. [96] stated. 
- One or two contractors are expected to work in the plant room 
regularly (e.g. maintenance, inspection and testing). 
- Other space on the ground floor is assumed to serve the corridor, 
lobby, lift, stairs or the like. No occupants counted as per the 
C/AS1 precautions. 
Means of escape - Two escape routes are provided in the building  
Active systems  
-  According to the C/AS1 Clause 4.5.11, for SR purpose group 
where any lower floor contains a purpose group other than SR 
(e.g. CM retail shops, ID distribution substation), all lower floor 
shall have either Type 3 (heat detector), Type 4 (smoke detector) 
or Type 6 (Sprinkler).  In this research, a Type 4 automatic fire 
alarm system with smoke detectors and manual call points is to be 
installed throughout the building and is monitored. 
-  Fire hose reels, Fire hydrant system and Fire panel board are 
assumed to be in the building. 
-  Depending on the fire safety design in each scenario, sprinkler 
systems may or may not be provided. 
 
Table  7-2: Specifications of the distribution substation 
Location of the 
distribution substation 
The distribution substation is located on the ground floor having one 
external wall with an access direct to the outside and an internal 
access is provided to the building.  
Room geometry W4m x L6m x H3.6m 
Number of transformers One transformer (3-phase, 750kVA – 11kV/415V) 
Combustible materials Dielectric material, cables and electrical equipment, transient 
combustible materials and combustible vapour 
Volume of oil  
 
550 – 840 L for any liquid type transformer  
Oil containment is installed.  
(Applicable for liquid type transformer only) 
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Generally, distribution transformers can have power ratings of 300kVA, 500kVA, 750kVA, 
1000kVA or more. Some recent researchers have found the average power consumption is 
about 8 to 10kVA per New Zealand household. In this case, the model building is assumed to 
include shops and apartments in a 6 storey building. Assuming there are 6 apartments on each 
floor, the total power consumption is determined to be 360kVA. To be conservative, higher 
total power consumption is expected. Therefore, a single 750kVA (3-phase, 11kV to 415V 
step-down) transformer is considered to be adapted for the model building.  
 
Through discussion with a senior sales engineer [97], it is understood that a 750kVA liquid 
type transformer usually contains about 550L to 840L of transformer oil and the most likely 
volume of oil is about 600L. Typically, the size of a 750kVA transformer is about L 1.5m x 
W 1.5m x H 2m. Therefore, including the associated facilities, the floor area of the 
distribution substation is estimated to be about 24m2 with a room ceiling height of 3.6m.  
 
Two site visits were conducted to two distribution substations in New Zealand. One of which 
is in the Christchurch city centre and another is at the University of Canterbury. Some 
photographs were taken at these distribution substations as attached in Appendix A. From the 
site inspections, some transient combustible materials are found in distribution substations. 
These materials include wooden boards and furniture. Therefore, these combustible materials 
should be included when considering the fire loads in the distribution substations.  
 
The model building is assumed to be a non-sprinklered building sprinkler. It is understood 
that in a sprinklered building, sprinkler system is likely to be extended to the distribution 
substation inside and the costs of this extension is expected to be low. Therefore, the cost-
effectiveness of installing a sprinkler system in the distribution substation inside a sprinklered 
building is expected to be higher than installing a sprinkler system in the distribution 
substation inside a non-sprinklered building due to its low cost. To be conservative, this 
research assesses the risk of transformer fire in a non-sprinklered building. 
 
Recently, many new distribution substations often separate transformers, switchgears and 
other low hazard electrical facilities by internal construction. This approach has two main 
advantages: the first advantage is to reduce the probability of the electrical contractors to 
work in a high risk indoor environment for a long time and another advantage is to prevent 
small electrical or cable fires spread to the high hazard equipment. However, this research 
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primarily considers the fire risk exposure to the building occupants and the fire origin is the 
transformer (not ignited from other exposure fires). Therefore, the internal construction 
separating the equipment in a distribution substation is not considered to have a significant 
benefit to the building occupants in this case. Therefore, this research will only assess a 
transformer fire in a distribution substation with no internal constructions separating the 
equipment.  
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7.3 Analysis Approach 
 
A total of 14 scenarios with different fire safety designs and transformer types for a 
distribution substation in a high-rise building are assessed in this research. In order to evaluate 
the fire risk in a distribution substation with different fire safety designs separately, the same 
type of transformer, Flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer, is used in the first 
10 scenarios. Generally, the differences between these scenarios are the involvement of the 
sprinkler systems and the use of different FRR construction. Simply, sprinkler systems are 
considered to be either installed or not installed in the room. Five typical levels of FRR 
construction are assessed, which are 30 minute FRR, 1 hour FRR, 2 hour FRR, 3 hour FRR 
and 4 hour FRR.  
 
Thereafter, two particular fire safety designs, i.e. 3 hour fire separation with no sprinkler 
systems and 1 hour fire separation with sprinkler systems, are selected as a baseline for 
analysing the transformer types. In Scenario 11 to Scenario 14, two types of transformers with 
a low fire hazard, a less flammable liquid (silicone oil) insulated transformer and a dry type 
(dry air) transformer, will be used to replace flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated 
transformer. The reason for selecting these two fire safety designs as the baseline in this part 
is due to these two fire safety designs being recommended in the NFPA as mentioned in 
Section  3.5. Note that NFPA is the only standard provided the fire safety protection 
requirements for other types of transformers. A brief summary of the fire safety design and 
type of transformer used in each scenario is shown in Table  7-3. Note that smoke detection 
and alarm systems and manual Fire Service suppression are considered in all cases. 
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Table  7-3: A brief description of the fire protection systems combination for each scenario 
Scenario Type of transformer 
Smoke 
detection 
system  
Sprinkler 
system 
Manual fire 
suppression 
system 
FRR 
construction
1 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Not provided Provided 30 minute 
2 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Not provided Provided 1 hour 
3 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Not provided Provided 2 hour 
4 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Not provided Provided 3 hour 
5 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Not provided Provided 4 hour 
6 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Provided Provided 30 minute 
7 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Provided Provided 1 hour 
8 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Provided Provided 2 hour 
9 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Provided Provided 3 hour 
10 Liquid Type (Mineral oil) Provided Provided  Provided 4 hour 
      
4a Liquid Type (Silicone oil) Provided Not provided Provided 3 hour 
4b Dry Type (Dry air) Provided Not provided Provided 3 hour 
      
7a Liquid type (Silicone oil) Provided Provided Provided 1 hour 
7b Dry Type (Dir air) Provided Provided Provided 1 hour 
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7.4 Identifying the Initiating Event and the Pathway Factors 
 
As discussed earlier in the report, the major cause of transformer failure is insulation 
breakdown / arcing, which may rupture the transformer tank, releasing the oil and then 
igniting the dielectric material once it is exposed to oxygen. In this research, a transformer 
fire in a distribution substation is assumed to be the initial event. The pathway factors of the 
event tree are developed as follow:  
 
• Smoke detection system (SDS) - Success/ Failure 
• Sprinkler system (SS) - Success/ Failure or not installed 
• Manual Fire Service suppression, which is further separated into two parts: 
o Firefighters’ action time (FAT): the time between when the Fire Service is 
alerted and when the firefighters start to fight the fire (ta_a) is less than 10 
minutes - Success/ Failure 
o Manual Fire Fighting (MFF) - Success/ Failure 
• Wall barrier integrity maintained (WBI) - Success/ Failure 
 
7.5 Structuring the Event Tree Branch Logic 
 
The structure of the event tree for transformer fires in distribution substations is shown in 
Figure  7-1. The event tree logic is read off from the source (A) on the left hand side, through 
the pathways (B - F) to the targets (G - J). There are two outcome segments, Yes/No, for each 
pathway factors, where ‘Yes’ implies success and ‘No’ implies failure. The probability of the 
various consequences is then calculated by multiplying together the various branch 
probabilities of each factor. Consequence levels are measured based on the number of 
fatalities (NOF) and the civilian fatality rate (CFR) (Refer to Section  7.7). In order to allow 
the fire risks to be combined, the consequence are converted to equivalent monetary values 
(EMV) using the value of statistical life (VSL) in Aldy and Viscusi [98]. Finally, the total risk 
(J) of a transformer fire in a distribution substation is estimated by multiplying the probability 
and the EMV consequence as described in Equation  7-2. A brief description for each of the 
outcome events of the event tree is illustrated in Table  7-4. 
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Figure  7-1: Structure of the event tree for a transformer fire in a distribution substation 
Source Pathway factors   Target 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)  (I) (J) = (G)*(I) 
Consequence Initiating 
event SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Event 
No. Prob.
CFR NOF 
EMV 
Fire risk 
NZD$/ fire 
incident 
               
  Yes      Yes 1          
                  
     Yes  Yes 2          
                   
 Yes  Yes  Yes 3          
        No              
          No 4          
    No               
       Yes Yes  5          
                   
   No  Yes 6         Transfor
mer fire      No             
       No 7          
                 
   Yes     Yes  8         
                  
      Yes Yes  9         
                    
  No  Yes  Yes 10          
       No             
         No 11         
   No              
     Yes Yes  12         
                  
    No  Yes 13         
     No             
      No 14         
 
where:  
SDS = Smoke detection system Prob. = Probability 
SS  = Sprinkler system CFR = Civilian fatality rate 
FAT = Firefighters’ action time NOF = Number of fatalities 
MFF = Manual fire fighting EMV = Equivalent Monetary Value 
WBI = Wall barrier integrity maintained  
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Table  7-4: A brief description for each of the 14 outcome events 
Outcome event Description of the event 
1 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Success 
Firefighter Action Time : 1(See note below) 
Manual Fire Fighting : 1(See note below) 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by both smoke detectors and 
sprinkler heads; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Fire is controlled by sprinkler systems; 
-  Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected; 
2 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Success 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is controlled by the firefighters; 
-  Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected;  
3 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is out of control; 
- Fire is confined to the distribution substation but 
smoke may spread out of the room; 
4 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Failure  
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is out of control and is not confined to the 
distribution substation; 
- Outbreak fire occurred. Both fire and smoke may 
spread beyond the distribution substation; 
5 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Success 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected;  
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is controlled by the firefighters; 
- Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected; 
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Table  7-4 continued 
Outcome event Description of the event 
6 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is out of control; 
- Fire is confined to the distribution substation but 
smoke may spread out of the room; 
7 
Smoke Detection System : Success 
Sprinkler System : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Failure 
- Fire is detected by smoke detectors; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is out of control and is not confined to the 
distribution substation; 
- Outbreak fire occurred. Both fire and smoke may 
spread beyond the distribution substation; 
8 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System  : Success 
Firefighter Action Time : 1(See note below) 
Manual Fire Fighting : 1(See note below) 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is detected by the sprinkler heads; 
- Early detection and fire alarm is expected; 
- Fire is controlled by sprinkler systems; 
- Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected; 
9 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Success 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is controlled by the firefighters; 
- Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected; 
10 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is out of control; 
- Fire is confined to the distribution substation but 
smoke may spread out of the room;  
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Table  7-4 continued 
Outcome event Description of the event 
11 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Success 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Failure 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take action to fight the fire within 10 
minutes since the Fire Service is alerted 
(Involvement of firefighters in the earlier stage); 
- Fire is out of control and is not confined to the 
distribution substation; 
- Outbreak fire occurred. Both fire and smoke may 
spread beyond the distribution substation; 
12 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Success 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is controlled by the firefighters; 
- Fire may not be suppressed immediately but 
confinement in the distribution substation is 
expected; 
13 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Success 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is out of control; 
- Fire is confined to the distribution substation but 
smoke may spread out of the room; 
14 
Smoke Detection System : Failure 
Sprinkler System  : Failure 
Firefighter Action Time : Failure 
Manual Fire Fighting : Failure 
Wall Barrier Integrity : Failure 
- Fire is not detected by any fire safety systems; 
- No early detection and fire alarm provided; 
- Firefighters take more than 10 minutes to start 
the fire suppression; 
- Fire is out of control and is not confined to the 
distribution substation; 
- Outbreak fire occurred. Both fire and smoke may 
spread beyond the distribution substation; 
 
1 Manual Fire Service suppression is expected to be success in the case of sprinkler controlled fire 
regardless the intervention time and firefighters’ ability. Hence, success or failure of the FAT and the 
MFF is not considered to be necessary. 
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7.6 Quantification of the Branch Line Probabilities 
 
7.6.1 Initiating Event Likelihood 
 
Initiating event likelihood means the frequency of the initiating event occurring. In the 
assessment, a transformer fire in a distribution substation is considered as the initiating event. 
This research is particularly interested in the effects once a transformer fire occurs. To be 
conservative, the likelihood of a transformer fire is assumed to be one (100%). In other words, 
the event that a transformer fire has occurred in a distribution substation inside a building is 
investigated.  
 
7.6.2 Smoke Detection System (SDS) 
 
Smoke detection systems are intended to: 
 
1) Detect fire by smoke; 
2) Provide an early warning alarm to the building occupants; 
3) Alert the Fire Service; 
4) Activate other fire protection systems (e.g. fire dampers and smoke exhaust systems). 
 
Hence, good reliability of smoke detection systems can provide a reasonable level of 
protection to the safety of the building occupants. It is understood that the performance of 
smoke detection systems is generally high in case of transformer fires. Unlike domestic 
smoke detection systems, where the system performance is often affected by lack of power 
supply or delay due to the distance to the fire (as the Government of Alberta [99] stated), 
smoke detection systems in distribution substations are expected to be more efficient due to 
back-up power supply being provided and the room area being relatively small so the location 
of smoke detectors should be close to the transformer. In an event of a liquid type transformer 
fire in a distribution substation, a transformer oil fire is expected. According to the research 
by Heskestad and Dobson [51], HRR and toxic smoke released by a transformer oil fire 
should be large enough to activate the smoke detectors installed in the room. Hence, the 
reliability of the smoke detection systems in a distribution substation is expected to be 
relatively high.  
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The figure below shows the probability distribution of the performance of smoke detection 
system reliability for general buildings. As stated in the Data Collection section, the reliability 
data for a smoke detection system was obtained from two articles. Out of these data, a 
minimum of 77.8%, a maximum of 94% and an average of 84.8% are observed. Due to the 
lack of available data, a triangular distribution is considered in the assessment.  
 
 Triangular distribution (77.8%, 84.8%, 94.0%) 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
 
Figure  7-2: Probability distribution of the performance of smoke detection systems 
 
Table  7-5: Summary of the probability distribution of the performance of smoke detection systems 
Distribution types and parameters Triangular distribution 
Maximum 94% 
Minimum 77.8% 
Mean 84.8% 
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7.6.3 Sprinkler System (SS) 
 
Sprinkler systems are intended to: 
 
1) Detect fire by hot smoke; 
2) Provide an early warning alarm to the building occupants; 
3) Provide an early suppression (control) to the fire; 
4) Alert the Fire Service. 
 
Sprinkler systems are known to be very effective and efficient systems to suppress or control 
a fire. They activate when temperatures surrounding the sprinkler head reaches the sprinkler 
activation temperature. As discussed in Section  5.2.2, a fuel load is expected in the 
distribution substation, including dielectric material, electrical equipment, power cables and 
the transient combustible materials. Hence, transformer fires are very unlikely to be too small 
to activate the sprinkler systems as the first category in Thomas [80]. Thereforem, transformer 
fires are considered to be large enough to activate the sprinkler heads unless the sprinkler 
systems are defective or damaged.  
 
The figure below shows the probability distribution of the performance of sprinkler system 
reliability for general buildings. As stated in the Data Collection section, the reliability data 
for a sprinkler system was obtained from a total of 11 articles. Out of these data, a minimum 
of 81.3%, a maximum of 99.5% and an average of 93.4% are observed. Due to the lack of 
available data, a triangular distribution is considered in the assessment.  
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Triangular distribution (81.3%, 93.4%, 99.5%) 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
 
Figure  7-3: Probability distribution of the performance of sprinkler system 
 
Table  7-6: Summary of the probability distribution of the performance of sprinkler system  
Distribution types and parameters Triangular distribution 
Maximum 99.5% 
Minimum 81.3% 
Mean 93.4% 
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7.6.4 Manual Fire Service Suppression – Firefighter Action Time (FAT) 
 
The probability of the time between when the Fire Service is alerted and when the firefighters 
start to fight the fire, ta_a, is less than 10 minutes (PFAT) is measured based on the results of the 
NZFS FIRS statistical data analysis. According to the 20 fire incidents reported to the NZFS 
FIRS with respect to fires initiating in distribution substations, the time between the Fire 
Service being alerted and the firefighters starting to take action to fight the fire is often 
delayed due to traffic congestion or other interventions. For example, more than half of these 
fire incidents [65] have reported that the firefighters are required to wait for the power to be 
isolated before they can start the fire suppression and in one case, the firefighters took almost 
8 minutes in traffic.  
 
It is understood that the earlier firefighters start attacking the fire, the higher the chance that 
they can manage to control and suppress the fire. In this research, the critical time between the 
Fire Service being alerted and the firefighters starting taking action to fight the fire is 
considered to be 10 minutes, as Fontana et al. [100] stated. Based on the NZFS FIRS 
statistical data, the probability that the Fire Service can start trying to suppress the transformer 
fire within 10 minutes from receiving an alarm signal (PFAT) is examined in Table  7-7. As 
defined in Section  7.2, the fire protection systems in the building are to be monitored. The 
Fire Service is expected to be alerted either by a fire alarm or an emergency call. 
 
Table  7-7: Probability that ta_a less or more than 10 minutes 
Year 
Number of 
distribution 
substation fires
Number of these 
fires that ta_a < 10 
minutes  
Probability 
of FAT 
success 
Probability 
of FAT 
failure 
January 2000 - January 2001 4 2 50% 50% 
January 2001 - January 2002 0 0 N/A N/A 
January 2002 - January 2003 5 4 80% 20% 
January 2003 - January 2004 4 1 25% 75% 
January 2004 - January 2005 3 0 0% 100% 
January 2005 - January 2006 4 2 50% 50% 
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From the available data above, it is found that the minimum, maximum and average (mean) of 
the probability of FAT success are of 0%, 80% and 41%, respectively; while the minimum, 
maximum and average (mean) of the probability of FAT failure are of 100%, 20% and 59%. 
The following figures show the triangular distributions for the probability of success and 
failure of the FAT  
Triangular distribution (0%, 41%, 80%) 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
 
Figure  7-4: Probability distribution of FAT – success (PFAT_S) 
 
Triangular distribution (0%, 59%, 100%) 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
 
Figure  7-5: Probability distribution of FAT– failure (PFAT_F) 
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Table  7-8: Summary of the probability distribution of firefighters’ action time 
  
Probability distribution of FAT – success 
(less than 10 minutes) 
Probability distribution of FAT – failure 
(more than 10 minutes) 
Distribution types 
and parameters Triangular distribution  Triangular distribution   
Maximum 80% 100%  
Minimum 0% 20% 
Mean 41% 59% 
 
7.6.5 Manual Fire Service Suppression – Manual Fire Fighting (MFF)  
 
Fontana et al. [100] state that the probability that the Fire Service can control the fire (PMFF) 
depends on the ability of the firefighters and the alarm time. Based on the data found in 
Fontana et al. [100], the PMFF in general buildings is estimated (Refer to Appendix D). As the 
results show, the PMFF is determined to be in the range of 67.4% (volunteer non-professional 
firefighters and the ta_a more than 10 minute) to 98.8% (full training professional firefighters 
and the ta_a less than 10 minute). Table  7-9 shows the PMFF in different situations where the 
ability of firefighters and the early warning alarm are considered.  
 
Table  7-9: PMFF in general buildings  
In general building Probability of MFF success to control the fire (PMFF_S) 
Probability of MFF fail to 
control the fire (PMFF_F) 
Firefighters’ 
ability 
Early 
warning  
alarm 
ta-a less than 
10 min 
ta-a more than 
10 min 
ta-a less than 
10 min 
ta-a more 
than 10 min 
Professional 
firefighters  Not provided 80.0% - 95.0% 71.6% - 85.0% 5% - 20% 5% - 29.4% 
Non-
professional 
firefighters  
Not provided 75.8% - 90.0% 67.4% - 80.0% 10% - 14.2% 20% - 32.6% 
Professional 
firefighters  Provide 83.2% - 98.8% 81.1% - 96.3% 1.2% - 17.8% 3.7% - 18.9%
Non-
professional 
firefighters  
Provide 82.1% - 97.5% 71.6% - 85.0% 2.5% - 17.9% 15% - 28.4% 
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From the literature, it is found that about 9,000 firefighters are distributed over 400 fire 
stations in New Zealand. The Fire Service annual report 2005 [101] states there are a total of 
1607 career (professional) firefighters in New Zealand, 2005. As defined in Section  7.2, the 
model building is to be located in the central city and hence is considered to be acceptable to 
assume the building being protected by professional firefighters, rather the volunteer (non-
professional) firefighters. As a result, the PMFF for professional firefighters in Table  7-9 are 
selected for this assessment.  
 
Through discussion with a senior fire station officer in Victoria Fire Service [102], it is 
understood that the PMFF given in Table  7-9 seem applicable in the event of general electrical 
fires (e.g. dry type transformer), rather transformer oil fires, and the PMFF of transformer oil 
fire should be lower. As known, oil fire can be controlled once the oil temperature is lower 
than its flash point. According to the studies on the transformer dielectric fluids in Section  4.8, 
it is understood that typical mineral oil and silicone oil have the minimum flash point of 
100°C and 300°C, respectively. As advised by the senior fire station officer [102], the PMFF of 
less flammable oil fires and flammable oil fires may reduce approximately 4 to 5% and 10 to 
12%, respectively, from the PMFF of general electrical fires (Note that the mean value is used 
for the assessment, i.e. the PMFF is reduced by 4.5% for less flammable oil fires and 11% for 
flammable oil fires). Hence, the PMFF for different types of transformer are summarised in 
Table  7-10. 
 
Table  7-10: Probability distribution of manual fire fighting performance 
PMFF for different transformer types installed Smoke 
Detection 
System 
(SDS) 
Firefighter 
Action Time 
(FAT) 
Manual Fire 
Fighting 
(MFF) 
Flammable 
liquid insulated 
(mineral oil) 
Less flammable 
liquid insulated 
(silicone oil) 
Dry type  
(dry air) 
Success 72.2% - 87.8% 78.7% - 94.3% 83.2% - 98.8% 
Success 
Success 
(less than 10 
minutes) Failure 12.2% - 27.8% 5.7% - 21.3% 1.2% - 16.8% 
Success 70.1% - 85.3% 76.6% - 91.8% 81.1% - 96.3% 
Success 
Failure  
(more than 
10 minutes) Failure 14.7% - 29.9% 8.2% - 23.4% 3.7% - 18.9% 
Success 69.0% - 84.0% 75.5% - 90.5% 80.0% - 95.0% 
Failure 
Success 
(less than 10 
minutes) Failure 16.0% - 31.0% 9.5% - 24.5% 5.0% - 20.0% 
Success 60.6% - 74.0% 67.1% - 80.5% 71.6% - 85.0% 
Failure 
Failure  
(more than 
10 minutes) Failure 26.0% - 39.4% 19.5% - 32.9% 15.0% - 28.4% 
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7.6.6 Wall Barrier Integrity Maintained (WBI) 
 
The primary purposes of fire separation construction are:  
 
1) To prevent spread of fire to other parts of the building; 
2) To maintain the buildings structural integrity; 
3) To provide a sufficient tenability along escape routes for some specified period of 
time. 
 
The selection of the fire resistance rating (FRR) for building construction often depends on 
the fire load density, ventilation factor and conversion factor, as mentioned in the Fire 
Engineering Design Guide [32]. In order to estimate the probability of the wall barrier 
integrity being maintained (PWBI), it is necessary to determine the probability of the equivalent 
time of fire exposure. If the equivalent time of fire exposure is over the provided FRR, the 
wall barrier is considered to have failed to maintain the construction integrity. By the same 
reasoning, if the provided FRR is over the equivalent time of fire exposure the wall barrier is 
considered to have maintained its integrity.  
 
The fire loads in a distribution substation containing a liquid type transformer may vary 
significantly. Depending on the rupture point of the tank, the expected amount of transformer 
oil released from the tank may be different. For example, if the rupture point is at the bottom 
of the tank, the tank of oil is expected to be released; whereas if the rupture point is on the top 
of the tank, the amount of transformer oil released from the tank is less.  
 
Literature have indicated that tank rupture, as a result of internal transformer failure such as 
arcing, is likely to occur round at the top edge of the tank. In that case, only a small amount of 
the contained dielectric fluids would be expected to be released from the tank; in other words, 
the fuel loads exposed in the transformer room would also be relatively low. However, no 
relevant studies, researches or statistical data were found to support this phenomenon. 
Therefore, to be conservative, the assessment assumes at that least half the tank of transformer 
oil (50%) would be released in the case of a fire but that the transformer oil is most likely to 
be released completely (100%).  
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According to a reference by ABB Power Transmission Pty Ltd. [103], it is understood that 
typical dry type transformers often contain less than 5% of combustible materials compared to 
the liquid type transformer. To be conservative, the fuel loads in a dry type transformer is 
considered to be determined by multiplying 5% with the fuel loads in a flammable liquid 
(mineral oil) insulated transformer. Hence, the probability of equivalent time of fire exposure 
for dry type transformer installed can be determined. 
 
The calculation of the equivalent time of fire exposure (te) is discussed in the C/AS1, as 
follows: 
 
Equation  7-3:  fbfe wket ××=  
 
where wf is the ventilation factor 
 ef is the fire load density in the design area (MJ/m2 floor area) 
 kb is a conversion factor 
 
 
Fire load density in a distribution substation (ef): 
 
A typical fire load density for power stations and transformer winding occupancy was found 
to be 600MJ/m2 from the Fire Engineering Design Guide [32]. However, this value is given 
without providing any specific details, such as the number of transformers in the station, the 
power rating of the transformers, the type of dielectric material, the volume of transformer oil 
or the size of transformer. Hence, a more specific fire load density for a distribution 
substation containing a single 750kVA transformer is determined using the following 
equations from the Fire Engineering Design Guide [32]: 
 
 
Equation  7-4:  
f
f A
Ee =  
 
Equation  7-5:  ( )∑ ×= i Ci iHME  
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Equation  7-6:  )( iii VaDM ××=  
 
where E is the total fuel load in the design area (MJ) 
 Af is the floor area (m2) 
 Mi is the mass of the fuel, i (kg) 
 Hc is the heat of combustion of the fuel, i (MJ/kg) 
 Di is the density of the fuel, i (kg/m3) 
 Vi is the volume of the fuel, i (m3) 
 
a is the fraction of oil released (0.5 for 50% oil released and 1 for 100% oil 
released) 
 i is the type of fuel 
 
 
Based on the literature reviews and the site visits, it was found that the major combustible 
material in a distribution substation consists of dielectric fluid (e.g. transformer oil), wood 
products (e.g. wooden hardboard, furniture), electrical components and power cables (e.g. 
PVC). Through discussion with a senior sales engineer [97], it is understood that a 750kVA 
liquid type transformer usually contains about 550L (0.55 m3) to 840L (0.84 m3) of 
transformer oil and the most likely volume of oil is about 600L (0.60 m3). In addition to the 
total amount of the contained dielectric fluid in a transformer, a factor is to be introduced to 
the calculation. This factor is to predict the percentage of the contained dielectric fluid is 
likely to be released in the event of a fire. However, due to a lack of available information, the 
conservatism is to assume that at least half the tank of transformer oil, 50% (minimum), 
would be released but that the transformer oil is most likely to be released completely, 100% 
(most likely value and maximum). Considering the floor area of the distribution substation is 
24 m2, the volumes of the wood products and the power cables (assuming a total of 15 m of 
35 mm2 and 10 m of 185 mm2 thick copper cables) are estimated to be about 0.16 m3 and 
0.0024 m3, respectively. The density and heat of combustion of transformer oils are referred 
to Section  4.8. Furthermore, the density and the heat of combustion for the wood products and 
the power cables are found to be 720 kg/m3 and 19.8 MJ/kg and 1710 kg/m3 and 16 MJ/kg, 
respectively. Table  7-11 indicates the input parameters and values for determining the fire 
load density. 
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Table  7-11: Input parameters and values for determining the fire load density 
 Mineral oil Silicone oil Wood products 
Power 
cables 
Density, kg/m3 830 – 890 960 – 1100 720 1710 
*Volume, m3 0.55 - 0.84 (0.6) 0.55 - 0.84 (0.6) 0.16 0.0024 
Likelihood to be present in a 
transformer room in the event 
of a fire (est. %) 
50%- 100% 
(100%) 
50%- 100% 
(100%) 100% 100% 
Heat of Combustion, MJ/kg 45.9 28 19.8 16.0 
*Note that the values in the brackets imply the most likely value 
 
Ventilation factor (wf): 
 
This factor may be calculated by knowing the dimensions of the floor area, wall/roof opening 
and height of the room. The equations are shown as follow: 
 
Equation  7-7:  5.0
1
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Equation  7-8:  25.0025.0 <<= v
f
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Equation  7-9:  20.0≤= h
f
h
h A
A αα  
 
Equation  7-10:  )101(5.12 2vvvb αα −+⋅=  
 
where H is the height of the distribution substation (m) 
 Av is the area of wall openings (m2)  
 Ah is the area of roof openings (m2) 
 Af is the floor area (m2) 
 vα  is the ratio of the area of wall opening to the floor area 
 hα  is the ratio of the area of roof opening to the floor area 
 
In the model, the floor area of the distribution substation is defined as 24 m2, 4 m by 6 m, 
with a height of 3.6 m. The size of wall openings is estimated based on the expected wall 
leakage, such as cable penetrations or doorways. As defined in Section  7.2, two 1.98 m by 
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0.8 m single doors, one internal exit via the building and one direct access to the outside, are 
to be installed in the distribution substation. The expected minimum wall opening is 0.1 m2 
assuming there is improper sealed cable penetration or leakage through the doorways; and the 
expected maximum wall opening is 3.2 m2 assuming both the single doors are fully opened in 
the case of a fire. However, it is considered to be very likely to have both doors fully opened 
in an event of a transformer fire and it is known the smaller the wall openings, the higher the 
ventilation factor and the higher the equivalent time of fire exposure would be. Therefore, to 
be conservative, the most likely wall opening is assumed to be 0.5 m2; one single door 
partially opened during fire.  
 
Due to the general restriction of openings on the roof in a distribution substation, the roof 
openings are likely to be small. However, small leakages may occur due to improper sealed 
cable penetrations and the venting system where the automatic fire damper may be defective 
or not installed. Therefore, the area of roof opening is assumed to be in the range of 0.01 m2 
and 0.1 m2 and is a uniform distribution. Table  7-12 indicates the input parameters and values 
for determining the ventilation factor. 
 
Table  7-12: Input parameter and values for determining the ventilation factor 
Floor area (m2) 24 
Height of roof (m) 3.6 
Area of wall openings (m2) 
Triangular distribution 0.1 – 3.2 
(0.5) 
Area of roof openings (m2) Uniform distribution 0.01 – 0.1 
 
Conversion factor (kb): 
 
Conversion factor is determined based on the use of the construction materials in the 
distribution substations. By knowing the thermal inertia (kρc) of the distribution substation 
construction materials, the conversion factor can be found from the table given in the Fire 
Engineering Design Guide [32]. For a high-rise building, 21.6m high, the building is 
generally constructed with concrete, but in some cases brick and masonry may be used 
instead. Because selection of the construction materials may vary in different buildings, the 
construction material is not defined in this study. Instead, sensitivity analysis was carried out 
to analysis the effects of the conversion factor on the overall results of the equivalent time 
calculation using the @Risk4.5.  
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As a result of the sensitivity analysis, it was found that conversion factor may change the 
result of equivalent time of fire exposure by about 25% to 25.7%, depending on the type of 
insulation fluid and the construction materials installed. This change is considered to be 
significant in the measurement of the equivalent time. Therefore, a range of thermal inertia is 
used to cover the thermal inertia of three possible construction materials (concrete, brick and 
masonry). Uniform distribution is used for the conversion factor with the boundaries of 0.065 
(lightweight concrete ceiling and floor, plasterboard walls) and 0.08 (Normal concrete ceiling 
and floor, plasterboard walls). Note the values of thermal conductivity (k), density (ρ) and 
specific heat (c) for these construction materials are found from Karlsson [104].  
 
Overall, the equation for the equivalent time can be rewritten by substituting Equation  7-8 
through Equation  7-10 into Equation  7-7, as follows: 
 
Equation  7-11: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cablecablecablewoodwoodwoodoiloiloil
f
fb
e HcVDHcVDHcVaDA
wk
t ⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅⋅×= )(
 
Due to the involvement of the probability distributions as listed in Table  7-13, the equivalent 
time of fire exposure (te) is determined using @Risk4.5. Using a trial-and-error method, the 
result is found to have no significant differences when the number of iterations is above 5,000. 
 
Table  7-13: The input probability distributions for the calculation of equivalent time 
Probability distribution 
Input parameters Unit 
Distribution types Min. value
Most likely 
value 
Max. 
value
Area of wall openings (Av) m2 
Triangular 
distribution 0.1 0.5 3.2 
Area of roof openings (Ah) m2 Uniform distribution 0.01 Not required 0.1 
Density of mineral oils (Doil) kg/m3 Uniform distribution 830 Not required 890 
Density of silicone oils (Doil) kg/m3 Uniform distribution 960 Not required 1100 
Total volume of the oil contain 
(Voil) m3 
Triangular 
distribution 0.55 0.60 0.84 
Est. % of oil to be released from a 
transformer in the event of a fire ----- 
Triangular 
distribution 0.50 1.0 1.0 
Conversion factor (kb) ----- Uniform distribution 0.65 Not required 0.08 
* Most likely value is not required for Uniform distribution. 
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The probability of the wall barrier integrity being maintained (PWBI) can be determined based 
on the probability distribution of the equivalent time of fire exposure. Several standard FRR 
constructions are selected to be assessed, such as FRR of 30 minute, 1 hour, 2 hour, 3 hour 
and 4 hour. These FRR levels are considered as the critical time for the wall barrier to 
maintain its integrity. In other words, when the equivalent time exceeds the critical time of the 
selected standard FRR, the wall barrier is considered to fail.  
 
A summary of the overall results is shown in Table  7-14. 
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Figure  7-6: Probability distribution of equivalent time for transformer with mineral oil  
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 Distribution for S/F41
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Figure  7-7: Probability distribution of equivalent time for transformer with silicone oil  
 
 
 
As ABB Power Transmission Pty. Ltd. [103] stated, typical dry type transformer often contain 
less than 5% of combustible materials compared to the liquid type transformers. To be 
conservative, the fuel loads in a dry type transformer is considered to be determined by 
multiplying 5% with the fuel loads in a flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer. 
Therefore, the probability of equivalent time of fire exposure for dry type transformer 
installed is determined as follows: 
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 D istribution for D/G41
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Figure  7-8: Probability distribution of equivalent time for transformer with dry type dielectric material  
 
Table  7-14: Summary of the probability distribution of wall barrier integrity maintained (PWBI) 
FRR 
construction WBI 
Flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
installed (mineral oil) 
Less flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
installed (silicone oil) 
Dry type 
transformer 
installed (dry air) 
Success 0% 0% 89% 
30 minute 
Failure 100% 100% 11% 
Success 0% 1% 100% 
1 hour 
Failure 100% 99% 0% 
Success 18% 48% 100% 
2 hour 
Failure 82% 52% 0% 
Success 64% 95% 100% 
3 hour 
Failure 36% 5% 0% 
Success 95% 100% 100% 
4 hour 
Failure 5% 0% 0% 
 
 
 
 
S: 89 % 
F: 11 %
30 min
S: 100 % 
F: 0 % 
> 1 hr 
S – PWBI_S (success) 
F – PWBI_F (failure) 
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7.6.7 Summary of the Probability Distributions for the Pathway Factors 
 
An overall summary of the probability distributions for the pathway factors in each scenario 
with a short description are shown in Table  7-15. The incident outcomes in each scenario are 
classified into four groups as follows: 
 
Group 1) Sprinkler systems success: This is the best case scenario. The sprinkler systems are 
in service and operating as intended in the event of a fire. Sprinkler heads, as a thermal 
detection system, are expected to detect the fire as well as providing an early suppression to 
control fire spread. Hence, the loss expectancy is considered to be normal. Occupants are 
expected to escape with no injuries. Fire damage to the object of origin is expected. 
 
Group 2) Sprinkler systems fail but manual Fire Service suppression is a success: This 
situation is considered as a selected probable case. In this case, the sprinkler system is 
defective, fails to operate or is just not installed in the first place, but the firefighters are able 
to control the fire. However, the fire may spread to other parts of the room. The probable 
maximum loss is expected and the fire damage to parts of the room shall be addressed. Life 
safety is not considered to be significant in this situation. No injuries are expected. 
 
Group 3) Both automatic and manual suppression measure fail but the fire is successfully 
confined to the room of origin: This situation is considered as a selected probable case. The 
probable maximum loss is expected and the fire damage to the entire room of origin shall be 
addressed. Life safety is addressed in this case.  
 
Group 4) All fire safety protection systems fail (uncontrolled fire), which is the worst case 
scenario: All detection and protection features are assumed to be out of service or ineffective 
and the FRR construction fails to limit the fire to the room. Hence, maximum foreseeable loss 
is expected and fire damage beyond the room of origin may occur. Health and life safety may 
be threatened.  
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Table  7-15: Overall summary of the probability distributions for the pathway factors 
Pathway 
factor Description 
Relevant 
scenarios Success 
1Failure 
SDS 
(Refer to 
Section  7.6.2) 
System installed, the 
probability of the system 
reliability is expressed as a 
triangular distribution  
All scenarios 
Triangular 
distribution 
 (0.78, 0.85, 
0.94) 
Triangular 
distribution 
  (0.06, 0.15, 
0.22) 
System not installed 
Scenario  
1 – 5, 4a, 4b 
0% 100% 
SS  
(Refer to 
Section  7.6.3) 
System installed, the 
probability of the system 
reliability is expressed as a 
triangular distribution  
Scenario 6 – 
10, 7a, 7b 
Triangular 
distribution 
 (0.81, 0.93, 1) 
Triangular 
distribution 
 (0, 0.07, 0.19)
FAT 
(Refer to 
Section  7.6.4) 
The time between the Fire 
Service being alerted and the 
firefighters starting to take 
action to fight the fire (ta_a) is 
less than 10min. Triangular 
distribution is obtained for the 
probabilities based on the 
NZFS FRIS data. This factor 
is appropriate for all 
scenarios. 
All scenarios 
Triangular 
distribution 
 (0, 0.41, 0.8) 
Triangular 
distribution 
  (0.2, 0.59, 1) 
 
1 Note that sum of the success and failure probability for the same factor should be equal to 
one. To avoid confliction occur (success and failure probability for a same factor do not equal 
to one) while the Monte Carlo simulation, the probability distribution of success is used in the 
simulation and the probability of failure is simply equal to one minus the probability of 
success, i.e. P (failure) = 1 - P (Success). However, the probability distributions of failure are 
given for reference. 
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Table  7-15 continued 
Pathway 
factor Description 
Relevant 
scenarios Success 
1 Failure 
a) Flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.72, 0.88) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.12, 0.28) 
b) Less flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 
4a, 7a 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.79, 0.94) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.06 0.21) 
Case 1:  
SDS success 
FAT success 
c) Dry type transformer 
(Dry air) 
Scenario 
4b, 7b 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.83, 0.99) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.01, 0.17) 
a) Flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.70, 0.85) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.15, 0.30) 
b) Less flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 
4a, 7a 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.77, 0.92) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.08, 0.23) 
Case 2:  
SDS success 
FAT failure 
c) Dry type transformer 
(Dry air) 
Scenario 
4b, 7b 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.81, 0.96) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.04, 0.19) 
a) Flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.69, 0.84) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.16, 0.31) 
b) Less flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 
4a, 7a 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.76, 0.91) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.09, 0.24) 
Case 3:  
SDS failure  
FAT success 
c) Dry type transformer 
(Dry air) 
Scenario 
4b, 7b 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.80, 0.95) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.05, 0.20) 
a) Flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.61, 0.74) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.26, 0.39) 
b) Less flammable liquid 
insulated transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 
4a, 7a 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.67, 0.81) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.19, 0.33) 
2 MFF  
(Refer to 
Section  7.6.5) 
Case 4:  
SDS failure 
FAT failure 
c) Dry type transformer 
(Dry air) 
Scenario 
4b, 7b 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.72, 0.85) 
Uniform 
distribution  
(0.15, 0.28) 
2 Note that all four cases are expected to be used in all scenarios. The difference between the 
four cases is a combination of early earning system (i.e. SDS) and the intervention time (i.e. 
FAT). These events are expected in each of the scenarios and; therefore, all four cases are to 
be used in the assessment for each scenario. 
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Table  7-15 continued 
Pathway 
factor Description 
Relevant 
scenarios Success 
1Failure 
Case 1: 
Construction 
having a FRR 
of 30 minute 
a) Flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 0% 100% 
a) Flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 0% 100% 
b) Less flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 7a 1% 99% 
Case 2: 
Construction 
having a FRR 
of 1 hour  
c) Dry type 
transformer (Dry 
air) 
Scenario 7b 100% 0% 
Case 3: 
Construction 
having a FRR 
of 2 hour  
a) Flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 18% 82% 
a) Flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 64% 36% 
b) Less flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Silicone oil) 
Scenario 4a 95% 5% 
Case 4: 
Construction 
having a FRR 
of 3 hour 
c) Dry type 
transformer (Dry 
air) 
Scenario 4b 100% 0% 
3 WBI  
(Refer to 
Section 
 7.6.6) 
Case 5: 
Construction 
having a FRR 
of 4 hour 
a) Flammable 
liquid insulated 
transformer 
(Mineral oil) 
Scenario 
1 – 10 95% 5% 
 
3 Note that only construction having a FRR of 1 hour and 3 hour is further assessed in 
Scenario 7a and 7b and Scenario 4a and 4b with different transformer types. Hence, the PWBI 
for these scenarios are also included in the table above. 
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7.7 Quantification of the Consequence 
 
7.7.1 Introduction 
 
Consequence of fire can generally be categorized into one of the followings: 
 
• Property damage 
• Life safety exposure  
• Business interruption 
• Environmental impact 
 
However, for the purpose of this research, only the life safety exposure is examined as 
consequences in fire. To determine the life safety consequence, two significant parameters are 
considered. These are the rates of civilian fatalities and injuries in fire and the value of 
statistical life (VSL).  
 
7.7.2 Rate of civilian fatalities and injuries 
 
In this chapter, the rate of civilian fatalities and injuries for each outcome event from the 
event tree analysis are determined based on the effectiveness of various combinations of fire 
safety systems in the building. This approach has also been introduced in Thomas [80].  
 
Thomas [80] has studied the effectiveness of several fire safety systems in fires reported to 
the NFIRS between 1983 and 1995. In the study, it compared the consequence of fires for the 
various occupancies and with the various combinations of sprinkle, detector and FRR 
construction presence with respects to the number of fire fighter and civilian casualties and 
estimated property losses. The effectiveness of sprinkler, detector and FRR construction in 
reducing death and injury for residential apartments and retails is extracted from Thomas [80] 
and reproduced in Table  7-16. 
 
Note that in comparison with the life safety consequence of distribution substation fires 
between 1980 and 2002 reported to the NFIRS as indicated in Table  5-1 (2.1 to 2.8 fatalities 
per 1000 fire and 39 to 57 injuries per 1000 fire), the rate of casualties in Thomas study is 
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considered to be more conservative (2.8 to 11 fatalities per 1000 fire and 90 to 117 injuries 
per 1000 fire).  
 
Table  7-16: Rate of casualties in residential apartment and retail areas with various combinations of 
fire safety systems 
Detector Sprinkler 
FRR 
construction 
Rate of civilian 
fatalities per 
1000 fires 
Rate of civilian 
injury per 1000 
fires 
Present Present Present 2.8 90.4 
Present Absent Present 6.8 109.4 
Present Absent Absent 8.7 116.8 
Absent Present Present 3.7 76.8 
Absent Absent Present 8.3 95.5 
Absent Absent Absent 11 102.6 
 
The total rates of civilian fatalities and injuries per fire for each outcome event from the Event 
Tree Analysis are shown in Table  7-17. As expected, in the event of sprinkler or MFF control 
fire, the FRR construction is considered to be able to withstand the fire; therefore, the rate of 
casualties of Event 2 is assumed to be equal to Event 3 (also applies to Event 5 / Event 6, 
Event 9 / Event 10 and Event 12 / Event 13).  
 
Moreover, the pathway factor of FAT is expected to affect the probability of manual fire 
fighting (MFF) only and it was included during the likelihood calculation, and therefore, the 
civilian fatality rate of Event 2 is assumed to be equal to Event 5 (also applies to Event 3 / 
Event 6, Event 4 / Event 7, Event 9 / Event 12, Event 10 / Event 13 and Event 11 / Event 14) 
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Table  7-17: Rate of casualties per fire in the model building with various combinations of fire safety 
systems for each outcome event.   
Initiating 
event SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Event 
No. 
Rate of civilian 
fatality per fire 
Rate of civilian 
injury per fire 
           
  Yes      Yes 1 2.8 x 10-3 90.4 x 10-3 
           
     Yes  Yes 2 6.8 x 10-3 109.4 x 10-3 
            
 Yes  Yes  Yes 3 6.8 x 10-3 109.4 x 10-3 
        No       
          No 4 8.7 x 10-3 116.8 x 10-3 
    No        
       Yes Yes 5 6.8 x 10-3 109.4 x 10-3 
             
   No  Yes 6 6.8 x 10-3 109.4 x 10-3 Transfor
mer fire      No       
       No 7 8.7 x 10-3 116.8 x 10-3 
           
   Yes     Yes 8 3.7 x 10-3 76.8 x 10-3 
            
      Yes Yes 9 8.3 x 10-3 95.5 x 10-3 
             
  No  Yes  Yes 10 8.3 x 10-3 95.5 x 10-3 
       No       
         No 11 11.0 x 10-3 102.6 x 10-3 
   No        
     Yes Yes 12 8.3 x 10-3 95.5 x 10-3 
            
    No  Yes 13 8.3 x 10-3 95.5 x 10-3 
     No       
      No 14 11.0 x 10-3 102.6 x 10-3 
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7.7.3 Value of statistical life 
 
To estimate the total risk of a transformer fire, these outcome events must have a common 
unit. One typical way is to translate the outcome event into the equivalent monetary value 
(EMV). From the literature review, it is understood that the approach of placing a value on 
casualties in fire has been questioned by relevant stakeholders. However, Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) [105] and Ashe W. et al. [106] have indicated that indeed, 
such values are implicit in decision made for many organizations, in particular for Department 
of Transport (e.g. decision on whether to fund a road improvement), Department of Fire 
Service (e.g. how much to spend on the fire protection systems versus the life safety 
consequence) as well as the medical insurance companies and the like.  
 
In addition, Krupnick [107] also stated that the value of statistical life (VSL) is an expression 
of the preference of reducing the risk of death (in monetary terms). Therefore, in this research, 
the civilian fatalities and injuries are to be translated to an equivalent monetary value (EMV) 
for the cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Depending on the age group, educational qualification and wealth, the value of a statistical 
life in 2002 to 2006 is found to be in a range of NZD $1.9 million and NZD $15million from 
ODPM [105] (United Kingdom), Ashe [106] (Australia), Slayter [108] (Australia), Danish 
Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) [109] (Denmark), Ministry of Transport [110] 
(New Zealand), Aldy and Viscusi [98] (USA), Krupnick  [107] (USA) and a text book, Barry 
[93] (USA). Considering these studies, the values used in this research are $3 million for the 
value of a fatality and $ 250,000 for the value of an injury.  
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7.7.4 Consequence of a fire 
 
As the result, the life safety consequence of all 14 outcome events is translated to an EMV as 
indicated in Table  7-18.  
 
Table  7-18: EMV for the life safety consequence of each outcome events 
Event 
No. 
Rate of civilian 
fatality per fire 
Value of a 
fatality 
Rate of civilian 
injury per fire 
Value of an 
injury 
Equivalent 
Monetary Value 
(EMV) NZD$ 
1 0.0028 $3,000,000 0.0944 $250,000 $32,000 
2 0.0068 $3,000,000 0.1094 $250,000 $47,750 
3 0.0068 $3,000,000 0.1094 $250,000 $47,750 
4 0.0087 $3,000,000 0.1168 $250,000 $55,300 
5 0.0068 $3,000,000 0.1094 $250,000 $47,750 
6 0.0068 $3,000,000 0.1094 $250,000 $47,750 
7 0.0087 $3,000,000 0.1168 $250,000 $55,300 
8 0.0037 $3,000,000 0.0768 $250,000 $30,300 
9 0.0083 $3,000,000 0.0955 $250,000 $48,775 
10 0.0083 $3,000,000 0.0955 $250,000 $48,775 
11 0.0110 $3,000,000 0.1026 $250,000 $58,650 
12 0.0083 $3,000,000 0.0955 $250,000 $48,775 
13 0.0083 $3,000,000 0.0955 $250,000 $48,775 
14 0.0110 $3,000,000 0.1026 $250,000 $58,650 
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7.8 Fire Risk Estimation 
 
Risk estimation is a process for assigning the frequencies and consequences of the hazardous 
event into various levels of risk. It can be expressed in terms of the likelihood of incident 
outcomes (outcomes probability) and the consequences (translated into the EMV) as 
illustrated in Equation  7-2. The probability distributions for each of the pathway factors have 
been introduced in Section  7.6.2 through to Section  7.6.6. Based on these defined probability 
distributions, Monte Carlo simulations for the fire risk estimation were conducted using 
@Risk4.5 as discussed in Section  7.1. In the simulations, the settings generally follow the 
default choice except for the sampling type and the number of iterations.  
 
In the simulations, “Monte Carlo” is selected as the type of sampling. For the number of 
iterations, a trial-and-error method is used. It is found that the results would have no 
significant differences when the number of iterations rises above 5,000. Hence, 5,000 
iterations are considered to be sufficient for the simulation. A summary of the statistical 
values of the total risk (NZD$/ fire incident) for each scenario is shown in Table  7-19 (Refer 
to Appendix E).  
 
Note that this research primarily assumed that the fire protection required by the compliance 
document (C/AS1) is considered as the minimum requirements in the assessment, such as 
installing smoke detection and alarm systems and a minimum of 30 minute fire separation 
between the distribution substation and the interior spaces of the building. Scenario 1, which 
has the minimum fire protection requirements, is expected to have the highest risk compared 
to other scenarios.  
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Table  7-19: summary of the statistical values of the total risk (NZD$/fire incident) for each scenario 
Total risk: NZD$/ fire incident 
Re (existing risk of the base case) or Rm (modified risk of the alternative)  
Mean Standard Deviation 5% tile 95% tile Min Max 
Scenario 1 
(Base case 1) 49,690 240 49,310 50,080 49,013 50,450 
Scenario 2 49,690  240 49,310 50,080 49,010 50,450 
Scenario 3 49,330 190 49,030 49,650 48,780 49,950 
Scenario 4 48,620 100 48,450 48,790 48,310 48,960 
Scenario 5 47,990  40 47,920 48,050 47,890 48,090 
Scenario 6 32,520  710 31,440 33,800 30,990 34,460 
Scenario 7 32,520  710 31,440 33,800 30,990 34,460 
Scenario 8 32,490  700 31,430 33,740 30,990 34,380 
Scenario 9 32,420  670 31,400 33,620 30,980 34,210 
Scenario 10 32,370  650 31,390 33,530 30,980 34,060 
Scenario 4 
(Base case 2) 48,620 100 48,450 48,790 48,310 48,960 
Scenario 4a 47,960 40 47,900 48,030 47,850 48,070 
Scenario 4b 47,900 30 47,840 47,950 47,810 47,980 
Scenario 7 
(Base case 3) 32,520  710 31,440 33,800 30,990 34,460 
Scenario 7a 32,470 690 31,480 33,700 30,990 34,300 
Scenario 7b 32,360 640 31,380 33,510 30,980 34,040 
Mean Min Max 95% tile5% tile 
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As a result of the Monte Carlo simulation, the sensitivity to the total risk is also obtained. As 
the result, it is found that active fire safety systems, such as smoke detection systems and 
sprinkler systems, are the most sensitive parameters. In particular, when a sprinkler system is 
presented in the building (Scenario 6 to Scenario 10), it is always the most sensitive factor.  
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CHAPTER 8 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 Introduction to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a practical way of evaluating the economic efficiency of resource 
allocation. By analysing the cost requirement for the risk reduction alternatives and 
determining the benefit cost ratio (B/C), the mutually exclusive scenarios may have a 
common unit so that they can be compared and ranked in accordance to their priorities. As a 
result, the economically best investment can be found. Overall, the information provided from 
the B/C analysis may include: 
 
• The estimated equivalent monetary value of the fire risk reduction 
• The initial and annual cost of the alternatives 
• The B/C ratio 
 
Any alternative scenario with a B/C ratio above one is considered to be a beneficial 
investment. In addition to the B/C analysis, the effectiveness and efficiency of the alternative 
scenarios are also discussed in this study. Since the main concern of this study is the health 
and safety impacts on people (life safety consequences), the benefit of the risk reduction 
alternatives primarily apply to the building occupants. Note that loss of property (impact on 
property), business interruption costs (impact on the retail shops) and environmental damage 
are excluded from this assessment. 
 
In this chapter, the 14 scenarios are analysed based on three critical base scenarios. A scenario 
with the lowest level of fire protection (Scenario 1) is considered as the base case for Scenario 
2 – Scenario 10, where a flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer is used. The 
purpose of this part of the analysis is to evaluate the cost and benefit of different fire safety 
designs without the influence of different transformer types.  
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Thereafter, Scenario 4 and Scenario 7 are selected as the base cases for Scenario 4a and 4b 
and Scenario 7a and 7b, respectively. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to evaluate the 
cost and benefits of different types of transformers, such as less flammable liquid (silicone oil) 
insulated transformers and dry type (dry air) transformers. The reason for selecting Scenario 4 
and Scenario 7 as the base cases in this part is due to the fire safety designs in these two 
scenarios being recommended in the NFPA as mentioned in Table  3-5. Note that NFPA is the 
only standard provided the fire protection requirements for other types of transformers. 
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8.2 Methodology 
 
According to the benefit cost analysis manual [111], the benefit cost ratio (B/C) can be 
measured by the total discounted benefits divided by the total discounted costs. In general, it 
is a beneficial investment if the B/C ratio is greater than one. The factors of the B/C ratio 
include: 
  
? The existing risk estimated for the base case;  
? The modified risk estimated for the alternatives; 
? Initial cost of the alternatives; 
? Annual cost of the alternatives; 
? The present worth factor which is a function of the interest rate; 
? The estimated useful lifetime of the system.  
 
The following equations are extracted from the benefit cost analysis manual [111] to 
determine the B/C ratio: 
 
Equation  8-1: 
( )
CI
NiAPACB ,,// =  Equation  8-2: CB ARA −=  
Equation  8-3: meB RRR −=  Equation  8-4: ( ) ( )( )N
N
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iNiAP +⋅
−+=
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11,,/  
 
where B/C is the benefit cost ratio 
 A is the cost avoidance ($) 
 IC is the initial cost ($) 
 AC is the annual cost ($) 
 RB is the risk benefit ($) 
 Re is the existing estimate risk ($) 
 Rm is the modified estimate risk ($) 
 P/A is the present worth factor 
 i is the interest rate (%) 
 N is the useful lifetime (year) 
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In the following section, both initial and annual costs of individual systems or equipment are 
provided with a distribution to capture the uncertainty in the values. However, only the mean 
value is used to determine the B/C ratio.  
 
For the calculation, the annual interest rate (7%) is assumed to be constant throughout the 
useful lifetime of the distribution substation (30 years). The value of the annual interest rate is 
obtained by averaging the annual interest rate from different banks in New Zealand in 2006. 
As introduced by Tremblay [69], Guy [112] and ABB Power Transmission [113], an average 
useful lifetime of 30 years is considered to be appropriate for the major equipment in 
distribution substations, such as transformers and switchgear. As a result, the present worth 
factor (P/A, i, N) is determined to be 12.41 using Equation  8-4. 
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8.3 Cost Analysis for the Risk Reduction Alternatives 
 
8.3.1 Cost Consideration 
 
Costs of alternative scenarios can be expressed in terms of their initial costs and annual costs. 
In this study, initial costs are defined as the cost incurred during the first year from the system 
being installed, whilst annual costs are the ongoing operating costs for maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the system. The initial costs can be determined by the sum of two separate 
costs; these are: 
  
? System (equipment) costs; 
? Installation (labour) costs.  
 
It is understood that the installation costs are very difficult to predict because it can vary 
significantly depending on the individual case. Rawlinsons 2004 [114] has proposed an 
allowance of 5% to 10% on top of the equipment costs is considered to be appropriate for the 
total initial costs. In addition, the cost of the individual equipment or systems are measured 
based on the values given in Rawlinsons 2004 [114].  
 
On the other hand, the annual costs are the ongoing costs. These costs may include the 
following:  
 
? Maintenance costs (e.g. cleaning for dry type transformers); 
? Inspection and testing costs (e.g. sprinkler heads, detectors);  
? Ongoing operating costs (e.g. transmission connection, on-duty observers); 
? Replacement costs (e.g. oil replacements). 
 
The cost estimates for individual equipment or systems are discussed in the following sections. 
Note that, smoke detection system is considered to be a common system for all scenarios; 
therefore, no additional costs are required from the base case. Hence, the costs estimates for 
the smoke detection system are not discussed in the analysis. 
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8.3.2 Sprinkler System 
 
As defined previously, the model building is not protected with sprinkler systems. Therefore, 
if sprinkler systems are installed in a distribution substation, the total cost of the sprinkler 
systems should include the cost of sprinkler heads, control board, pipes, fittings, valves and 
the like. It is understood that in sprinklered buildings, sprinkler system is likely to be 
extended to the distribution substation inside and the costs of this extension is expected to be 
low. Therefore, the cost-effectiveness of installing a sprinkler system in the distribution 
substation inside a sprinklered building is expected to be higher than installing a sprinkler 
system in the distribution substation inside a non-sprinklered building due to its low cost. To 
be conservative, this research only assesses the risk of transformer fire in a non-sprinklered 
building. Hence, the costs of control board, valves and the like are included in the assessment. 
 
It is understood that typical high-rise non-sprinklered buildings generally contain two 
individual main pipes from the main water supply: one is for the building use and another one 
is for fire hydrants. If sprinkler systems are installed, an additional main pipe is required for 
supporting the sprinkler systems separately from another two main pipe. However, through 
discussion with a fire service engineer [115], it is understood that the additional main pipe for 
the sprinkler systems may not be necessary to the model building in this assessment. It is due 
to the required water flow to the sprinkler heads in the distribution substation on ground floor 
being able to be supported by the fire hydrant pipe. 
 
In the model building, the distribution substation is located on the ground floor of the building. 
The floor area is 24 m2 with floor-to-ceiling height of 3.6 m. As mentioned, the water supply 
to the sprinkler heads is from another main pipe (fire hydrant). Figure  8-1 shows typical 
sprinkler systems and associated equipment for distribution substations. As stated in Standard 
NZS 4541:2003 [33], each sprinkler head can provide a coverage of 3 m by 4 m (12 m2). 
However, due to the shape of the distribution substation, three sprinkler heads are required to 
provide a full coverage to the area. The associated equipment of the sprinkler systems 
includes a gate valve, a monitored valve, an inspectors connection and the Fire Service 
connection, as discussed by Puchovsky [116].   
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Figure  8-1: Basic components of the sprinkler systems in the distribution substation 
 
 
According to Standard NZS 4541:2003 [33], the required water discharge density for liquid 
type and dry type transformers is at least 10 mm/min and 5 mm/min, respectively. As known, 
higher water discharge densities usually require larger pipe sizes, valves and fittings. 
Therefore, the cost of sprinkler systems for liquid type transformers is expected to be higher 
than the dry type transformers. 
 
The total cost of the sprinkler systems for a distribution substation with different types of 
transformers, in the model building, has been evaluated by the fire service engineer [115]. 
Considering that the water flow and pressure of the existing fire hydrant pipe is sufficient to 
support the sprinkler systems (no pumps are required), a conservative total cost of the 
sprinkler systems are estimated to be in the range of NZD$10,000 to NZD$14,000 for 
distribution substations with a liquid type transformer and NZD$9,000 to NZD$13,000 for 
distribution substations with a dry type transformer. Note that the given costs have included 
the installation costs.  
 
4m 
6m
3.6m
2m 2m
 
(1) Pipe for Building Use 
(2) Pipe for Fire hydrant 
(3) Pipe for sprinkler system 
(4) Gate valve to control water 
supply to system 
(5) Monitored valve and flow 
switch 
(6) Fire dept. connection 
(7) Control board 
(8) Inspector’s test connection 
(9) Sprinkler head 
Main water supply 
(1) (2) (3) 
(5)
2m 
2m 1m 1m 
(9) (9) (9) 
(3) 
(4) 
(6) 
(8) 
(7) 
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The frequency of the sprinkler systems inspection and testing are covered by Standard AS 
1851:2005 [117]. For different parts of the system, the required inspection and testing may 
vary from once a year to as much as once a week. For instance, the sprinkler system interface 
control valves are required to be inspected weekly while the alarm valve is to be inspected 
yearly.  
 
Through discussion with a senior fire protection engineer [118], the annual inspection and 
testing cost is estimated to be in the range of NZD$400 to NZD$600 (including weekly 
inspection and testing). On the other hand, the cost of the transmission connection to on-duty 
observer is advised to be about NZD$200 to NZD$300. In addition, the replacement cost is 
assumed to be in the range of NZD$0 to NZD$200 per year which may include the cost of 
sprinkler heads, fitting and the like. Table  8-1 shows the cost of sprinkler systems in a 
distribution substation and a summary of the initial costs and annual costs are indicated in 
Table  8-2. 
 
Table  8-1: Cost of sprinkler systems in the distribution substation 
Description Cost (NZD$) 
System/ Installation cost Sprinkler systems for distribution substation with a liquid oil insulated transformer $10,000 - $14,000 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $400 - $600 pa 
On-going operation cost Transmission connection to on-duty observer $200 - $300 pa 
Replacement cost General equipment (e.g. sprinkler heads) $0 - $200 pa 
System/ Installation cost Sprinkler systems for distribution substation with a dry type transformer $9,000 - $13,000 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $400 - $600 pa 
On-going operation cost Transmission connection to on-duty observer $200 - $300 pa 
Replacement cost General equipment (e.g. sprinkler heads) $0 - $200 pa 
 
Table  8-2: Initial costs and annual costs of sprinkler systems 
Initial cost (NZD$) Annual cost (NZD$) Relevant 
scenarios Transformer type Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. 
Scenario 1~5, 4a Liquid oil type $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Scenario 6~10, 7a Liquid oil type $10,000 $12,000 $14,000 $600 $850 $1,100 
Scenario 4b, 7b Dry type $9,000 $11,000 $13,000 $600 $850 $1,100 
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8.3.3 Fire Resistance Rated Constructions (Wall barrier)  
 
The cost of the FRR construction is determined based on the area of interior walls and the fire 
doors in the distribution substation. In this case, the total area of interior walls is determined 
to be 68.8m2 (subtract the area of the fire doors). The cost of the fire walls and doors are 
found in Rawlinsons 2004 [114]. As mentioned previously, the labour cost is to be 5% to 10% 
of the equipment cost. 
 
As expected, FRR construction has a very high reliability. According to Standard 
AS 1851:2005 (Table 17.4.1.1: Fire and Smoke barriers – walls) [117], fire construction is 
required to be inspected once every half year (e.g. check of penetrations and dampers). The 
maintenance, inspection and testing costs are provided by Integrity Fire Protection. An 
inspection cost of NZD$300 to NZD$600 is estimated. Hence, the cost of the FRR 
constructions and a summary of the initial costs and annual costs of the FRR construction 
system are shown in Table  8-3 and Table  8-4, respectively.  
 
Table  8-3: Cost of the FRR constructions 
Description Cost (NZD$) 
FRR wall: ($128/m2 - $136/m2) * 68.8m2 $8,800 - $9,400 
System cost 
Fire Door: $1,150 each (for two doors) $2,300 
Installation cost 5% - 10% of the system costs $560 - $1,170 
30 
min 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $300 - $600 pa 
FRR wall: ($132/m2 - $142/m2) * 68.8m2 $9,000 - $9,800 
System cost 
Fire Door: $1,350 each (for two doors) $2,700 
Installation cost 5% - 10% of the system costs $590 - $1,250 
1 hr 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $300 - $600 pa 
FRR wall: ($157/m2 - $170/m2) * 68.8m2 $10,000 - $11,700 
System cost 
Fire Door: $1,500 each (for two doors) $3,000 
Installation cost 5% - 10% of the system costs $590 - $1,470 
2 hr 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $300 - $600 pa 
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Table  8-3 continued  
Description Cost (NZD$) 
FRR wall: ($159/m2 - $168/m2) * 68.8m2 $10,900 - $11,700 
System cost 
Fire Door: $1,750 each (for two doors) $3,500 
Installation cost 5% - 10% of the system costs $720 - $1,520 
3 hr 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $300 - $600 pa 
FRR wall : ($173/m2 - $205/m2) * 68.8m2 $11,900 - $ 14,100 
System cost 
Fire Door : $2,100 each (for two doors) $4,200 
Installation cost 5% - 10% of the system costs $805 - $1,830 
4 hr 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $300 - $600 pa 
 
 
Table  8-4: Initial costs and annual costs of the FRR construction 
Initial cost (NZD$) Annual cost (NZD$)Relevant 
scenarios Description Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
Scenario 1, 6 30 minute FRR: total FRR wall area = 68.8m2, two single doors $11,700 $12,300 $12,900 $300 $450 $600
Scenario 2, 7, 
7a, 7b 
1 hour FRR: total FRR wall area 
= 68.8m2, two single doors $12,300 $13,100 $13,800 $300 $450 $600
Scenario 3, 8 2 hour FRR: total FRR wall area = 68.8m2, two single doors $13,700 $15,400 $16,200 $300 $450 $600
Scenario 4, 9, 
4a, 4b 
3 hour FRR: total FRR wall area 
= 68.8m2, two single doors $15,100 $16,000 $16,700 $300 $450 $600
Scenario 5, 10 4 hour FRR: total FRR wall area = 68.8m2, two single doors $16,900 $18,900 $20,100 $300 $450 $600
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8.3.4 Type of Transformer 
 
Three types of transformers are evaluated in this research. These include: 
 
? Flammable liquid insulated transformer (mineral oil)  
? Less flammable liquid insulated transformer (silicone oil) 
? Dry type transformer (dry air)  
 
A mineral oil insulated transformer is chosen as the base transformer type for the assessment. 
Through discussion with a senior sales engineer [97], the cost of a mineral oil insulated 
transformer is estimated about NZD$26,000 to NZD$28,000. The cost relationship between 
other types of transformer and the mineral oil insulated transformer is found in Goudie [56]. 
Taking the cost of a mineral oil insulated transformer as 100%, the relative initial costs of 
silicone oil insulated transformers and dry type transformers are found to be between 125% to 
135% and between 130% to 200%, respectively (including the initial cost of the dielectric 
fluid). Therefore, the cost of a silicone oil insulated transformer and a dry type transformer are 
determined to be in the range of NZD$32,500 to NZD$37,800 and NZD$33,800 to 
NZD$56,000, respectively, as shown in Table  8-5. 
 
The Hydroelectric Research and Technical Services Group [119] states that transformer oil 
rehabilitation should take place at the 10-year point and so on until the end of the useful 
lifetime of the transformer (approximately 30 years). Therefore, it is assumed the entire 
volume of transformer oil is replaced once every 10 years. In the recent market, the cost of 
mineral oil and silicone oil is found to be NZD$15 to NZD$30 and NZD$12 to NZD$15 per 
litre, respectively. Hence, for a transformer containing about 550L to 840L of oil, the cost of 
oil retrofill is estimated to be NZD$8,250 to NZD$25,200 (mineral oil) and NZD$6,600 to 
NZD$12,600 (silicone oil). Assuming the retrofill cost is equally split into 10 years, the 
replacement cost is estimated to be about NZD$825 to NZD$2520 (mineral oil) and 
NZD$660 to NZD$1,260 (silicone oil) per year.  
 
For the inspection and testing cost, the senior sales engineer [97] suggested that the annual 
maintenance cost of liquid type transformers is to be at least twice that of the dry type 
transformers. Note that the maintenance cost relationship between liquid type and dry type 
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transformers recommended is in disagreement with the reference by Goudie and Chatterton 
[56] as indicated in Section  4.7.1. It is because the testing cost of the dielectric materials are 
excluded in Goudie and Chatterton [56]. Therefore, the maintenance cost relationship 
proposed by the senior sales engineer [97] is used in the assessment. As advised, the 
maintenance cost of liquid type transformers is about NZD$400 to NZD$600 per year. 
Therefore, the maintenance cost of dry type transformers is estimated to be NZD$200 to 
NZD$300 per year. Note that replacement costs of a dry type transformer are likely to be low 
and is generally included in the inspection and testing costs. Therefore, it is neglected in the 
assessment. A summary of the initial costs and annual costs of different types of transformers 
are shown in Table  8-6.  
 
Table  8-5: Cost of different types of transformer 
Description Cost (NZD$) 
System/ Installation cost Flammable liquid insulated transformer (mineral oil) $26,000 - $28,000 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified  $400 - $600 pa 
Replacement cost Replace once in 10 years. Oil costs $15 - $30 per liter with a total of 550L - 840L oil  $830 - $2,520 pa 
System/ Installation cost 
Less flammable liquid insulated 
transformer (Silicone oil): 25%~35% 
above the cost of a mineral oil insulated 
transformer 
$32,500 - $37,800 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $400 - $600 pa 
Replacement cost Replace once in 10 years. Oil costs $12 - $15 per liter with a total of 550L - 840L oil $660 - $1,260 pa 
System/ Installation cost 
Dry type transformer (Dry air): 30%~100% 
above the cost of a mineral oil insulated 
transformer 
$33,800 - $56,000 
Inspection and testing cost Expert engineer justified $200 - $300 pa 
Replacement cost Very low and is included in the inspection and testing cost Neglect 
 
Table  8-6: Initial costs and annual costs of different types of transformers 
Initial cost (NZD$) Annual cost (NZD$) Relevant 
scenarios Description Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. 
Scenario 1 – 10 Liquid type (Mineral oil) $26,000 $27,000 $28,000 $1,230 $1,990 $3,120
Scenario 4a, 7a Liquid type (Silicone oil) $32,500 $35,200 $37,800 $1,060 $1,400 $1,860
Scenario 4b, 7b Dry type (Dry air) $33,800 $44,900 $56,000 $200 $250 $300
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8.3.5 Summary of the Cost Estimate  
 
A summary of the initial costs and annual costs for each scenario is shown in Table  8-7.  
 
Table  8-7: Summary of initial costs and annual costs (Mean value only) 
Sprinkler system FRR construction Transformer type Total cost 
 IC   
(NZD$) 
Ac 
(NZD$) 
IC   
(NZD$) 
Ac 
(NZD$) 
IC   
(NZD$) 
Ac 
(NZD$) 
IC   
(NZD$) 
Ac 
(NZD$) 
Scenario 1 
(Base case 1) $0  $0  $12,330 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $39,330 $2,440
Scenario 2 $0  $0  $13,140 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $40,140 $2,440
Scenario 3 $0  $0  $15,440 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $42,440 $2,440
Scenario 4 $0  $0  $15,980 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $42,980 $2,440
Scenario 5 $0  $0  $18,640 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $45,640 $2,440
Scenario 6 $12,000  $800  $12,330 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $51,330 $3,240
Scenario 7 $12,000  $800  $13,140 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $52,140 $3,240
Scenario 8 $12,000  $800  $15,440 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $54,440 $3,240
Scenario 9 $12,000  $800  $15,980 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $54,980 $3,240
Scenario 10 $12,000  $800  $18,640 $450 $27,000 $1,990 $57,640 $3,240
Scenario 4 
(Base case 2) 
$0  $0  $15,980 $450 $27,000 $1,990  $42,980 $2,440
Scenario 4a $0  $0  $15,980  $450  $35,100 $1,390  $51,080 $1,840
Scenario 4b $0  $0  $15,980  $450  $44,550 $250  $60,530 $700
Scenario 7 
(Base case 3) 
$12,000  $800  $13,140 $450 $27,000 $1,990  $52,140 $3,240
Scenario 7a $12,000  $800  $13,140 $450 $35,100 $1,390  $60,240 $2,640
Scenario 7b $11,000  $800  $13,140 $450 $44,550 $250  $68,690 $1,500
Note: Ic is the initial costs and Ac is the annual costs 
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8.4 Risk Reduction Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
According to Barry [93], Cost Benefit ratio (B/C) can be determined using Equation  8-1. 
Given the present worth factor (P/A, i, N) of 12.41, the equation of benefit cost ratio can be 
rewritten by substituting Equation  8-2 and Equation  8-3, as follows: 
 
Equation  8-5: 
( )
C
Cme
I
ARRCB −−⋅= 41.12/  
 
Based on the estimated total risk in Section  7.8 and the initial and annual costs in Section 
 8.3.5, the B/C ratio for the risk reduction strategies are determined using Equation  8-5. Note 
that the estimated total risk of the base case is considered as the existing risk (Re) while the 
estimated total risk of the alternatives is the modified risk (Rm). In the B/C ratio calculation, 
the initial costs (IC) and annual costs (AC) of the alternatives are determined based on the cost 
difference from its respective base case.  
 
For scenarios being a base case, no B/C ratio is expected since no risk benefit is expected. A 
summary of the results of the B/C ratio calculation is indicated in Table  8-8 (Also refer to 
Appendix F). In addition, the ranking of the B/C ratio of the alternatives are listed 
systematically in Table  8-9 through Table  8-11.  
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Table  8-8: A summary of the results of the B/C ratio calculation 
 
1 Existing risk, Re (NZD$) 
1 Modified risk, Rm (NZD$) 
2 Risk benefit 
RB (NZD$) 
3 Initial costs 
IC (NZD$) 
3 Annual costs 
AC (NZD$) 
B/C 
ratio 
Scenario 1 
(Base case 1) 
49,690 $0    N/A 
Scenario 2 49,690  $0  $810 $0  0.0  
Scenario 3 49,330 $360 $3,110  $0  1.4  
Scenario 4 48,620 $1,080  $3,650  $0  3.7  
Scenario 5 47,990  $1,700  $6,310 $0  3.4  
Scenario 6 32,520  $17,180  $12,000  $850  16.9  
Scenario 7 32,520  $17,180  $12,810  $850  15.8  
Scenario 8 32,490  $17,210  $15,110  $850  13.4  
Scenario 9 32,420  $17,270  $15,650  $850  13.0  
Scenario 10 32,370  $17,320  $18,310  $850  11.2  
Scenario 4 
(Base case 2) 
48,620 $0 $0 $0 N/A  
Scenario 4a 47,960 $650  $8,100  ($560) 1.9  
Scenario 4b 47,900 $720  $17,550  ($1,740) 1.7  
Scenario 7 
(Base case 3) 
32,520  $0 $0 $0 N/A  
Scenario 7a 32,470 $50  $8,100  ($600) 1.0  
Scenario 7b 32,360 $150  $16,550  ($1,740) 1.4  
 
1 Note that the estimated total risk of the base case is the existing risk, Re, and the estimated total 
risk of the alternatives is the modified risk, Rm. 
2 Risk benefit is the difference between the existing risk, Re and the modified risk, Rm. 
3 Initial costs, IC, and annual costs, AC, in the table indicate the cost difference from its respective 
base case; hence, when the required costs of alternatives are less then the costs of its respective 
base case, negative costs may result (as shown in the brackets). 
* N/A – Not applicable 
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Table  8-9: Ranking of the B/C ratios with Scenario 1 as the base case 
Rank B/C ratio Scenario 
Smoke 
detection 
system 
Sprinkler 
system 
FRR 
construction Transformer type 
----- N/A Scenario 1 Yes No 30 minute Mineral oil insulated transformer 
1 16.9  Scenario 6 Yes Yes 30 minute Mineral oil insulated transformer 
2 15.8  Scenario 7 Yes Yes 1 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
3 13.4  Scenario 8 Yes Yes 2 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
4 13.0  Scenario 9 Yes Yes 3 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
5 11.2  Scenario 10 Yes Yes 4 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
6 3.7  Scenario 4 Yes No 3 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
7 3.4  Scenario 5 Yes No 4 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
8 1.4  Scenario 3 Yes No 2 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
9 0.0  Scenario 2 Yes No 1 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
* N/A – Not applicable 
 
 
Table  8-10: Ranking of the B/C ratios with Scenario 4 as the base case 
Rank B/C ratio Scenario 
Smoke 
detection 
system 
Sprinkler 
system 
FRR 
construction Transformer type 
----- N/A Scenario 4 Yes No 3 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
1 1.9 Scenario 4a Yes No 3 hour Silicone oil insulated transformer 
2 1.7 Scenario 4b Yes No 3 hour Dry type  transformer 
* N/A – Not applicable 
 
 
Table  8-11: Ranking of the B/C ratios with Scenario 7 as the base case 
Rank B/C ratio Scenario 
Smoke 
detection 
system 
Sprinkler 
system 
FRR 
construction Transformer type 
----- N/A Scenario 7 Yes Yes 1 hour Mineral oil insulated transformer 
1 1.0 Scenario 7b Yes Yes 1 hour Dry type  transformer  
2 1.4 Scenario 7a Yes Yes 1 hour Silicone oil insulated transformer 
* N/A – Not applicable 
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8.5 Discussion 
 
Overall, it is found that scenarios with a sprinkler system, such as Scenario 6 to Scenario 10, 
would generally have higher C/B ratio than scenarios with no sprinkler protection, such as 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 5. As the results of the B/C analysis, Scenario 6 is found to be the 
economically best option and followed by scenarios having a higher FRR construction.  
 
In scenarios with sprinkler protection, it is found that the higher FRR construction would have 
the lower the B/C ratio, (The B/C ratio is reduced from 16.9 for Scenario 6 (FRR of 30 
minutes) to 11.2 for Scenario 10 (FRR of 4 hours). In scenarios without sprinkler protection, 
the scenario with a 3 hour FRR construction (Scenario 4) is considered to be the most cost-
effective solution in terms of occupants’ life safety consequence.  
 
In general, the results of the assessment agree with most of the regulation standards and the 
non-regulation guidelines as studied in the literature review section. The fire safety design 
options required by the standards and guidelines in Section  1.1 with respect to the 
corresponding B/C ratio determined are indicated in Table  8-12. 
 
Table  8-12: The ranking for the fire safety design options required in the standards and guidelines 
Option C/AS 1 NZFS NFPA BCA IEEE FM Global
Electricity 
provider (1) 
Electricity 
provider (2) 
1  9th 7th  6th N/A N/A 6th  8th 8th 
2  N/A N/A. 2nd 3rd N/A. 2nd  N/A 2nd 
* N/A = Not applicable 
 
It should be noted that the analysis consists of a certain amount of uncertainty, such as the 
cost of sprinkler systems and inspections are evaluated based only on engineering judgement. 
These costs may be different from one case to another. 
 
As known, a B/C ratio of greater than one implies the scenario is a beneficial investment 
whilst a B/C ratio less than one implies it is a loss investment. In this case, the B/C ratio for 
all scenarios is well above the critical value of one. This result not only shows that all 
alternative scenarios are beneficial investments, it also indicates that the alternative scenarios 
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are very cost-effective. The total risk for the first ten scenarios and their corresponding B/C 
ratio are shown in Figure  8-2.  
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Figure  8-2: Estimated total risk of the alternatives and their corresponding B/C ratio 
 
 
As can be seen, the total risk for the scenarios containing sprinkler systems, i.e. Scenario 6 to 
Scenario 10, is relatively low (The EMV is about NZD$30,000) compared to the scenarios 
without sprinkler systems, Scenario 1 to Scenario 5 (The EMV is about NZD$50,000). It 
should be noted that in the case of a sprinklered building, where the cost of extending the 
sprinkler system to the distribution substation is considered to be low compared to a non-
sprinklered building. It may result a higher B/C ratio for scenarios with sprinkler system due 
to the reduced cost. Further study may be required to carry on the comparison between the 
buildings with and without sprinkler protection. 
 
In the event of mineral oil insulated transformer fire in a distribution substation, large 
amounts of fuel is expected in the room due to the presence of oil. In such cases, if sprinkler 
systems are not installed, such as Scenario 1 to Scenario 5, low FRR construction is not 
considered to be sufficient to confine the fire. This concept is in agreement with the results of 
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the B/C analysis, where Scenario 2 (1 hour FRR and no sprinkler system) and Scenario 3 
(2 hour FRR and no sprinkler system) are both ranked near the bottom among the 9 
alternatives. On the other hand, if sprinkler systems are installed, such as Scenario 6 to 
Scenario 10, according to the results of the B/C analysis, a construction having a FRR of 30 
minute (Scenario 6) is considered to be the most cost-effective solution. 
 
In the second part of the B/C analysis, two other types of transformers replacing the 
flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer in a distribution substation are assessed. 
These are the less flammable liquid insulated (silicone oil) transformer and the dry type (dry 
air) transformer. As the results of the B/C analysis indicate, both these transformers are 
considered as a beneficial investment. This meant that replacing an existing mineral oil 
insulated transformer with a silicone oil or dry air insulated transformer is considered to be 
cost effective based on the B/C analysis presented in this report.  
 
It was found that the B/C ratio of less flammable liquid insulated transformers can be higher 
or lower than the B/C ratio of the dry type transformers depending on the existing fire safety 
design of the distribution substation. In the case of Scenario 4, as the base case, the scenario 
with the less flammable liquid insulated transformer has a higher B/C ratio. This result is 
considered to be reasonable since the dry type transformers are known as low hazard 
equipment and, thus, 3 hour FRR construction seems to be redundant. On the other hand, in 
the case of Scenario 7, as the base case, the scenario with the dry type transformer has a 
higher B/C ratio. 
 
Overall, it is found that using sprinkler system or replacing transformers with lower hazard in 
distribution substation can sufficiently reduce the fire risk to occupants in a high-rise building. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: 
 
? Fire safety design requirements for distribution substations are obtained from 
different standards and guidelines. However, the requirements in these documents are 
inconsistent. For a distribution substation containing a flammable liquid insulated 
transformer with no sprinkler system installed, the recommended fire separation 
constructions vary between 1 hour FRR and 4 hour FRR. When sprinkler systems are 
installed, the fire separation can generally reduce to 2 hour FRR or lower. Moreover, 
only one standard and one guideline provided the fire safety design of distribution 
substation containing less flammable liquid insulated transformers. As recommended, 
fire separation construction having a FRR of 1 hour or 3 hour is required in a non-
sprinklered distribution substation. When sprinkler systems are installed, no FRR 
constructions are required. Typically, a dry type transformer does not carry any a 
high hazard materials, hence, no fire separation constructions are required. 
 
? According to data provided by the NZFS FIRS [65], there were a total of 20 structure 
fires originating in distribution substations, in typical New Zealand buildings, during 
the 6 year period from January 2000 to January 2006. There were 13 fire incidents 
involving faults in the electrical wire and wiring insulation, and 4 fire incident having 
transformer and transformer fluid as the object first ignited. No fatalities were 
recorded for these fire incidents. In addition, it is found that the total number of 
distribution substations in New Zealand increased from about 24,000 in 1946 to 
about 170,000 in 2006.  
 
? The number of structure fires originating in switchgear areas or transformer vaults 
(distribution substation) and their consequences are obtained from the NFIRS. 
During the 22 year period from 1980 to 2002, an average of 1251 fires, 71 civilian 
injuries and 3 civilian deaths were recorded each year.  
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? The reliability of transformers and fire protection systems were studied in this 
research. Typical failure rates for transformers (fires may or may not occur) are 
found to be in the range of 0.2 x 10-3 to 140 x 10-3 failures per year. The reliability of 
smoke detection systems and sprinkler systems for general buildings were found to 
be in the range of 77.8% to 94% and 81.3% to 99.5%, respectively.  
 
? The statistical data used in this research may contain uncertainties due to the lack of 
information on the specified data for the fire safety protection systems, such as the 
reliability of smoke detection systems and sprinkler systems in distribution substation. 
Hence, further studies may be required for obtaining a more accurate result. 
 
? As a result of the Event Tree Analysis, the overall risks are obtained for a total of 14 
scenarios. The probability of the various consequences is calculated by multiplying 
the various branch probabilities of each factor and the consequences are determined 
based on the rates of civilian causalities in a fire and the value of statistical life 
(VSL). From literature, the value of statistical life is found to be $3 million for a 
death and $250,000 for an injury. As the result of the ETA analysis, Scenario 1, 
which contains the lowest level of fire safety design compared to the other scenarios, 
has the highest total risk, NZD$49,690 per transformer fire incident in a substation. 
As the level of fire safety increases, the total risk is expected to be reduced. Using the 
same type of transformer (Scenario 1 to Scenario 10), Scenario 10, which contains 
the highest level of fire safety design compared to the other scenarios, has reduced 
the total risk to NZD$32,370 per transformer fire incident in a substation.  
 
? From the Cost-Benefit Analysis, it is found that construction having a FRR of 4 hour 
and no sprinkler system installed, as proposed by the NZFS, is not considered to be 
the economically best option. As the result of the C/B ratio ranking, it is found that 
scenarios with a sprinkler system (Scenario 6 to Scenario 10) would generally have 
more cost benefit than scenarios without sprinkler system (Scenario 2 to scenario 5). 
Out of the nine scenarios having the same transformer type, Scenario 6 (sprinkler 
system provided/ 30 minutes FRR construction) is found to be the most cost effective 
scenario with a B/C ratio of 16.9. Moreover, in a non- sprinklered building, a 
scenario with 3 hours FRR construction (Scenario 4) is found to have the highest B/C 
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ratio (3.7). Note that the cost-benefit analysis in this research does not concern the 
property damage, business continuity or environment damage caused by transformer 
fires or fire extinguishments. 
 
As a result of this study, the following recommendations are offered: 
 
? The proposed four hour fire separation between the distribution substations and the 
interior spaces of the building, when no sprinkler system is provided, is not 
considered to be the most cost-effective alternative to the life safety of the building 
occupants.  
 
? From the life safety perspective, distribution substation in a high rise building is 
recommended to be protected by sprinklers and smoke detectors. If sprinkler system 
is provided, the FRR construction of the substation could be reduced to 30 minutes. 
If sprinkler system is not provided, construction may be required to have a higher 
FRR. As the result of the analysis, 3 hour FRR construction is determined to have the 
highest cost-benefit ratio in a non-sprinklered building. 
 
? In addition, replacing a flammable liquid insulated transformer with a less flammable 
liquid insulated transformer or a dry type transformer is generally considered to be 
economical alternatives. 
 
Future research is recommended in the following areas:  
 
? The 20 fire incidents in distribution substations, used in the report are not considered 
to be sufficient and representative. Further statistical analysis of indoor transformer 
fire incidents is recommended in order to obtain a more accurate result. 
 
? Conduct more detailed modeling to predict the environment conditions, the effect of 
toxic substances and effect of fires and explosions on building occupants.  
 
? Explosion hazards are one of the main concerns in the event of a transformer fire. 
Further studies may be required in this particular area. 
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? In addition to the occupant life safety as evaluated in this research, Clauses C1 – C4 
of the NZBC also requires the prevention of fire spread to adjacent properties and the 
protection of fire service personnel during fire rescue operations. To provide a 
complete assessment and recommendations on the fire protection for indoor 
distribution substation in residential buildings, further studies on these aspects is 
needed. 
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APPENDIX A: Transformer and Associated Equipment 
Appendix A1 - Site Visit (1): Christchurch city centre 
 
 
Figure A1.1: 750kVA mineral oil fluid transformer 
 
Figure A1.2: Circuit board 
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Figure A1.3: Cables terminal 
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Figure A1.4: High voltage switchgear 
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Figure A1.5: Low voltage switchgear 
 
 
Figure A1.6: Cable tray 
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Appendix A2 - Site visit (2): University of Canterbury 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1: 750kVA mineral oil fluid transformer on an oil containment 
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Pressure 
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Tap changer
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Figure A2.2: Oil insulated high voltage switchgear 
 
 
Figure A2.3: Low voltage switchgear 
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Figure A2.4: Wall opening in a distribution station  
 
 
Figure A2.5:  Combustible material (wooden board) in a distribution substation 
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APPENDIX B: Distribution Substation Fire Safety 
Protection Required by the NZFS 
 
1) Place transformers and switchgear in separate rooms within vaults (distribution 
substation). A fire resistance rating of not less than F60 (1 hour rating) should apply 
to these partitions and all openings and penetrations in them. 
 
2) Separate vaults (distribution substation) from the interior spaces of buildings by walls 
and floor/ceiling assemblies having fire resistance ratings not less than F240 (4-hour 
rating) with suitable fire resistance rated protection of all openings and penetrations. 
 
3) Provide direct exterior access to transformer vaults (distribution substation) by means 
of a full-sized door (minimum clear opening area of 800 x 2100mm) wherever possible. 
 
4) Cable penetrations in fire resistance rated walls separating other interior spaces of 
the building from the vaults (distribution substation) should occur within 1.0m of the 
floor to avoid placing openings near ceilings where smoke, flames and heated gases 
may accumulate and spread in a fire situation. 
 
5) No penetrations should be permitted in the floor/ceiling assemblies separating a vault 
(distribution substation) from upper floors, and if at all possible installations in 
basements should be avoided altogether. 
 
6) Cable feeds into equipment should be from the top rather than the bottom to avoid 
placing cables in an area where burning transformer oil or fire suppression water 
may pool. 
 
7) Transformers and switchgear should be installed on plinths or platforms above the 
floor level to prevent connections inside equipment cabinets from coming into contact 
with burning transformer oil or fire suppression water. 
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8) Bunding of sufficient capacity to contain the contents of the largest transformer and a 
quantity of fire suppression water equal to that expected for 20 minutes flow from 
manual or automatic appliances should be provided. 
 
9) Install a sump pit and suction connection to provide for the removal of oil and water 
from the room without the need for entry. 
 
10) In building protected by automatic sprinkler systems, provide automatic sprinkler 
protection for transformer rooms within vaults (distribution substation). Provide gas 
flood or water mist systems in switchgear room. 
 
11) Provide deflagration venting direct to the building exterior from transformer rooms 
within vaults (distribution substation) or design the room to withstand and contain the 
pressure developed from a transformer explosion within the space. 
 
12) In buildings without automatic fire sprinkler systems, no additional fire protection 
need be installed beyond that required by the New Zealand Building Code. 
Nevertheless, we strongly encourage “the company” to install automatic heat 
detection in these and subscribe to appropriate monitoring and notification services to 
obtain early warning of a fire that may affect the reliability of the distribution grid. 
 
New Zealand fire Service - Whakaratonga Iwi 
Christchurch, 
New Zealand 
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APPENDIX C: Statistical data of Transformer Fires in 
Distribution Substations 
 
The table below shows the statistical data for the number of distribution substations in New 
Zealand between 1946 and 1995 and the estimated number of distribution substations between 
1996 and 2006. Refer to the New Zealand Energy and Resources Division and Market 
Information and Analysis Group [70], the New Zealand Energy Modelling and Statistics Unit 
[71] and [72], and the New Zealand Ministry of Energy [73] 
 
Year ending 31st March Number of substations Year ending 31st March 
Number of 
substations 
1946 23559 1977 97961 
1947 24361 1978 101010 
1948 25271 1979 103586 
1949 26395 1980 106056 
1950 27795 1981 108581 
1951 28880 1982 111135 
1952 30350 1983 113548 
1953 31931 1984 116212 
1954 33787 1985 119159 
1955 36112 1986 121954 
1956 38277 1987 124864 
1957 40415 1988 119008 
1958 42643 1989 127262 
1959 44702 1990 128918 
1960 46911 1991 130948 
1961 49312 1992 134205 
1962 51838 1993 133692 
1963 54377 1994 135656 
1964 56645 1995 138695 
1965 58200 1996 141330 
1966 62318 1997 144015 
1967 65624 1998 146752 
1968 68687 1999 149540 
1969 71300 2000 152381 
1970 74847 2001 155277 
1971 78143 2002 158227 
1972 81677 2003 161233 
1973 84647 2004 164297 
1974 87839 2005 167418 
1975 90925 2006 170599 
1976 94671   
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The following tables show the data on distribution substation fire incidents recorded by the 
NZFS FIRS between 2000 and 2006 [65]. 
 
Number of fires 
Year Number of fires 
January 2000 - January 2001 4 
January 2001 - January 2002 0 
January 2002 - January 2003 5 
January 2003 - January 2004 4 
January 2004 - January 2005 3 
January 2005 - January 2006 4 
 
Monthly trends 
Month Number of fires 
January 3 
February 1 
March 1 
April 0 
May 1 
June 4 
July 3 
August 2 
September 1 
October 1 
November 1 
December 2 
 
Time of day 
Time period of day Number of fires 
23:00 ~ 03:00 3 
03:00 ~ 07:00 3 
07:00 ~ 11:00 5 
11:00 ~ 15:00 4 
15:00 ~ 19:00 2 
19:00 ~ 23:00 3 
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Supposed Causes 
Supposed causes Number of fires  
Electrical failure 12 60.0% 
Lack of maintenance 1 5.0% 
Equipment overloaded (includes electric 
cords serving too many appliances) 4 20.0% 
Mechanical failure or malfunction 2 10.0% 
Unknown 1 5.0% 
 
 
Primary ignition object 
Item First Ignited Number of fires   
Electrical wire, Wiring insulation 13 65.0% 
Transformer, Transformer fluids 4 20.0% 
Other known item first ignited 3 15.0% 
 
 
Equipment involved 
1 Equipment involved Number of fires   
Transformer & associated equipment - Circuit 
breakers associated with transformers 4 20.0% 
Transformer & associated equipment - Distribution 
type 7 35.0% 
Transformers & associated equipment - not classified 
above 1 5.0% 
Information not recorded 6 30.0% 
Other known equipment: Power cable, controlling 
switch 2 10.0% 
 
1 This provides a classification for the equipment that provided the heat that started the fire, or was 
involved in the release of hazardous substances; the equipment involved in the incident is to be listed 
when it is identified as providing the heat that started fire or was the cause of the incident; 
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Source of ignition (Heating source) 
1 Heat source Number of fires  
Short circuit arc 12 60.0% 
Arc from fault, loose or broken conductor 2 10.0% 
Heat from overloaded equipment 2 10.0% 
Other known heat source 4 20.0% 
 
1 This provides a classification for the form of heat energy igniting the fire e.g. flame, spark or hot 
surface 
 
Extent flame damage 
Extent of flame damage Number of fires 
No damage of this type 0 
Confined to object of origin 5 
Confined to room of origin 1 
Confined to structure of origin 6 
Unknown 8 
 
 
Extent smoke damage 
Extent of smoke damage Number of fires 
No damage of this type 3 
Confined to object of origin 1 
Confined to part of room or area of origin 1 
Confined to room of origin 2 
Confined to structure of origin 5 
Unknown 8 
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The table below shows the statistical data on the consequence of transformer fire incidents 
recorded in the NFIRS between 1980 and 2002 [66]. 
 
Direct Property Damage (Million) 
Year Number of transformer fires 
Number of 
Deaths 
Number of 
injuries (million NZ$)  (x1000 NZD$/ fire) 
1980 1890 15 48 52.0 27.5 
1981 1730 5 91 52.3 30.2 
1982 1770 0 50 54.2 30.6 
1983 1580 0 95 45.1 28.6 
1984 1650 0 174 49.3 29.9 
1985 1650 2 84 37.3 22.6 
1986 1520 8 94 46.5 30.6 
1987 1480 2 91 59.8 40.4 
1988 1280 4 69 67.5 52.7 
1989 1310 2 77 49.7 38.0 
1990 1240 5 72 45.9 37.0 
1991 1100 0 57 53.6 48.7 
1992 1260 0 121 55.5 44.1 
1993 1090 0 103 76.2 69.9 
1994 1180 1 85 31.5 26.7 
1995 1000 0 93 55.5 55.5 
1996 1000 0 35 42.5 42.5 
1997 990 6 26 45.3 45.7 
1998 1030 3 28 67.2 65.2 
1999 880 6 41 20.0 22.8 
2000 730 0 55 27.7 37.9 
2001 730 2 31 69.8 95.6 
2002 680 0 18 56.0 82.4 
Average 1250.9 2.7 71.2 50.5 40.3 
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APPENDIX D: Calculation of the Probability of Manual Fire 
Fighting Performance 
 
The probability that the Fire Service can control fires is found in Fontana et al. [100]. As 
stated, the probability that fire spread is stopped by fire firefighters for general buildings is in 
the range of 0.8 to 0.95. Since the research only provides details on the PMFF for commercial 
buildings, the ratio between the PMFF in different situation for commercial buildings is used to 
determine the PMFF for general buildings. The calculations are shown in Table D-1.  
 
1 Commercial building 
Firefighters' ability Early warning alarm 
PMFF_S 
(ta_a < 10 minutes)
Ratio 
PMFF_S 
(ta_a > 10 minutes) 
Ratio 
Professional Not provided 0.95 
0.95/0.95 
= 100% 0.85 
0.85/0.95  
= 89.5% 
Professional Provided 0.988 
0.988/0.95 
= 104% 0.963 
0.963/0.95  
= 101.4% 
1  The performance of PMFF is given for commercial building. Use it as a base and determined the ratio. 
 
General building 
Upper bound (PMFF = 0.95 where professional firefighter and no early warning alarm provided) 
Firefighters' ability Early warning alarm PMFF_S (ta_a < 10 minutes) PMFF_S (ta_a > 10 minutes) 
Professional Not provided 0.95 * 100% = 0.95 0.95 *  89.5% = 0.85 
Professional Provided 0.95 * 104% = 0.988 0.95 * 101.4% = 0.963 
General building 
Lower bound (PMFF = 0.80 where professional firefighter and no early warning alarm provided) 
Firefighters' ability Early warning alarm PMFF_S (ta_a < 10 minutes) PMFF_S (ta_a > 10 minutes) 
Professional Not provided 0.80 * 100% = 0.80 0.80 *  89.5% = 0.761 
Professional Provided 0.80 * 104% = 0.832 0.80 * 101.4% = 0.811 
 
Same approach is used to determine the probability of the non-professional firefighter 
controlling the fire. The overall results are shown in Table D-2 as follow: 
 
General building 
Firefighters' ability Early warning alarm 
PMFF_S  
(ta_a <10 min) 
PMFF_S  
(ta_a >10 minutes) 
Professional firefighters  Not provided 80.0% - 95.0% 71.6% - 85.0% 
Non-professional firefighters  Not provided 75.8% - 90.0% 67.4% - 80.0% 
Professional firefighters  Provide 83.2% - 98.8% 81.1% - 96.3% 
Non-professional firefighters  Provide 82.1% - 97.5% 71.6% - 85.0% 
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APPENDIX E: Probability Distribution of the Total Risk for 
each scenario 
 
Scenario 1: No sprinkler system, 30 minute FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.27602 47750 13180 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 1.000 0.06900 55300 3816 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.39659 47750 18937 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 1.000 0.11382 55300 6294 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.04461 48775 2176 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 1.000 0.01370 58650 804 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.05805 48775 2831 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 1.000 0.02821 58650 1654 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 49692 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             49,013  5%  $             49,311  
Maximum  $             50,446  50%  $             49,376  
Mean  $             49,693  95%  $             49,436  
Std Dev  $                  235      
 Distribution for Scenario 1 F ire risk
E M V /D196
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Scenario 2: No sprinkler system, 1 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident 
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.27602 47750 13180 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 1.000 0.06900 55300 3816 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.39659 47750 18937 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 1.000 0.11382 55300 6294 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.04461 48775 2176 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 1.000 0.01370 58650 804 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.05805 48775 2831 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 1.000 0.02821 58650 1654 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 49692 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             49,013  5%  $             49,311  
Maximum  $             50,446  50%  $             49,376  
Mean  $             49,693  95%  $             49,436  
Std Dev  $                  235      
 Distribution for Scenario 2 F ire risk
E M V /D197
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Scenario 3: No sprinkler system, 2 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident 
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.27602 47750 13180 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.200 0.01380 47750 659 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.800 0.05520 55300 3053 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.39659 47750 18937 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.200 0.02276 47750 1087 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.800 0.09106 55300 5035 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.04461 48775 2176 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.200 0.00274 48775 134 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.800 0.01096 58650 643 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.05805 48775 2831 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.200 0.00564 48775 275 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.800 0.02257 58650 1323 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 49334 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             48,779  5%  $             49,025  
Maximum  $             49,949  50%  $             49,079  
Mean  $             49,334  95%  $             49,126  
Std Dev  $                  190      
 D istribution for Scenario 3 F ire risk
E M V /D198
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Scenario 4: No sprinkler system, 3 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident 
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.27602 47750 13180 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.600 0.04140 47750 1977 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.400 0.02760 55300 1526 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.39659 47750 18937 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.600 0.06829 47750 3261 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.400 0.04553 55300 2518
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.04461 48775 2176 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.600 0.00822 48775 401 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.400 0.00548 58650 321 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.05805 48775 2831 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.600 0.01692 48775 825 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.400 0.01128 58650 662 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 48616 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $                48,311  5%  $             48,449  
Maximum  $                48,955  50%  $             48,482  
Mean  $                48,616  95%  $             48,506  
Std Dev  $                    102      
 Distribution for Scenario 4 F ire risk
E M V /D199
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Scenario 5: No sprinkler system, 4 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident 
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.27602 47750 13180 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.950 0.06555 47750 3130 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.200 0.050 0.00345 55300 191 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.39659 47750 18937 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.950 0.10813 47750 5163 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.223 0.050 0.00569 55300 315 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.04461 48775 2176 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.950 0.01302 48775 635 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.235 0.050 0.00069 58650 40 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.05805 48775 2831 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.950 0.02680 48775 1307 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.327 0.050 0.00141 58650 83 
          Total: 1.00000 Total: 47988 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $               47,886  5%  $             47,924  
Maximum  $               48,086  50%  $             47,937  
Mean  $               47,988  95%  $             47,946  
Std Dev  $                     37      
 D istribution for Scenario 5 F ire risk
E M V /D200
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Scenario 6: Sprinkler system, 30 minute FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.02375 47750 1134 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 1.000 0.00594 55300 328 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.03412 47750 1629 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 1.000 0.00979 55300 542 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.00384 48775 187 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 1.000 0.00118 58650 69 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.00499 48775 244 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 1.000 0.00243 58650 142 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32516 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $               30,988  5%  $             31,438  
Maximum  $               34,459  50%  $             31,621  
Mean  $               32,516  95%  $             31,759  
Std Dev  $                    711      
 D istribution for Scenario 6 F ire risk
E M V /D202
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Scenario 7: Sprinkler system, 1 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.02375 47750 1134 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 1.000 0.00594 55300 328 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.03412 47750 1629 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.000 0.00000 47750 0 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 1.000 0.00979 55300 542 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.00384 48775 187 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 1.000 0.00118 58650 69 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.00499 48775 244 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.000 0.00000 48775 0 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 1.000 0.00243 58650 142 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32516 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,988  5%  $             31,438  
Maximum  $             34,459  50%  $             31,621  
Mean  $             32,516  95%  $             31,759  
Std Dev  $                  711      
 D istribution for Scenario 7 F ire risk
E M V /D203
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Scenario 8: Sprinkler system, 2 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.02375 47750 1134 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.200 0.00119 47750 57 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.800 0.00475 55300 263 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.03412 47750 1629 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.200 0.00196 47750 94 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.800 0.00783 55300 433 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.00384 48775 187 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.200 0.00024 48775 11 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.800 0.00094 58650 55 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.00499 48775 244 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.200 0.00049 48775 24 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.800 0.00194 58650 114 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32485 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,986  5%  $             31,427  
Maximum  $             34,376  50%  $             31,607  
Mean  $             32,485  95%  $             31,743  
Std Dev  $                  698      
 D istribution for Scenario 8 F ire risk
E M V /D204
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Scenario 9: Sprinkler system, 3 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.02375 47750 1134 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.600 0.00356 47750 170 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.400 0.00237 55300 131 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.03412 47750 1629 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.600 0.00588 47750 281 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.400 0.00392 55300 217 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.00384 48775 187 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.600 0.00071 48775 34 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.400 0.00047 58650 28 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.00499 48775 244 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.600 0.00146 48775 71 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.400 0.00097 58650 57 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32423 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,981  5%  $             31,404  
Maximum  $             34,209  50%  $             31,580  
Mean  $             32,423  95%  $             31,712  
Std Dev  $                  671      
 D istribution for Scenario 9 F ire risk
E M V /D205
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Scenario 10: Sprinkler system, 4 hour FRR, Mineral oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.800 1.000 0.02375 47750 1134 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.950 0.00564 47750 269 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.200 0.050 0.00030 55300 16 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.777 1.000 0.03412 47750 1629 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.950 0.00930 47750 444 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.223 0.050 0.00049 55300 27 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.765 1.000 0.00384 48775 187 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.950 0.00112 48775 55 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.235 0.050 0.00006 58650 3 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.673 1.000 0.00499 48775 244 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.950 0.00231 48775 112 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.327 0.050 0.00012 58650 7 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32369 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,977  5%  $             31,386  
Maximum  $             34,063  50%  $             31,554  
Mean  $             32,369  95%  $             31,682  
Std Dev  $                  647      
 Distribution for Scenario 10 F ire risk
E M V /D206
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Scenario 4a: No sprinkler system, 3 hour FRR, Silicone oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.865 1.000 0.29845 47750 14251 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.135 0.949 0.04418 47750 2110 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.135 0.051 0.00239 55300 132 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.842 1.000 0.42976 47750 20521 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.158 0.949 0.07650 47750 3653 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.158 0.051 0.00415 55300 229 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.830 1.000 0.04840 48775 2361 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.170 0.949 0.00940 48775 459 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.170 0.051 0.00051 58650 30 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.738 1.000 0.06366 48775 3105 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.262 0.949 0.02144 48775 1046 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.262 0.051 0.00116 58650 68 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 47964 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             47,852  5%  $             47,899  
Maximum  $             48,074  50%  $             47,913  
Mean  $             47,964  95%  $             47,923  
Std Dev  $                   38      
 D istribution for Scenario 4a F ire risk
E M V /D208
 
V
al
ue
s 
in
 1
0
 ^-
3
V alues in Thousands
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
            
 M ean=47964.02 
47.85 47.9 47.95 48 48.05 48.1
@ RISK  Student V ersion
For A cademic U se Only
 5%  90% 5%
 47.8989  48.0246 
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Scenario 4b: No sprinkler system, 3 hour FRR, Dry type transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 31000 0 
2 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.910 1.000 0.31397 47750 14992 
3 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.090 1.000 0.03105 47750 1483 
4 0.855 1.000 0.403 0.090 0.000 0.00000 55300 0 
5 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.887 1.000 0.45273 47750 21618 
6 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.113 1.000 0.05768 47750 2754 
7 0.855 1.000 0.597 0.113 0.000 0.00000 55300 0 
8 0.145 0.000 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.00000 30300 0 
9 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.875 1.000 0.05102 48775 2488 
10 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.125 1.000 0.00729 48775 355 
11 0.145 1.000 0.403 0.125 0.000 0.00000 58650 0 
12 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.783 1.000 0.06754 48775 3294 
13 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.217 1.000 0.01872 48775 913 
14 0.145 1.000 0.597 0.217 0.000 0.00000 58650 0 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 47898 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             47,813  5%  $             47,839  
Maximum  $             47,976  50%  $             47,851  
Mean  $             47,898  95%  $             47,860  
Std Dev  $                   34      
 D istribution for Scenario 4b F ire risk
E M V /D209
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For A cademic U se Only
 5%  90% 5%
 47.8394  47.9531 
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Scenario 7a: Sprinkler system, 1 hour FRR, Silicone oil insulated transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
transformer 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.865 1.000 0.02568 47750 1226 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.135 0.010 0.00004 47750 2 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.135 0.990 0.00397 55300 219 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.842 1.000 0.03697 47750 1766 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.158 0.010 0.00007 47750 3 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.158 0.990 0.00687 55300 380 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.830 1.000 0.00416 48775 203 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.170 0.010 0.00001 48775 0 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.170 0.990 0.00084 58650 50 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.738 1.000 0.00548 48775 267 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.262 0.010 0.00002 48775 1 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.262 0.990 0.00192 58650 113 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32470 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,987  5%  $             31,418  
Maximum  $             34,296  50%  $             31,601  
Mean  $             32,470  95%  $             31,736  
Std Dev  $                  691      
 D istribution for Scenario 7a F ire risk
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Scenario 7b: Sprinkler system, 1 hour FRR, dry type transformer 
Outcome 
event No. SDS SS FAT MFF WBI 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
Consequence 
EMV (NZD$)  
Risk NZD$/ 
fire incident
1 0.855 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.78184 31000 24237 
2 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.910 1.000 0.02701 47750 1290 
3 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.090 1.000 0.00267 47750 128 
4 0.855 0.086 0.403 0.090 0.000 0.00000 55300 0 
5 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.887 1.000 0.03895 47750 1860 
6 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.113 1.000 0.00496 47750 237 
7 0.855 0.086 0.597 0.113 0.000 0.00000 55300 0 
8 0.145 0.914 ----------- ----------- 1.000 0.13213 30300 4004 
9 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.875 1.000 0.00439 48775 214 
10 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.125 1.000 0.00063 48775 31 
11 0.145 0.086 0.403 0.125 0.000 0.00000 58650 0 
12 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.783 1.000 0.00581 48775 283 
13 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.217 1.000 0.00161 48775 79 
14 0.145 0.086 0.597 0.217 0.000 0.00000 58650 0 
     Total: 1.00000 Total: 32361 
Note that the values above only show the mean values of the distributions. 
 
 
 
 
Simulation result from @Risk4.5 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Value %tile Value 
Minimum  $             30,976  5%  $             31,384  
Maximum  $             34,042  50%  $             31,550  
Mean  $             32,361  95%  $             31,678  
Std Dev  $                  643      
 Distribution for Scenario 7b F ire risk
E M V /D212
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APPENDIX F: Calculation of the Cost Benefit Ratio 
  
1 Existing risk, Re (NZD$) 
1 Modified risk, Rm (NZD$)
2 Risk benefit RB 
(NZD$) 
3 Initial costs 
IC (NZD$) 
3 Annual costs 
AC (NZD$) 
Interest 
rate, i 
Useful life 
time, N (Year) (P/A,i,n) 
B/C 
ratio Rank 
Scenario 1 (Base case 1) $49,692 $0 $0 $0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Scenario 2  $49,692 $0 $806 $0 7% 30 12.4 0.0 9 
Scenario 3  $49,334 $359 $3,106 $0 7% 30 12.4 1.4 8 
Scenario 4  $48,616 $1,077 $3,648 $0 7% 30 12.4 3.7 6 
Scenario 5  $47,988 $1,704 $6,307 $0 7% 30 12.4 3.4 7 
Scenario 6  $32,516 $17,177 $12,000 $850 7% 30 12.4 16.9 1 
Scenario 7  $32,516 $17,177 $12,806 $850 7% 30 12.4 15.8 2 
Scenario 8  $32,485 $17,208 $15,106 $850 7% 30 12.4 13.4 3 
Scenario 9  $32,423 $17,269 $15,648 $850 7% 30 12.4 13.0 4 
Scenario 10  $32,369 $17,323 $18,307 $850 7% 30 12.4 11.2 5 
Scenario 4 (Base case 2) $48,616 $0 $0 $0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Scenario 4a  $47,964 $652 $8,100 ($597) 7% 30 12.4 1.9 1 
Scenario 4b  $47,898 $718 $17,550 ($1,743) 7% 30 12.4 1.7 2 
Scenario 7 (Base case 3) $32,516 $0 $0 $0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Scenario 7a  $32,470 $45 $8,100 ($597) 7% 30 12.4 1.0 2 
Scenario 7b  $32,361 $154 $16,550 ($1,743) 7% 30 12.4 1.4 1 
1 Note that the estimated total risk of the base case is the existing risk, Re, and the estimated total risk of the alternatives is the modified risk, Rm. 
2 Risk benefit is the difference between the existing risk, Re and the modified risk, Rm. 
3 Initial costs, IC, and annual costs, AC, in the table indicate the cost difference from its respective base case; hence, when the required costs of alternatives 
are less then the costs of its respective base case, negative costs may result (as shown in the brackets). 
* N/A – Not applicable 
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